Good news pick of the fortnight

As the Rabbit yields to the Dragon, the focus this week is on good news – or at least, less bad news.

• Kavi presents a more upbeat assessment of Cambodia’s potential as Chair of ASEAN (16 Jan). He notes its capacity “to reset the grouping's global standing and relations with all of its powerful dialogue partners”, and focuses on three areas in in which Cambodia can take the lead: narrowing the development gap; ensuring “that ASEAN will not become a pawn in the major powers’ competition”; and promoting cooperation within the Lower Mekong Initiative.
• Reports by Goldman Sachs and HSBC sparked upbeat headlines about the Philippines’ economic trajectory. “Philippines to leapfrog to be 16th largest economy by 2050” (13 Jan) and “Philippines may become key global growth driver” (16 Jan) are two such. Such predictions of good things to come have been made before, of course, and Michael Alan Hamlin examines whether anything might be different this time (25 Jan).
• And Myanmar keeps churning out the surprises, including a ceasefire with the Karen National Union and the release of further political prisoners. President Thein Sein has even given an interview (20 Jan).There may, of course, still be unpleasant surprises ahead, but Nicholas Farrelly (16 Jan) writes that “right now my very strong impression is that we need to give Burma’s decision-makers the full benefit of the doubt. Somebody, somewhere is doing their best to demonstrate goodwill. They are hoping that the world takes notice.” As he points out, the next top priority should be trying to forge peace with the Kachin Independence Army. Andrew Selth (24 Jan) offers a useful assessment of advances so far and challenges to come.
• Intriguingly, former diplomat David Brown (21 Jan) reports that “hopes of a deal between China and Vietnam are rising in the South China Sea”. Probably best not to hold our breath – nevertheless: “Eight months after trading threats, China and Vietnam are now huddled in negotiations over the northern section of the South China Sea, an expanse that no other nations claim.” This initiative could only be part of the solution to what is a much more convoluted problem, but a pragmatic step forward would be a useful precedent.
• And The Star (23 Jan) notes: “Malaysia and Indonesia have agreed on a permanent regional secretariat to look into issues of sustainable marine development, resources management, research and development projects and income improvement of coastal communities between the two countries.” OK, a secretariat is not exciting news, but it’s way better than some of the headlines on maritime and border issues we’ve seen between Indonesia and Malaysia in recent years.

China-SEA-US: infernal triangle and tenacious hash

I’m rarely a fan of Australian FM Kevin Rudd’s pronouncements, but I thought his speech to the Asia Society on 13 January struck a useful note. I could have done without the renewed harping on the Asia Pacific community (surely better to just let that go?), but the speech offered a reminder that “there is something in China's concept of a ‘harmonious world’ which the US, the rest of the region and the rest of the world can work with”. The idea “represents a Chinese attempt to accommodate a diversity of values, and a diversity of interests in the international order, and a commitment to peaceful dialogue, not sabre-rattling conflict, as a means of dealing with difference.”

Diversity is the key word here: “Major differences in the respective national interests and values systems of China and the United States will … be with us for the foreseeable future.” Nevertheless, these differences do not preclude “common strategic co-existence within the framework of agreed norms”.

Indeed, they don’t. The basic norms of international co-existence grew out of the need to manage difference, not eliminate it.

These norms of international society are not static. So Rudd is right to point out that China’s harmonious world concept is “compatible with the future evolution of the multilateral rules-based order”.

The word to emphasize, though, is evolution, as opposed to imposition. If norms are to evolve in a way that keeps key constituents on board, they have to be based on consensus, not domination. Achieving a genuine consensus means that everyone needs something resembling an equal voice. (International politics will never give everyone an equal voice – but it’s in the interests of the bigger ones to disguise that inequality as much as possible, and it’s in the interests of the very biggest to come up with some arrangement for sharing with the up-and-coming.)

Consensus and sharing are concepts that often seem at odds with the US playbook, however.

