China-SEA-US: infernal triangle and tenacious hash

I’m rarely a fan of Australian FM Kevin Rudd’s pronouncements, but I thought his speech to the Asia Society on 13 January struck a useful note. I could have done without the renewed harping on the Asia Pacific community (surely better to just let that go?), but the speech offered a reminder that “there is something in China's concept of a ‘harmonious world’ which the US, the rest of the region and the rest of the world can work with”. The idea “represents a Chinese attempt to accommodate a diversity of values, and a diversity of interests in the international order, and a commitment to peaceful dialogue, not sabre-rattling conflict, as a means of dealing with difference.”

Diversity is the key word here: “Major differences in the respective national interests and values systems of China and the United States will … be with us for the foreseeable future.” Nevertheless, these differences do not preclude “common strategic co-existence within the framework of agreed norms”.

Indeed, they don’t. The basic norms of international co-existence grew out of the need to manage difference, not eliminate it.

These norms of international society are not static. So Rudd is right to point out that China’s harmonious world concept is “compatible with the future evolution of the multilateral rules-based order”.

The word to emphasize, though, is evolution, as opposed to imposition. If norms are to evolve in a way that keeps key constituents on board, they have to be based on consensus, not domination. Achieving a genuine consensus means that everyone needs something resembling an equal voice. (International politics will never give everyone an equal voice – but it’s in the interests of the bigger ones to disguise that inequality as much as possible, and it’s in the interests of the very biggest to come up with some arrangement for sharing with the up-and-coming.)

Consensus and sharing are concepts that often seem at odds with the US playbook, however.

I was reminded of this again on reading a recent report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), entitled Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, which – according to Jim Lobe (12 Jan) – is “certain to be read carefully by regional specialists due to the close ties that exist between CNAS and the administration”.

As a whole, the report is nuanced, and many of the points are well made. M. Taylor Fravel, for example, makes the useful observation(p. 44) that “China has not been as assertive in this dispute as many observers contend,” and recalls (p.46): “A number of states – including China – have increased their efforts to claim, assert, exercise and enforce competing claims to maritime rights in the South China Sea… Although some observers focus on China as the primary antagonist, the competition stems from an increasing willingness of all claimants, especially Vietnam, to assert and defend their claims.” He warns (p. 47): “Looking forward, the United States must balance efforts to maintain stability in the South China Sea against actions that could inadvertently increase instability, especially greater involvement in the resolution of the dispute itself – an action that would be seen in the region and beyond as moving away from the principle of neutrality.” (And incidents such as this one surely don’t help in this context.) Ian Storey, on the other hand, does characterize China’s actions in the South China Sea as “increasingly assertive” and concerning, but emphasizes (p. 53), “China is not likely to try to resolve disputes in the South China Sea through military force, as the costs of doing so would greatly outweigh the benefits.”

The first chapter, however, by Patrick Cronin and Robert Kaplan, is rather more troubling. It's perhaps unfair to single out this particular contribution to what is a very wide discussion, but it conveniently exemplifies problematic themes that frequently lurk in the background of the debate.

The US’ aim in dealing with China and the South China Sea, the authors assert, should be cooperation – “but cooperation can best be advanced from a position of strength. This will require maintaining US strength and wider regional cooperation, a concept that might be called ‘cooperative primacy’” (p. 6). To this end, they recommend that the US strengthen its naval presence, “foster a new web of security partnerships”, put peace and security in the South China Sea “at the top of its diplomatic and security agenda”, promote further regional economic integration, and “get its China policy right. This will require active diplomatic and economic engagement backed by a strong U.S. military and a growing economy. A realistic policy begins by shoring up American power and then actively supports rules-based cooperation; it avoids military conflict but not diplomatic confrontation” (summary on p. 6; detail on pp. 20-26).

They rightly recognize that regional states are reluctant to choose between China and the US, and therefore there are “limits to what others can do” (p. 18).

But overall, empathy with the perceptions and predicament of others is not this chapter’s strong suit.

Primacy does not have to mean dominance, the authors insist. But what it does mean must appear equally worrying to China (and to many in SEA). Primacy “means that the United States retains its role as a regional power in order to shepherd its allies and partners into doing more on their own behalf. In this way, the balance of power can be maintained, even as the burden on the United States decreases” (p. 10). The role of the US should be to “encourage alliances and effective strategic partnerships between the Asia-Pacific states themselves, as another means of helping to shape a firm but cooperative environment for a rising China” (p. 21). Would China (and others) not be forgiven for finding this a tiny bit patronizing? Shepherding people and creating “firm but cooperative” environments sounds like what teachers and parents do. This doesn’t sound like the low-profile exercise of power that covers great-power functions with a semblance of legitimacy – it sounds more like wanting your own way.

Regardless of the semantics, the adoption of these proposals – beefing up the US navy, ratcheting the South China Sea right up the diplomatic priority list, surrounding China with this “new web of security partnerships”, and introducing economic arrangements that many experts argue will shut China out – could hardly fail to look pretty assertive, even aggressive, to the one on the receiving end.

