More on the non-communiqué

So we don’t have a communiqué, but we do now have a statement on “ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea”.

The dust has still to settle, however.

Bunn Nagara adopts a phlegmatic stance, accusing us all of worrying far too much over this blessed communiqué.

I disagree with him here – I think it’s an important wake-up call to all ASEAN’s member countries to keep a sharp eye out for divide-and-rule and unite-and-rule tactics, both from inside and outside the Association.

But I do agree with him on this point:

“Cynics predicting doom-and-gloom scenarios for ASEAN forget that its watchword has always been ‘resilience’, as supported by its near-half-century record. ASEAN is made of sterner stuff, to which its experience testifies. But ASEAN is also not immune to the pitfalls of complacency. Failure to do what is needed now can escalate current challenges and lead to more problems in the future.”

His pull-no-punches comments on Philippines diplomacy (to some extent backed by domestic players) also make a refreshing change from the “it’s all China’s fault” narratives.

And in his conclusion, he’s surely right on the money:

“Disputes are also best settled, or can only be settled, through negotiations or arbitration. Souring the atmosphere by making diplomacy difficult only makes things worse for everyone. With China, it has been said that upping the ante only strengthens the hand of hardliners in Beijing. Most ASEAN countries are wise enough to steer clear of that approach, however much of a rush it may give some politicians playing to the gallery at home.”


UPDATE 24 July: Simon Tay always strikes a good balance on this issue. He suggests agreeing on “a form of words about the South China Sea” – something akin to the form of words over the “one-China” principle, which “has helped frame a range of differences that is understood (but not conceded) by each party”. Such a move would reduce the likelihood that communiqués would be held hostage by a single issue, as has so painfully been the case recently. But he also warns that “each ASEAN member must be willing to keep the group's interest as a whole in view, and not focus solely on its bilateral ties with China or America. Otherwise ASEAN will not only fail to be neutral, but be ineffective and indeed neutered.”

On trying to see it China's way

Here’s a great post by Sam Roggeveen of The Interpreter. It addresses a failure I observe time after time in contemporary commentary – a failure to try to understand how things look from China’s point of view.

Now admittedly, this is hard. “China” doesn’t always speak with one voice.

But it is nevertheless a vital element that a lot of commentators, obsessively gnawing away at China's rise and its implications for “us”, just don’t seem to get.

“Understanding” does not mean placating, or excusing the inexcusable in China’s often tone-deaf diplomacy. It just means taking the time and imaginative effort to see the world from China's corner.

As Roggeveen concludes: “To manage the transition away from American dominance, we've got to try harder to understand China's point of view.”

Yes, yes, and yes.

Myanmar's three big Es

A propos of the event I noted last month, and my own recent (tourist) visit to Myanmar, here’s a selection of snippets from the last few months.

Three “big Es” are prominent: expectations, economics, and ethnicity.

Not surprisingly, the expectations thread is still strong, with multiple calls for nuance, careful observation, and open-mindedness in assessing the challenges and opportunities:

Jim Della-Giacoma (19 March): “What is now self-evident is that the bicameral Union Assembly is taking a life of its own and it is not just the 'rubber stamp' legislature many imagined it would be.”

Yangon correspondent (26 March): “At the centre of the increasingly vibrant parliament sits one figure: Thura Shwe Mann, the former number three in the military junta and now speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw… Against most expectations … he has emerged as the strongest advocate for the strengthening of the parliamentary system and its independence from government…”

Thomas Carothers (2 April): “Burma is experiencing a striking and largely unpredicted political opening… When I visited Burma last month, it was impossible not to be struck by the powerful sense among many Burmese that this is an enormous moment for the country, a political opportunity that many barely dared to hope for over the last twenty years. Encouraging as they are, however, these developments represent only a doorway to a possible democratic transition… So political opening? Yes. Economic reform? Likely. Democratic transition? Too early to tell…”

Hamish McDonald (April): “The simple paradigm of a revered democracy advocate holding out in her enforced isolation against a brutal, reform-resistant military now needs to be abandoned. The outside world must engage with a more complex political situation, judiciously supporting reformers and good policy in both government and opposition (p.2).”

Transnational Institute Burma Policy Briefing (June): “Once the genie of change is out of the bottle – especially in a failed or repressed state – dynamics are released that can engender new crises as well as fresh opportunities in addressing national challenges that have long needed resolution. As a result, very unexpected outcomes can occur…”

Assessments of the potential wider regional impact of Myanmar's recent moves also reflect a range of expectations:

Lina Gong (March): “The success of the reforms in Myanmar has important ramifications not just for the country, but also for stability and development in the region.”