I was reminded of this again on reading a recent report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), entitled Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, which – according to Jim Lobe (12 Jan) – is “certain to be read carefully by regional specialists due to the close ties that exist between CNAS and the administration”.

As a whole, the report is nuanced, and many of the points are well made. M. Taylor Fravel, for example, makes the useful observation(p. 44) that “China has not been as assertive in this dispute as many observers contend,” and recalls (p.46): “A number of states – including China – have increased their efforts to claim, assert, exercise and enforce competing claims to maritime rights in the South China Sea… Although some observers focus on China as the primary antagonist, the competition stems from an increasing willingness of all claimants, especially Vietnam, to assert and defend their claims.” He warns (p. 47): “Looking forward, the United States must balance efforts to maintain stability in the South China Sea against actions that could inadvertently increase instability, especially greater involvement in the resolution of the dispute itself – an action that would be seen in the region and beyond as moving away from the principle of neutrality.” (And incidents such as this one surely don’t help in this context.) Ian Storey, on the other hand, does characterize China’s actions in the South China Sea as “increasingly assertive” and concerning, but emphasizes (p. 53), “China is not likely to try to resolve disputes in the South China Sea through military force, as the costs of doing so would greatly outweigh the benefits.”

The first chapter, however, by Patrick Cronin and Robert Kaplan, is rather more troubling. It's perhaps unfair to single out this particular contribution to what is a very wide discussion, but it conveniently exemplifies problematic themes that frequently lurk in the background of the debate.

The US’ aim in dealing with China and the South China Sea, the authors assert, should be cooperation – “but cooperation can best be advanced from a position of strength. This will require maintaining US strength and wider regional cooperation, a concept that might be called ‘cooperative primacy’” (p. 6). To this end, they recommend that the US strengthen its naval presence, “foster a new web of security partnerships”, put peace and security in the South China Sea “at the top of its diplomatic and security agenda”, promote further regional economic integration, and “get its China policy right. This will require active diplomatic and economic engagement backed by a strong U.S. military and a growing economy. A realistic policy begins by shoring up American power and then actively supports rules-based cooperation; it avoids military conflict but not diplomatic confrontation” (summary on p. 6; detail on pp. 20-26).

They rightly recognize that regional states are reluctant to choose between China and the US, and therefore there are “limits to what others can do” (p. 18).

But overall, empathy with the perceptions and predicament of others is not this chapter’s strong suit.

Primacy does not have to mean dominance, the authors insist. But what it does mean must appear equally worrying to China (and to many in SEA). Primacy “means that the United States retains its role as a regional power in order to shepherd its allies and partners into doing more on their own behalf. In this way, the balance of power can be maintained, even as the burden on the United States decreases” (p. 10). The role of the US should be to “encourage alliances and effective strategic partnerships between the Asia-Pacific states themselves, as another means of helping to shape a firm but cooperative environment for a rising China” (p. 21). Would China (and others) not be forgiven for finding this a tiny bit patronizing? Shepherding people and creating “firm but cooperative” environments sounds like what teachers and parents do. This doesn’t sound like the low-profile exercise of power that covers great-power functions with a semblance of legitimacy – it sounds more like wanting your own way.

Regardless of the semantics, the adoption of these proposals – beefing up the US navy, ratcheting the South China Sea right up the diplomatic priority list, surrounding China with this “new web of security partnerships”, and introducing economic arrangements that many experts argue will shut China out – could hardly fail to look pretty assertive, even aggressive, to the one on the receiving end.

The guts of the problem, it seems, is that “the South China Sea is where a militarily rising China is increasingly challenging American naval preeminence” (p. 7). Regardless of all the talk of protecting SLOCs for the good of all, this is the motivation that seems to come through most strongly. After all, “America’s reach should match its sprawling interests around the globe”. An apparently approving reference (p. 8) to an alternative idea of “building a grand coalition of the navies of all freedom-loving countries to relieve the United States of its maritime burden as its power wanes” gives the distinct impression that the real concern is not so much order at sea as the quest to ensure that the “right” kind of state has the upper hand. There is little empathy with the idea that China might also want its reach to match its increasing interests. And “freedom-loving” sounds way too much like code for “not China”.

