Following Myanmar

'Myanmar is becoming a "normal" country in ways that were unthinkable two years ago,' writes Trevor Wilson, in an upbeat assessment. Some changes are now 'incontrovertible', and we are witnessing 'unprecedented openness and inclusiveness about government processes' and 'the return of vigorous parliamentary government'.

International Crisis Group's CrisisWatch database continues to provide a useful log of events in Myanmar, including the ups and downs of ethnic issues.

'Democracy!' shouted an old guy pedalling past on a bicycle, as I took this picture in upstate Myanmar.

T-shirts like these are freely on sale in downtown Yangon these days.

Southern Thailand, Singapore, and inequality

Three interesting pieces this morning:

First, Joshua Kurlantzick reviews the ongoing violence that 'has made southern Thailand the deadliest war zone in East Asia', while remaining 'almost invisible on the global stage'.

Despite some new government initiatives, the violence has recently spiked. Explanations for this vary, the most depressing being that young men in the south, now innured to violence and facing the consequences of national economic slow-down, 'have become wedded to the insurgency as a way of life':

'As each generation of young men in the south has been drawn into the insurgency, and as some teachers, local clerics, and other powerful southerners treat the insurgents with great respect, generation after generation of southerners see the battle as the best option not just for their politics, but for their own social well-being. And that is a hard cycle to break.'

I hope he is not right, and there is still a chance for the politics of opportunity to count for something in southern Thailand.

Second, a fascinating opinion piece by Adrian W. J. Kuah focuses on the contrast currently emerging in Singapore between 'the imperative of the national narrative and the ethos of a networked city':

'Whereas the national narrative emphasises the continuity and coherence of place, the clearly-bounded territory that is the locus of collective identity and values, the ethos of a global, networked city privileges and celebrates the transient flows of people and capital, with the city being an open arena of ambition and competition.'

These competing impulses are proving difficult to reconcile -- which is one of the reasons for the current 'unhappiness with the state of immigration policies', as Kuah delicately puts it.

Amid these competing ideas of spaces and flows, there's a renewed need, it seems to me, for Doreen Massey's concept of place, which articulates 'a global sense of the local, a global sense of place' (1994, Space, Place and Gender. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp 154-6).

Thirdly, Scott Winship reminds us that inequality is a complex topic to handle. A lot of what we intuitively suspect about it is hard to ground in evidence, and its effects vary depending on development levels. Focusing on the United States, Winship writes:

'There are plenty of reasons to worry about inequality of opportunity — socioeconomic gaps in college-going are on the rise, and test-score gaps between rich and poor kids have similarly increased, to name just two examples. But the evidence that these problems would diminish if we could limit the top 1 percent’s incomes to those seen in other countries is nonexistent... Studies on whether inequality hurts economic growth typically focus on developing countries...

'Similarly, the influential research of economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argues that inequality leads to less democracy and reinforces itself through politics, but it too is based on developing countries. There has been hardly any research that rigorously tests whether economic inequality in the United States is associated with worse political or policy outcomes for the nonrich.'

Like many others, I'm concerned about inequality in Southeast Asia, and convinced that smarter policy is a big part of the answer. But designing and implementing smarter policy that will create synergies at both national and regional levels is no small challenge.  

Calm words on oil and troubled waters

Worth a look is this balanced take by the Carnegie Endowment's Douglas H. Paal (16 Oct) on the disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

He reminds us:

"The common media narrative is that China is being more aggressive. But if you trace back the origins of the latest flare-ups—in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and there’s even a China-South Korea rock that they’re arguing about—they actually all started outside of China. What we’re seeing from China are exaggerated reactions, and people notice that more than what was done by the Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, or South Korea..."

His advice:

"This is a time when we need to get past elections, past transitions, and allow some cool diplomacy to go to work...

"My own view is that a lot of the fuel from the flames of these tensions in the East China Sea and the South China Sea would be taken out if we could divert the competition for energy and the competition for marine resources into separate dialogues...

"But what would be really difficult is to try to settle the sovereign claims. With China rising, Japan in a difficult period, and Southeast Asia going through all sorts of change, countries are not going to willingly give up their claims on sovereignty. They might settle in the end to leave things as they are. With changing ratios of power among the various parties out there, they’re not likely to settle claims—history suggests they won’t do it...

"As a practical matter, let’s just do what they’ve done for the last forty years in the region and shelve the territorial sovereignty issues and work on the functional problems. I hope that after we get past elections and transitions in East Asia, maybe we can move in that direction."

Much of this resonates with the advice from Sam Bateman that I flagged up a little while ago.

All worth remembering as the November summit season looms...

The passing of a "great survivor"

Milton Osborne chronicles the "remarkable odyssey of Norodom Sihanouk", as do many other obituaries. Osborne's Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness (1994, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press) is still a great introduction to this complex figure.