Pavin Chachavalpongpun (April): “ASEAN is locked in a strategic tug-of-war with China over Myanmar.”

Marwaan Macam-Markar (11 April): “In easing the pressure off a reforming Myanmar, ASEAN will lay open the democratic deficits of its other members who have not been exposed for their harsh treatment of opposition figures, of suppressing the media or refusing the rights of political and civil liberties.”

Thitinan Pongsudhirak (29 May): “The immediate implication for the ASEAN neighbourhood centres on democratisation… If democracy in Myanmar continues to go from strength to strength, the pressure to democratise in other ASEAN states will surely grow. Myanmar’s progress will advertise the benefits of reform to authoritarian regimes.”

But increasingly, Myanmar’s future seems dominated by two other “big Es”. One is economics. Again, caution is a dominant note in the commentary: 

The Asialink Conversations, held in Yangon, 2-4 February: “Myanmar currently has a large underground, or informal, economy and it is estimated that more than 50 percent of trade is not recorded… Although the ASEAN Economic Community represents an opportunity for Myanmar to undertake reforms in line with regional standards, some acknowledge that ‘our government is only 10 months old and the problems are 60 years old. They can’t be solved overnight and we need a lot of assistance’ [p. 9]”…

Vikram Nehru (23 April): “The exchange rate reform was just the first salvo in what many anticipate will be a steady effort to overhaul the economy and build incentives and institutions for sustained and inclusive growth… The danger is not that Myanmar will do too little, but that it may be asked to do too much… A rush to reform may cause instability that could be seized upon by reform opponents to rewind the clock and go back to the bad old ways.”

Thomas Parks (9 May): “The hotels in Yangon are packed with international aid professionals… But in these heady days of Burma’s opening up to the world, let’s not forget the risks and lessons from scaling up the level of foreign aid too quickly… There are a few basic lessons from the past that should be kept in mind at this early stage, as the international community has an opportunity to get things right in Burma…”

John Riady (10 May): “The best ASEAN foreign policy toward Burma is paradoxically domestic growth and prudent policy-making. By itself of course this is not sufficient – we must continue to engage Burma and make sure the ‘dividends of reform’ are felt by its citizens. But setting a good example is ultimately what will keep the pressure for reform alive.”

Khin Omar (5 June): “The giddy promise of investment and re-engagement with Burma is blinding the West, as well as its Asian neighbors, to the realities of the once-pariah nation… Foreign investors should wait until the nation is reconciled before proceeding with the unabated enthusiasm currently on display.”

Helen James (7 June): “Economic prosperity does not, in itself, presage an evolutionary trajectory toward democratic governance, but it is certain that poverty breeds the conditions in which repression, dictatorship and corruption flourish – and that all of these are precursors of human rights abuse.”

A third big E is ethnicity. Ethnic issues exploded into the news recently with the upsurge in communal violence in western Myanmar. But the urgent need to reach viable long-term solutions that are acceptable to all Myanmar's people forms a constant backdrop to the whole political process:

Transnational Institute Burma Policy Briefing (February): “Peace must be understood as an overarching national issue, which concerns citizens of all ethnic groups in the country, including the Burman majority.”

Kyaw San Wai (21 February): “A ‘trust deficit’ exists between the government and ethnic minority groups who remain sceptical, as they do not perceive a fundamental change in the power structure… [M]ost of the majority Bamar are unaware of, and often unable to fathom the sentiments behind ethnic grievances. For the minorities, vivid recollections of unequal and often violent treatment serve as stark reminders to be wary of both the military and the Bamar. These grievances can easily be exploited to turn into hatred.”

Nicholas Farrelly (6 June) presents a collection of links on the Kachin War.

ICG (12 June): “The communal bloodshed in Myanmar’s Rakhine State represents both a consequence of, and threat to, Myanmar’s current political transition. While communal tensions and discrimination against Myanmar’s Muslim minority long predate the country’s recent opening up, the loosening of authoritarian constraints may well have enabled this current crisis to take on a virulent intensity. Equally, failure to both halt the crisis and address its underlying causes risks halting or even eroding Myanmar’s current reform initiatives…”

Francis Wade (21 June): “The UN reports that sectarian violence over the past fortnight in western Burma has displaced 90,000 people. The figure is higher than the total for Kachin state in Burma’s north, which for more than a year has played host to armed conflict.”

And the fact that small political openings do not translate automatically and directly into ethnic tolerance or responsible reporting is no doubt obvious, but is still worth noting (June and July).

There’s actually a fourth big E hanging over Myanmar's future, too – education – and there are some interesting updates here. But more on that another time...