There is also something weirdly disingenuous about the assertions on p. 14: “Once China has sufficient influence, the South China Sea will be for China what the Greater Caribbean (including the Gulf of Mexico) was for an emerging United States – a physical and symbolic manifestation of regional hegemony.” This is a very forthright admission that the US did to others what China is accused of perhaps contemplating now – a strangely inappropriate evocation of a blatant double standard. We did it – but you can’t. Of course, no-one in SEA wants China to play the kind of role the US did in its back yard – but taking for granted that China wants to, and that there is a predetermined path for rising powers (the one we trod), risks self-fulfilling prophecies, and reduces diplomatic room for manoeuvre.

Lastly, I can’t help but shudder at the advice on p. 21: “Nationalism in South China Sea countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia – as well as in countries further afield like India, Japan and Korea – may be the best basis for stitching together common interests in a loose, almost invisible network of like-minded and increasingly capable maritime states that are willing to help deflect Chinese hegemony.” Nationalism is SEA’s scourge. Even in its polite guise, it is one of the biggest factors militating against cooperation in the region, and its worst manifestations are irredeemably nasty. Anything that is stitched together on this basis risks being an unholy fabric indeed – and one that may well end up ensnaring the US itself.

In sum, it is not differences but US attitudes to differences that might preclude Rudd's “common strategic co-existence within the framework of agreed norms”.

Foreign ministers and think tanks aside, however, the region is still digesting the implications of the US “pivot”.

A couple of themes recur in the commentary. One is whether the US can sustain it in face of electoral and budgetary pressures. The other, more complex, set of considerations revolves around what it means for the region, and how regional players should respond.

Jamil Maidan Flores wonders (2 Jan): “Will it [the “pivot”] be just a military redeployment that creates tension or will it be a total re-engagement involving economic, social and cultural initiatives that do not exclude any country in the region? Much depends on how the United States finesses this geopolitical maneuver. Much also depends on China’s response and the ability of ASEAN and Indonesia to craft a situation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ among all players, including India, South Korea and Japan.”

Untung Suropati (15 Dec) puts Indonesia’s position quite starkly:  “The US will never let China play a bigger role in the Asia Pacific. China will continue to rise, playing a bigger role in the region every single day. It is up to Indonesia to determine how it would stand in the region. How we react to the Darwin arrangement would be crucial to how we position our country in the region.” Other Indonesian scholars voice similar concerns (11 Jan). Fearing that the US strategy would “trigger further reactions from China and potentially even Russia”, Bantarto Bandoro urges Indonesia to “take a stance that won’t be regarded as support for US policy in the Asia-Pacific. The Indonesian government must issue a statement telling the US that Obama’s new policy should not disrupt the situation and condition in the region.” Haryadi Wiryawan, stressing the importance of Indonesian diplomacy, predicts: “The tension in the region will escalate. China will not respond to this by doing nothing. Countries in the region will increase their military spending to anticipate further developments. Indonesia also needs to continually strengthen its defense.”

There is clear recognition (17 Jan) that China also confronts a dilemma – “the task of not only responding to the US resurgence, but also managing its assertive intentions and the need for regional stability and cooperation”.

And ASEAN faces an ongoing and increasingly delicate “balancing act”. As Yang Razali Kassim from RSIS points out (17 Jan): “The growing US presence in East Asia is bound to provoke a response from China, though initially Beijing has adopted an ambiguous position…  China’s muted official line, however, suggests Beijing’s fear of being cast as an aggressive rising power, though China's anxiety over the American pivot is likely to grow in intensity as the US steps up its reengagement in East Asia… How China reacts to ASEAN’s hedging depends on how Beijing perceives ASEAN in the context of the larger US pivot to East Asia. Is ASEAN seen as the extended arm of the US to contain China? ASEAN is highly sensitive to how it is viewed by a rising China. It does not want to be dragged into China's rivalry with the US - and ASEAN has a long historical memory.”