The guts of the problem, it seems, is that “the South China Sea is where a militarily rising China is increasingly challenging American naval preeminence” (p. 7). Regardless of all the talk of protecting SLOCs for the good of all, this is the motivation that seems to come through most strongly. After all, “America’s reach should match its sprawling interests around the globe”. An apparently approving reference (p. 8) to an alternative idea of “building a grand coalition of the navies of all freedom-loving countries to relieve the United States of its maritime burden as its power wanes” gives the distinct impression that the real concern is not so much order at sea as the quest to ensure that the “right” kind of state has the upper hand. There is little empathy with the idea that China might also want its reach to match its increasing interests. And “freedom-loving” sounds way too much like code for “not China”.

There is also something weirdly disingenuous about the assertions on p. 14: “Once China has sufficient influence, the South China Sea will be for China what the Greater Caribbean (including the Gulf of Mexico) was for an emerging United States – a physical and symbolic manifestation of regional hegemony.” This is a very forthright admission that the US did to others what China is accused of perhaps contemplating now – a strangely inappropriate evocation of a blatant double standard. We did it – but you can’t. Of course, no-one in SEA wants China to play the kind of role the US did in its back yard – but taking for granted that China wants to, and that there is a predetermined path for rising powers (the one we trod), risks self-fulfilling prophecies, and reduces diplomatic room for manoeuvre.

Lastly, I can’t help but shudder at the advice on p. 21: “Nationalism in South China Sea countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia – as well as in countries further afield like India, Japan and Korea – may be the best basis for stitching together common interests in a loose, almost invisible network of like-minded and increasingly capable maritime states that are willing to help deflect Chinese hegemony.” Nationalism is SEA’s scourge. Even in its polite guise, it is one of the biggest factors militating against cooperation in the region, and its worst manifestations are irredeemably nasty. Anything that is stitched together on this basis risks being an unholy fabric indeed – and one that may well end up ensnaring the US itself.

In sum, it is not differences but US attitudes to differences that might preclude Rudd's “common strategic co-existence within the framework of agreed norms”.

Foreign ministers and think tanks aside, however, the region is still digesting the implications of the US “pivot”.

A couple of themes recur in the commentary. One is whether the US can sustain it in face of electoral and budgetary pressures. The other, more complex, set of considerations revolves around what it means for the region, and how regional players should respond.

Jamil Maidan Flores wonders (2 Jan): “Will it [the “pivot”] be just a military redeployment that creates tension or will it be a total re-engagement involving economic, social and cultural initiatives that do not exclude any country in the region? Much depends on how the United States finesses this geopolitical maneuver. Much also depends on China’s response and the ability of ASEAN and Indonesia to craft a situation of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ among all players, including India, South Korea and Japan.”

Untung Suropati (15 Dec) puts Indonesia’s position quite starkly:  “The US will never let China play a bigger role in the Asia Pacific. China will continue to rise, playing a bigger role in the region every single day. It is up to Indonesia to determine how it would stand in the region. How we react to the Darwin arrangement would be crucial to how we position our country in the region.” Other Indonesian scholars voice similar concerns (11 Jan). Fearing that the US strategy would “trigger further reactions from China and potentially even Russia”, Bantarto Bandoro urges Indonesia to “take a stance that won’t be regarded as support for US policy in the Asia-Pacific. The Indonesian government must issue a statement telling the US that Obama’s new policy should not disrupt the situation and condition in the region.” Haryadi Wiryawan, stressing the importance of Indonesian diplomacy, predicts: “The tension in the region will escalate. China will not respond to this by doing nothing. Countries in the region will increase their military spending to anticipate further developments. Indonesia also needs to continually strengthen its defense.”

There is clear recognition (17 Jan) that China also confronts a dilemma – “the task of not only responding to the US resurgence, but also managing its assertive intentions and the need for regional stability and cooperation”.

And ASEAN faces an ongoing and increasingly delicate “balancing act”. As Yang Razali Kassim from RSIS points out (17 Jan): “The growing US presence in East Asia is bound to provoke a response from China, though initially Beijing has adopted an ambiguous position…  China’s muted official line, however, suggests Beijing’s fear of being cast as an aggressive rising power, though China's anxiety over the American pivot is likely to grow in intensity as the US steps up its reengagement in East Asia… How China reacts to ASEAN’s hedging depends on how Beijing perceives ASEAN in the context of the larger US pivot to East Asia. Is ASEAN seen as the extended arm of the US to contain China? ASEAN is highly sensitive to how it is viewed by a rising China. It does not want to be dragged into China's rivalry with the US - and ASEAN has a long historical memory.”

Even Australia is not immune from the soul-searching. Stephen Grenville writes: “The central task [of the team commissioned to draw up a White Paper on Australia in the Asian Century] is not to draw up a plan for getting ourselves into lock-step with the US 'pivot' into Asia. It is to change the Australian mindset so that we can take stock of how well we have made use of the opportunities given to us, as a small, rich technologically-advanced country on the edge of the world's most dynamic region. Do we ride the resources wave into the beach and then spread out a towel for a sunbake? Or do we address what seems to be a long list of missed or half-taken opportunities?”

I guess it would have happened sometime anyway, but the South China Sea has been a big catalyst in all this pivoting and agonizing. Its anagram is “tenacious hash”. How appropriate.