The Bangkok Post interestingly catalogues reactions and background, as does Albeiro Rodas's blog.

Sanchita Basu Das on the ASEAN Economic Community

It is "highly unlikely", writes Sanchita Bas Das, the ASEAN Studies Centre's lead researcher on the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), "that ASEAN can achieve its target of building an AEC by 2015."

She substantiates that claim by working her way through the achievements and challenges of the four "pillars" of the AEC.

But nil desperandum. A foundation has been laid, and though time presses, "ASEAN economic integration efforts will not be derailed easily".

She concludes with some eminently sensible advice on the way forward:

"One way for ASEAN is to focus on 'core' elements of integration and implement them earnestly in the shortest possible time. This may include trade liberalisation, services liberalisation (at least the tourism sector), and measures to enhance connectivity, transparency and predictability in the region. The rest of the process, as envisaged in the AEC Blueprint, can follow beyond 2015."

"Cautious optimism" for the southern Philippines

The "Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro" may be the breakthrough that is needed to terminate a long-running insurgency in the southern Philippines.

This would be good news not only for the Philippines but also for the region.

Hopes on previous occasions have been dashed, but Joseph Franco explains why this time could be different, while reminding us that this is just one step on a much longer path to lasting peace.

UPDATE 10 October and 22 October: See also Steven Rood's insightful commentaries for The Interpreter and for the Asia Foundation.

Farish Noor urges regional spirit

I have given up apologizing for my inadequacies as a blogger...

But here's an article I have to draw attention to.

I, too, look forward to the "rise of pan-ASEAN global citizens"...

Sam Bateman and the South China Sea

Bit of a blogging pause again…

But I had to draw attention to this eminently sensible piece by Sam Bateman. He concludes his analysis with some recommendations:

“The game of ‘tit for tat’ in the South China Sea benefits nobody and has to end…

“Attempts to define ‘areas of dispute’are futile. Even the search for a Code of Conduct will not succeed if it places emphasis on dispute resolution and concessions on sovereignty as confidence-building measures rather than on cooperation. Cooperation must be put back on the agenda…

“A cooperative management regime is required based on a functional approach that exploits the common interests of claimant countries. A first step would be to set up a management body for the South China Sea comprised of all bordering countries. ASEAN and China should negotiate the establishment of such a body. The US can bring the ‘carrots’ of experience in oceans management to the table rather than the ‘sticks’ of increased military engagement.”

More on the non-communiqué

So we don’t have a communiqué, but we do now have a statement on “ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea”.

The dust has still to settle, however.

Bunn Nagara adopts a phlegmatic stance, accusing us all of worrying far too much over this blessed communiqué.

I disagree with him here – I think it’s an important wake-up call to all ASEAN’s member countries to keep a sharp eye out for divide-and-rule and unite-and-rule tactics, both from inside and outside the Association.

But I do agree with him on this point:

“Cynics predicting doom-and-gloom scenarios for ASEAN forget that its watchword has always been ‘resilience’, as supported by its near-half-century record. ASEAN is made of sterner stuff, to which its experience testifies. But ASEAN is also not immune to the pitfalls of complacency. Failure to do what is needed now can escalate current challenges and lead to more problems in the future.”

His pull-no-punches comments on Philippines diplomacy (to some extent backed by domestic players) also make a refreshing change from the “it’s all China’s fault” narratives.

And in his conclusion, he’s surely right on the money:

“Disputes are also best settled, or can only be settled, through negotiations or arbitration. Souring the atmosphere by making diplomacy difficult only makes things worse for everyone. With China, it has been said that upping the ante only strengthens the hand of hardliners in Beijing. Most ASEAN countries are wise enough to steer clear of that approach, however much of a rush it may give some politicians playing to the gallery at home.”


UPDATE 24 July: Simon Tay always strikes a good balance on this issue. He suggests agreeing on “a form of words about the South China Sea” – something akin to the form of words over the “one-China” principle, which “has helped frame a range of differences that is understood (but not conceded) by each party”. Such a move would reduce the likelihood that communiqués would be held hostage by a single issue, as has so painfully been the case recently. But he also warns that “each ASEAN member must be willing to keep the group's interest as a whole in view, and not focus solely on its bilateral ties with China or America. Otherwise ASEAN will not only fail to be neutral, but be ineffective and indeed neutered.”

On trying to see it China's way

Here’s a great post by Sam Roggeveen of The Interpreter. It addresses a failure I observe time after time in contemporary commentary – a failure to try to understand how things look from China’s point of view.

Now admittedly, this is hard. “China” doesn’t always speak with one voice.

But it is nevertheless a vital element that a lot of commentators, obsessively gnawing away at China's rise and its implications for “us”, just don’t seem to get.