Even Australia is not immune from the soul-searching. Stephen Grenville writes: “The central task [of the team commissioned to draw up a White Paper on Australia in the Asian Century] is not to draw up a plan for getting ourselves into lock-step with the US 'pivot' into Asia. It is to change the Australian mindset so that we can take stock of how well we have made use of the opportunities given to us, as a small, rich technologically-advanced country on the edge of the world's most dynamic region. Do we ride the resources wave into the beach and then spread out a towel for a sunbake? Or do we address what seems to be a long list of missed or half-taken opportunities?”

I guess it would have happened sometime anyway, but the South China Sea has been a big catalyst in all this pivoting and agonizing. Its anagram is “tenacious hash”. How appropriate.

Rudd, Papua, Anwar, and ASEAN: The week in SEA

• There’s surely something bizarre in Kevin Rudd’s advice to firms to “wake up to Indonesia” (11 Jan) in the context of a continuing DFAT exhortation to “reconsider your need to travel”. Rudd “urged Australia's top 100 or so company boards to meet at least once a year in Jakarta ‘just to open their eyes to the new reality’.”
• Indonesian Vice President Boediono (12 Jan) has acknowledged the need for a different approach to Papua, insisting: “The people must be given a sense of safety, a sense of justice, not just be given new buildings.”
• A slew of comment greeted the acquittal of Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia. While welcoming the decision, many see significant potholes ahead. As Bridget Walsh points out: “Mr. Najib has to be able to show that the acquittal was a sign of strength, rather than one of weakness. Mr. Anwar on his part has to extend his reach beyond his base, and convince skeptics that his politics is not just about his persona or about being victimized.”
• There’s still lots of buzz about ASEAN’s economic potential. A bouncy article by Vincent Chin (9 Jan) proclaims: “The time is now, the place is ASEAN”. While acknowledging the difficulties inherent in realizing the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), he notes: “Momentum has been established, and a more conducive commercial environment has already been brought about. This is because businesses are being told that they can plan investments and jobs in a region that is getting more tightly interlinked. As major changes do come about, these firms will have real competitive advantages against their rivals… It's truly our turn now.”
• The governor of the bank of Thailand also warns against complacency (12 Jan): “Over the longer term, I also see it as very crucial that we address obstacles to integration at the root cause, which is the weak integration mindset... My concern is that many key stakeholders of ASEAN integration still view the AEC with cynicism – that life will go on, with few changes to the status quo. This complacency is very dangerous because we may wake up and find that we are already too late to catch the rising wave of ASEAN.”
• Meanwhile, moves to present ASEAN as a single tourist destination make sense both economically and in terms of bolstering SEA’s regional identity (12 Jan).
• The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration is supposed to be finalized this year. There has been heightened criticism of late that the process has so far failed to involve the full range of stakeholders.

Fun and the Philippines

Continuing last week’s Philippines theme, the country’s new tourism slogan – “It’s more fun in the Philippines” – has certainly proved fun for bloggers, tweeters, and FBers (8 Jan), despite its alleged “copycat” qualities (6 Jan).

Less entertaining are warnings of a possible terror attack on a religious procession (9 Jan), and the conservative end of the economic growth forecasts for the year (7 Jan):

“Economists have warned that without strong consumer spending and private investments, growth would remain at low levels and this would stymie government efforts to curb poverty and spread income opportunities, particularly among marginalized Filipinos. In its latest Philippine Quarterly Update (PQU), the World Bank said the country's GDP growth last year would be only 3.7 percent while growth in 2012 is projected to improve to 4.2 percent.”

Meanwhile, the Philippines “has protested a new ‘intrusion’ by China in waters it claims to be Philippine territory” (8 Jan).