That missing communiqué

ASEAN’s unprecedented failure to agree on a communiqué after the foreign ministers’ meeting last week, because of problems finding acceptable wording on the South China Sea (SCS) issue, is still provoking plenty of commentary.

For Ernest Bower, it’s all China's fault:

“Fundamentally, the chaos at the ASEAN meeting was an outcome cynically manipulated and abetted by a China that has decided that a weak and divided ASEAN is in its national interests.

“Understanding the fact that China has decided to undermine ASEAN unity and the fact that ASEAN has the capacity and commitment to overcome this shortsighted campaign to break its ranks is a necessary condition for advising policy-makers in Manila to avoid the trap of underinvesting in ASEAN. They should continue joining countries that push to advance regional structures that will promote peace, security and prosperity in the Asia Pacific to strengthen ASEAN…

“Filipinos should know what happened in Phnom Penh and understand that the message from Cambodia is not ‘ASEAN is messy and we should proceed carefully and reduce our engagement and investment,’ but rather ‘ASEAN unity is not supported by China and this is an indication we need to redouble our efforts to engage and support ASEAN’s goals for unity.’”

Tan Seng Chye, on the other hand, names no individual countries. But by emphasizing ASEAN as a “neutral platform”, and presenting the SCS as a distraction from the main purpose of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), he clearly points towards the Philippines and Viet Nam.

“What happened at the recent AMM should be taken seriously by ASEAN as a wake-up call. For the first time certain individual ASEAN countries were prepared to pursue their own interest to the extent of disregarding ASEAN’s cohesion and the practice of finding a compromise for ASEAN’s common interests. This issue has become more challenging for ASEAN because of the emerging big power rivalry in the region including in the SCS…

“Over the years, ASEAN has been able to establish its importance and relevance as a neutral platform and a convenor [italics added] for the major powers to meet with ASEAN countries and among themselves…

“The new era of emerging big power rivalry in the region involves the US’ enhanced engagement in the Asia region and its pivot or re-balancing of its military forces to Asia Pacific as well as China’s response to the US strategy to conscribe it. This rivalry has an impact on ASEAN... 

“The AMM has been distracted from its main purpose and objectives by the SCS disputes which would not be resolved for a long time to come… Looking forward, ASEAN should review what has happened at the AMM and in recent times and consider how it can regain its cohesion and solidarity for ASEAN to maintain its relevance and role in the region to further ASEAN’s interests.”

For Kavi Chongkittavorn, there is guilt everywhere. The ASEAN claimants, the ASEAN non-claimants, the current Chair, the US, China – all “have effectively held ASEAN hostage one way or another”, and used it “as a play toy for their own benefits all the way”.

This is nearer the mark, I feel (although it is perhaps a little harsh on the non-claimants).

China seems to be making diplomatic missteps into an art form. But did the US really not foresee this kind of escalation after its highly public 2010 intervention and subsequent “pivot”? Did Viet Nam and the Philippines really think all ASEAN's members would want to sign up to some China-antagonizing mission over the South China Sea? Did the Cambodian Chair really think it was OK to massively inflate the whole issue, yet again, by not moving heaven and earth to reach an agreement?

The cohesive role to which ASEAN-the-organization should be aspiring is that of providing an open and level platform – one that shores up political will for a long-term search for a solution, but also facilitates the kind of short-term understandings necessary to minimize the risk of accidents and the escalation of small flare-ups.

This role is much less likely to be realized if ASEAN, as an organization, shows itself to be partial. Individual members, therefore, who appear to be blatantly pushing the association to line up behind one “side” – whichever side that might be – are doing ASEAN, and SEA as a whole, a grave disservice.

UPDATE (18 July): Former Ambassador Saban Siagian warns: “If this diplomatic guerrilla war between Washington and Beijing continues unchecked it could be the beginning of the end for ASEAN,” and calls for urgent Indonesian diplomatic action. The Bangkok Post, too, in an article referred to by Milton Osborne in The Interpreter, points the finger at the US and China: “There was no clear winner in last week's skirmish between two superpowers in Phnom Penh and it is probably in the interests of all Asean nations and the world that there not be a winner in this power struggle. Instead both countries should drop the Cold War mentality and begin working together on resolving the maritime disputes and other issues in a way that reflects their strategic and economic interdependence.” This report details some of the behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts.

UPDATE (19 July): Karim Raslan evokes “a constant tussle for pre-eminence and advantage between Washington and Beijing”, in which “the two sides wrestled almost without care for their nominal hosts”, displaying “intensity, fury and doggedness”. ASEAN's members face a choice: “they can live up to Asean’s promise as a means to keep the countries in the region from being pawns of great powers, or again fall victim to the age-old tactic of divide and conquer.”