Myanmar's three big Es

A propos of the event I noted last month, and my own recent (tourist) visit to Myanmar, here’s a selection of snippets from the last few months.

Three “big Es” are prominent: expectations, economics, and ethnicity.

Not surprisingly, the expectations thread is still strong, with multiple calls for nuance, careful observation, and open-mindedness in assessing the challenges and opportunities:

Jim Della-Giacoma (19 March): “What is now self-evident is that the bicameral Union Assembly is taking a life of its own and it is not just the 'rubber stamp' legislature many imagined it would be.”

Yangon correspondent (26 March): “At the centre of the increasingly vibrant parliament sits one figure: Thura Shwe Mann, the former number three in the military junta and now speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw… Against most expectations … he has emerged as the strongest advocate for the strengthening of the parliamentary system and its independence from government…”

Thomas Carothers (2 April): “Burma is experiencing a striking and largely unpredicted political opening… When I visited Burma last month, it was impossible not to be struck by the powerful sense among many Burmese that this is an enormous moment for the country, a political opportunity that many barely dared to hope for over the last twenty years. Encouraging as they are, however, these developments represent only a doorway to a possible democratic transition… So political opening? Yes. Economic reform? Likely. Democratic transition? Too early to tell…”

Hamish McDonald (April): “The simple paradigm of a revered democracy advocate holding out in her enforced isolation against a brutal, reform-resistant military now needs to be abandoned. The outside world must engage with a more complex political situation, judiciously supporting reformers and good policy in both government and opposition (p.2).”

Transnational Institute Burma Policy Briefing (June): “Once the genie of change is out of the bottle – especially in a failed or repressed state – dynamics are released that can engender new crises as well as fresh opportunities in addressing national challenges that have long needed resolution. As a result, very unexpected outcomes can occur…”

Assessments of the potential wider regional impact of Myanmar's recent moves also reflect a range of expectations:

Lina Gong (March): “The success of the reforms in Myanmar has important ramifications not just for the country, but also for stability and development in the region.”

Pavin Chachavalpongpun (April): “ASEAN is locked in a strategic tug-of-war with China over Myanmar.”

Marwaan Macam-Markar (11 April): “In easing the pressure off a reforming Myanmar, ASEAN will lay open the democratic deficits of its other members who have not been exposed for their harsh treatment of opposition figures, of suppressing the media or refusing the rights of political and civil liberties.”

Thitinan Pongsudhirak (29 May): “The immediate implication for the ASEAN neighbourhood centres on democratisation… If democracy in Myanmar continues to go from strength to strength, the pressure to democratise in other ASEAN states will surely grow. Myanmar’s progress will advertise the benefits of reform to authoritarian regimes.”

But increasingly, Myanmar’s future seems dominated by two other “big Es”. One is economics. Again, caution is a dominant note in the commentary: 

The Asialink Conversations, held in Yangon, 2-4 February: “Myanmar currently has a large underground, or informal, economy and it is estimated that more than 50 percent of trade is not recorded… Although the ASEAN Economic Community represents an opportunity for Myanmar to undertake reforms in line with regional standards, some acknowledge that ‘our government is only 10 months old and the problems are 60 years old. They can’t be solved overnight and we need a lot of assistance’ [p. 9]”…

Vikram Nehru (23 April): “The exchange rate reform was just the first salvo in what many anticipate will be a steady effort to overhaul the economy and build incentives and institutions for sustained and inclusive growth… The danger is not that Myanmar will do too little, but that it may be asked to do too much… A rush to reform may cause instability that could be seized upon by reform opponents to rewind the clock and go back to the bad old ways.”

Thomas Parks (9 May): “The hotels in Yangon are packed with international aid professionals… But in these heady days of Burma’s opening up to the world, let’s not forget the risks and lessons from scaling up the level of foreign aid too quickly… There are a few basic lessons from the past that should be kept in mind at this early stage, as the international community has an opportunity to get things right in Burma…”

John Riady (10 May): “The best ASEAN foreign policy toward Burma is paradoxically domestic growth and prudent policy-making. By itself of course this is not sufficient – we must continue to engage Burma and make sure the ‘dividends of reform’ are felt by its citizens. But setting a good example is ultimately what will keep the pressure for reform alive.”

Khin Omar (5 June): “The giddy promise of investment and re-engagement with Burma is blinding the West, as well as its Asian neighbors, to the realities of the once-pariah nation… Foreign investors should wait until the nation is reconciled before proceeding with the unabated enthusiasm currently on display.”

Helen James (7 June): “Economic prosperity does not, in itself, presage an evolutionary trajectory toward democratic governance, but it is certain that poverty breeds the conditions in which repression, dictatorship and corruption flourish – and that all of these are precursors of human rights abuse.”

A third big E is ethnicity. Ethnic issues exploded into the news recently with the upsurge in communal violence in western Myanmar. But the urgent need to reach viable long-term solutions that are acceptable to all Myanmar's people forms a constant backdrop to the whole political process:

Transnational Institute Burma Policy Briefing (February): “Peace must be understood as an overarching national issue, which concerns citizens of all ethnic groups in the country, including the Burman majority.”

Kyaw San Wai (21 February): “A ‘trust deficit’ exists between the government and ethnic minority groups who remain sceptical, as they do not perceive a fundamental change in the power structure… [M]ost of the majority Bamar are unaware of, and often unable to fathom the sentiments behind ethnic grievances. For the minorities, vivid recollections of unequal and often violent treatment serve as stark reminders to be wary of both the military and the Bamar. These grievances can easily be exploited to turn into hatred.”

Nicholas Farrelly (6 June) presents a collection of links on the Kachin War.

ICG (12 June): “The communal bloodshed in Myanmar’s Rakhine State represents both a consequence of, and threat to, Myanmar’s current political transition. While communal tensions and discrimination against Myanmar’s Muslim minority long predate the country’s recent opening up, the loosening of authoritarian constraints may well have enabled this current crisis to take on a virulent intensity. Equally, failure to both halt the crisis and address its underlying causes risks halting or even eroding Myanmar’s current reform initiatives…”

Francis Wade (21 June): “The UN reports that sectarian violence over the past fortnight in western Burma has displaced 90,000 people. The figure is higher than the total for Kachin state in Burma’s north, which for more than a year has played host to armed conflict.”

And the fact that small political openings do not translate automatically and directly into ethnic tolerance or responsible reporting is no doubt obvious, but is still worth noting (June and July).

There’s actually a fourth big E hanging over Myanmar's future, too – education – and there are some interesting updates here. But more on that another time...