“Understanding” does not mean placating, or excusing the inexcusable in China’s often tone-deaf diplomacy. It just means taking the time and imaginative effort to see the world from China's corner.

As Roggeveen concludes: “To manage the transition away from American dominance, we've got to try harder to understand China's point of view.”

Yes, yes, and yes.

Myanmar's three big Es

A propos of the event I noted last month, and my own recent (tourist) visit to Myanmar, here’s a selection of snippets from the last few months.

Three “big Es” are prominent: expectations, economics, and ethnicity.

Not surprisingly, the expectations thread is still strong, with multiple calls for nuance, careful observation, and open-mindedness in assessing the challenges and opportunities:

Jim Della-Giacoma (19 March): “What is now self-evident is that the bicameral Union Assembly is taking a life of its own and it is not just the 'rubber stamp' legislature many imagined it would be.”

Yangon correspondent (26 March): “At the centre of the increasingly vibrant parliament sits one figure: Thura Shwe Mann, the former number three in the military junta and now speaker of the Pyithu Hluttaw… Against most expectations … he has emerged as the strongest advocate for the strengthening of the parliamentary system and its independence from government…”

Thomas Carothers (2 April): “Burma is experiencing a striking and largely unpredicted political opening… When I visited Burma last month, it was impossible not to be struck by the powerful sense among many Burmese that this is an enormous moment for the country, a political opportunity that many barely dared to hope for over the last twenty years. Encouraging as they are, however, these developments represent only a doorway to a possible democratic transition… So political opening? Yes. Economic reform? Likely. Democratic transition? Too early to tell…”

Hamish McDonald (April): “The simple paradigm of a revered democracy advocate holding out in her enforced isolation against a brutal, reform-resistant military now needs to be abandoned. The outside world must engage with a more complex political situation, judiciously supporting reformers and good policy in both government and opposition (p.2).”

Transnational Institute Burma Policy Briefing (June): “Once the genie of change is out of the bottle – especially in a failed or repressed state – dynamics are released that can engender new crises as well as fresh opportunities in addressing national challenges that have long needed resolution. As a result, very unexpected outcomes can occur…”

Assessments of the potential wider regional impact of Myanmar's recent moves also reflect a range of expectations:

Lina Gong (March): “The success of the reforms in Myanmar has important ramifications not just for the country, but also for stability and development in the region.”

Pavin Chachavalpongpun (April): “ASEAN is locked in a strategic tug-of-war with China over Myanmar.”

Marwaan Macam-Markar (11 April): “In easing the pressure off a reforming Myanmar, ASEAN will lay open the democratic deficits of its other members who have not been exposed for their harsh treatment of opposition figures, of suppressing the media or refusing the rights of political and civil liberties.”

Thitinan Pongsudhirak (29 May): “The immediate implication for the ASEAN neighbourhood centres on democratisation… If democracy in Myanmar continues to go from strength to strength, the pressure to democratise in other ASEAN states will surely grow. Myanmar’s progress will advertise the benefits of reform to authoritarian regimes.”

But increasingly, Myanmar’s future seems dominated by two other “big Es”. One is economics. Again, caution is a dominant note in the commentary: 

The Asialink Conversations, held in Yangon, 2-4 February: “Myanmar currently has a large underground, or informal, economy and it is estimated that more than 50 percent of trade is not recorded… Although the ASEAN Economic Community represents an opportunity for Myanmar to undertake reforms in line with regional standards, some acknowledge that ‘our government is only 10 months old and the problems are 60 years old. They can’t be solved overnight and we need a lot of assistance’ [p. 9]”…

Vikram Nehru (23 April): “The exchange rate reform was just the first salvo in what many anticipate will be a steady effort to overhaul the economy and build incentives and institutions for sustained and inclusive growth… The danger is not that Myanmar will do too little, but that it may be asked to do too much… A rush to reform may cause instability that could be seized upon by reform opponents to rewind the clock and go back to the bad old ways.”

Thomas Parks (9 May): “The hotels in Yangon are packed with international aid professionals… But in these heady days of Burma’s opening up to the world, let’s not forget the risks and lessons from scaling up the level of foreign aid too quickly… There are a few basic lessons from the past that should be kept in mind at this early stage, as the international community has an opportunity to get things right in Burma…”

John Riady (10 May): “The best ASEAN foreign policy toward Burma is paradoxically domestic growth and prudent policy-making. By itself of course this is not sufficient – we must continue to engage Burma and make sure the ‘dividends of reform’ are felt by its citizens. But setting a good example is ultimately what will keep the pressure for reform alive.”