Aileen San Pablo-Baviera noted recently (5 Jan) that “the Aquino government’s tougher posture towards China with regard to the South China Sea disputes is changing the atmospherics of this long-standing regional security issue”, but the jury is still out on whether this strategy will get better results than the process of non-confrontation espoused by the more traditional approach. Nor are all ASEAN states “comfortable” with the change:

“Manila appears convinced that it is time to move beyond mere confidence building to a resolution of the conflict, but the response from other ASEAN countries has been tepid… During the ASEAN summit in Bali in November 2011, Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto del Rosario challenged ASEAN to ‘play a decisive role…if it desires to realise its aspirations for global leadership’. However ASEAN Chair and Indonesian foreign minister Marty Natalegawa made it clear that the priority remains concluding a regional code of conduct with China… Some observers may find that the recent rhetoric and confrontational approach by Philippine officials deviate from the path of constructive diplomacy that ASEAN seeks to pursue with China. Moreover, the strong US presence that the Philippines envisions for the region’s maritime security may not be welcomed by all ASEAN states… The immediate challenge for the Philippines is persuading both ASEAN neighbours and China that the solidarity and support it seeks is not for promoting Philippine claims or for ganging up on China. The larger aim is to institute cooperative solutions addressing the roots of the conflict based on international law.”

If only its under-rated tourist potential were the Philippines' biggest headache. 

UPDATE (13 Jan): There's an interesting little reflection on the new tourism campaign here.

The Philippines and the world

Steven Rood from the Asia Foundation has just posted an interesting round-up (4 Jan) of last year's events in the Philippines. Despite the concerns that have been articulated about some of President Aquino’s tactics in the fight against high-level fraud and graft, citizens are, it seems, more optimistic than they’ve been for 25 years, and support for the president remains high.

That’s interesting, because the economy, according to Andrew James Masigan (26 Dec), isn’t doing too well: “What started out as a year filled with hope and optimism turned out to be quite the non-event—at least in as far as the national economy is concerned… Think tanks from all over the world agree that we’d be lucky to achieve a full year’s growth of 3.8 percent. Numbers show that they are probably right.” Among his New Year wishes, therefore, is for the government to “shift its focus on the economy and pursue its development with the same zeal it did [former President] Arroyo’s arrest”.

Pia Lee-Brago (28 Dec) offers a run-down of Philippines foreign affairs activities for the year. With so many overseas workers, and so many trouble spots, it is not surprising that repatriation has been a big theme. Not that workers necessarily want to head home: “At least 31 Filipino workers were led out of Libya in March but many decided to remain because of promised increase of salary if they stay, while others were told they would lose entitlement to gratuity pay equivalent to one full month’s salary if they do not finish their contracts. The OFWs were actually more concerned about the difficulty of remitting money to their family than the air strikes on different parts of Libya. They asked how the government could help them in their remittances.”

But the world also comes to the Philippines. The Philippine Daily Inquirer (5 Jan) notes that the country’s Business Process Outsourcing industry employs around half a million Filipinos, and has overtaken India to become “the world’s biggest provider of call center agents”. The labour secretary is therefore keeping a careful eye on proposed changes of legislation in the US that might negatively impact this sector.

Filipinos certainly need to be resilient. An opinion piece in Business World Online (3 Jan) notes that the Brussels-based Center for Research and Epidemiology Disasters puts the Philippines top of its listings of disaster-prone countries: “Based on an annual statistical review compiled by the group, the Philippines led the list of natural disasters with 24, making the country the hardest hit in terms of calamities that pose a serious threat to life and limb. A poor second was China with 16 disaster events.”

Disaster-preparedness could certainly be better, but as much richer countries have discovered, no-one is immune. All the more reason, then, as Steven Rood's commentary emphasizes, to focus attention on the man-made disaster that is corruption.

Old chair, new chair: Indonesia, Cambodia, and the need for a niche

Cambodia is the new ASEAN chair-for-a-year.

