ASEAN, its parts, and its people

I complained recently that ASEAN is often unfairly maligned. I think one of the reasons is that it serves as a convenient target for criticism that actually should be directed elsewhere. 

In theory, everyone probably understands that ASEAN is an international, not a supranational, organization. Its members have to agree to do things. ASEAN can't order them to do things.

But when it is being exhorted, as it so often is, to move further, faster, and on a straighter course, the point somehow gets lost.

In assessing whether ASEAN’s community-building endeavours are “travelling on a bullet train or a horse-drawn cart”, this is a key consideration. There is no point in blaming ASEAN for delays that are actually the fault of particular member states or particular constituencies within those member states.  

This is a region of huge disparities. History has offered states lots of reasons to not trust their neighbours, and the intrusions of outside powers have often stirred the pot of mistrust even more. It is not always easy, even at the best of times, and with the best of intentions, to align your national interests with those of your very different neighbours in order to craft a community endeavour.

The societies within these disparate states are often riven by huge cleavages, too, making it equally difficult to sell those painfully crafted alignments to the wide array of constituencies at home. So the “parts” of the ASEAN cooperative effort become even more complex when its societies are added to the mix.

ASEAN's troubles are often ascribed to its elitism, and the Association is acutely aware that it needs to reach out to its people. This means, firstly, publicizing itself better, so that the region’s inhabitants are more aware of its possibilities and constraints, and secondly, fostering the kind of regional identification that will help ordinary people to see themselves as Southeast Asians, as well as Indonesians, Singaporeans, or whatever. The first of these two steps is costly, but relatively straightforward. The second is much more complex. And the two are not necessarily synergistic. Becoming more "people-centred", while necessary, is likely to make cooperation harder, not easier, at least in the short term.

“ASEAN? Is it useful for Indonesia, except [for getting] free visas?” – this is a very understandable question, and showing how it can be answered in the affirmative might well produce another ASEAN supporter. (Many of the people I talk to in Southeast Asia don’t know that much about ASEAN, and it is often judged on the basis of inadequate information.)

But this "what's in it for me" approach is premised on the idea that “ASEAN is good because it can be useful to me and to my country”. This is helpful in making the organization seem more meaningful. But what’s the logical next step? “How can we make sure ASEAN is more useful to my country – even though this may not necessarily be good for all the other countries?” or “How can we avoid the painful steps that other ASEAN countries think are useful for them, but don’t seem that great for us?”

It's a long leap to the follow-up question that would really help ASEAN: “How can ASEAN become more useful to the region as a whole – even if this involves sacrifices within my country in the short term?” What is needed to faciliate this response is smart policy on the part of individual governments – policy that can smooth the road for those who temporarily suffer for the sake of ultimate communal gain. But that can't be done by ASEAN.

Useful, too, as ASEAN Foundation head Makarim Wibisono points out, would be a sense of a common regional identity. Such an identity would mean that “if an Indonesian migrant worker is abused, we feel that it will affect ASEAN [rather than just Indonesia]. So far, we haven’t had such feeling.”

This is very true – these are precisely the kinds of problems that frequently drive strongly nationalistic popular responses. Nationalist outrage over some issue or another – often triggered by subjects that touch on cultural pride, but usually exacerbated by economic disparity – makes it even more difficult for governments to reach pragmatic cooperative solutions.

The impression is sometimes given that if we took Southeast Asia’s governments out of the picture, what would be left would be a peaceful and harmonious community of people. This is not borne out by the evidence.

Problems can usually be sorted out between governments, Makarim comments, because channels have been created for their regularized interaction and communication, and they know what to do to solve problems calmly. “But this is not the feeling of most people. So, it is important to intensify contact among the mass media, political parties, militaries and NGOs in ASEAN.” 

And, alongside increased contact, it is important, as Yayan GH Mulyana points out, to strive for the kind of “we-ness” that instinctively reaches for peaceful means to settle disputes. He looks forward to seeing the violent elements of nationalism “overcome by a constructive macro-nationalism”.

Fostering a regional outlook is not something that can be achieved overnight. But that's not all ASEAN's fault – such an outcome also needs governments, officials, and societies to climb on board.