During the handover ceremony, PM Hun Sen said the country’s priorities for its time as chair included achieving the requisite ASEAN Community milestones, making progress on the Initiative for ASEAN Integration and the grouping’s connectivity plans, and enhancing cooperation with ASEAN Dialogue Partners and other regional entities. 

The Southeast Asia Globe reports (28 Dec): “Last month, Cambodian foreign minister Hor Namhong said that, as chair of the regional body, Cambodia would attempt to improve relations between ASEAN and China, which will donate $10 billion in aid to the region.” Chheang Vannarith, meanwhile, from the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, predicts that one of Cambodia’s challenges “would be the continuing strategic competition between China and the United States, as well as the economic implications of this struggle. ‘The region should court both countries,’ he said.”

How this will mesh with predicted Chinese moves “to bring back the charm” will be interesting to watch.

Cambodia is kicking off a series of chairmanships by smaller and/or more politically conservative states. Not surprisingly, therefore, its performance as chair figures on Jamil Maidan Flores’s “watch list” for the year (2 Jan):  “Artillery duels at the disputed border area are not likely to erupt between Cambodia and Thailand during the year, but a lot of work needs be done by way of ASEAN community-building and sustaining a regional architecture in which China and the United States are involved. Cambodia will need all the help it can get from the rest of the ASEAN family, especially Indonesia.”

Apparently thinking along the same lines, Indonesian FM Marty Natalegawa made it abundantly clear in his annual statement to the press (4 Jan) that Indonesia will not be renouncing its leadership role along with its chair status:

“As Chair of ASEAN in 2011, Indonesia is determined that its contribution goes beyond the period of its chairmanship. Indeed, during the four decades of ASEAN’s journey, every time Indonesia served as ASEAN Chair, Indonesia always marked its chairmanship by taking ASEAN to a higher level…

“In 2012, Indonesia will ensure the continuation of the three ASEAN priorities set by Indonesia in 2011 as endorsed by ASEAN member states.

“Some major issues which are of great interests for Indonesia in 2012 are: making progress in the discussions on the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea; managing potential conflicts in the region; development of democracy and reconciliation in Myanmar; completion of the accession to the SEANWFZ Protocol by the Nuclear-Weapon-States; enhancement of maritime cooperation; implementation of a regional mechanism for disaster management, food security, energy security and economic sustainability of the region; ASEAN Connectivity; strengthening of the Bali Principles; and a Plan of Action of the Bali Concord III.”

As the region’s undisputed heavyweight, Indonesia is always going to be SEA’s indispensable nation. How it plays that hand – the degree to which it proves able to juggle internal and external pressures, and material and ideological constraints and opportunities – will be crucial in determining whether Cambodia’s chosen theme for the year (“ASEAN: One Community, One Destiny”) moves closer to being a reality.

But there’s another crucial difference in the two chairs’ beginnings. Indonesia – democratic backslidings notwithstanding – was still riding pretty high in the world’s press at the beginning of last year. Many Indonesians might have been thoroughly fed up by then with SBY’s performance, but the world at large, it seemed, was not. It suited many quarters to give Indonesia and its ASEAN role the benefit of the doubt.

Hun Sen and Cambodia start with distinctly less fanfare. Commentaries warn of “challenges ahead”, and the nation’s turn as chair is rather ominously seen as “a chance to gain credibility in the international community”.

Clearly, it’s not going to be an easy ride for Cambodia. As a small and poor country, it has to find its leadership niche – which will be very different from Indonesia’s.  And being much less of a democratic poster-child, it will have to contend with much more generalized hostility.

Yet, attempting an early reframing in September 2011, Ernest Bower presents Hun Sen as “a pragmatist and realist”, and writes of the need “to uncover new opportunities for alignment with Cambodia”. 

This plea for a tempered approach is not only relevant to the US. It is in everyone’s interests to make Cambodia’s turn in the sun a warming experience, not a roasting one.