Khin Omar (5 June): “The giddy promise of investment and re-engagement with Burma is blinding the West, as well as its Asian neighbors, to the realities of the once-pariah nation… Foreign investors should wait until the nation is reconciled before proceeding with the unabated enthusiasm currently on display.”

Helen James (7 June): “Economic prosperity does not, in itself, presage an evolutionary trajectory toward democratic governance, but it is certain that poverty breeds the conditions in which repression, dictatorship and corruption flourish – and that all of these are precursors of human rights abuse.”

A third big E is ethnicity. Ethnic issues exploded into the news recently with the upsurge in communal violence in western Myanmar. But the urgent need to reach viable long-term solutions that are acceptable to all Myanmar's people forms a constant backdrop to the whole political process:

Transnational Institute Burma Policy Briefing (February): “Peace must be understood as an overarching national issue, which concerns citizens of all ethnic groups in the country, including the Burman majority.”

Kyaw San Wai (21 February): “A ‘trust deficit’ exists between the government and ethnic minority groups who remain sceptical, as they do not perceive a fundamental change in the power structure… [M]ost of the majority Bamar are unaware of, and often unable to fathom the sentiments behind ethnic grievances. For the minorities, vivid recollections of unequal and often violent treatment serve as stark reminders to be wary of both the military and the Bamar. These grievances can easily be exploited to turn into hatred.”

Nicholas Farrelly (6 June) presents a collection of links on the Kachin War.

ICG (12 June): “The communal bloodshed in Myanmar’s Rakhine State represents both a consequence of, and threat to, Myanmar’s current political transition. While communal tensions and discrimination against Myanmar’s Muslim minority long predate the country’s recent opening up, the loosening of authoritarian constraints may well have enabled this current crisis to take on a virulent intensity. Equally, failure to both halt the crisis and address its underlying causes risks halting or even eroding Myanmar’s current reform initiatives…”

Francis Wade (21 June): “The UN reports that sectarian violence over the past fortnight in western Burma has displaced 90,000 people. The figure is higher than the total for Kachin state in Burma’s north, which for more than a year has played host to armed conflict.”

And the fact that small political openings do not translate automatically and directly into ethnic tolerance or responsible reporting is no doubt obvious, but is still worth noting (June and July).

There’s actually a fourth big E hanging over Myanmar's future, too – education – and there are some interesting updates here. But more on that another time...

That missing communiqué

ASEAN’s unprecedented failure to agree on a communiqué after the foreign ministers’ meeting last week, because of problems finding acceptable wording on the South China Sea (SCS) issue, is still provoking plenty of commentary.

For Ernest Bower, it’s all China's fault:

“Fundamentally, the chaos at the ASEAN meeting was an outcome cynically manipulated and abetted by a China that has decided that a weak and divided ASEAN is in its national interests.

“Understanding the fact that China has decided to undermine ASEAN unity and the fact that ASEAN has the capacity and commitment to overcome this shortsighted campaign to break its ranks is a necessary condition for advising policy-makers in Manila to avoid the trap of underinvesting in ASEAN. They should continue joining countries that push to advance regional structures that will promote peace, security and prosperity in the Asia Pacific to strengthen ASEAN…

“Filipinos should know what happened in Phnom Penh and understand that the message from Cambodia is not ‘ASEAN is messy and we should proceed carefully and reduce our engagement and investment,’ but rather ‘ASEAN unity is not supported by China and this is an indication we need to redouble our efforts to engage and support ASEAN’s goals for unity.’”

Tan Seng Chye, on the other hand, names no individual countries. But by emphasizing ASEAN as a “neutral platform”, and presenting the SCS as a distraction from the main purpose of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), he clearly points towards the Philippines and Viet Nam.

“What happened at the recent AMM should be taken seriously by ASEAN as a wake-up call. For the first time certain individual ASEAN countries were prepared to pursue their own interest to the extent of disregarding ASEAN’s cohesion and the practice of finding a compromise for ASEAN’s common interests. This issue has become more challenging for ASEAN because of the emerging big power rivalry in the region including in the SCS…

“Over the years, ASEAN has been able to establish its importance and relevance as a neutral platform and a convenor [italics added] for the major powers to meet with ASEAN countries and among themselves…

“The new era of emerging big power rivalry in the region involves the US’ enhanced engagement in the Asia region and its pivot or re-balancing of its military forces to Asia Pacific as well as China’s response to the US strategy to conscribe it. This rivalry has an impact on ASEAN... 

“The AMM has been distracted from its main purpose and objectives by the SCS disputes which would not be resolved for a long time to come… Looking forward, ASEAN should review what has happened at the AMM and in recent times and consider how it can regain its cohesion and solidarity for ASEAN to maintain its relevance and role in the region to further ASEAN’s interests.”

For Kavi Chongkittavorn, there is guilt everywhere. The ASEAN claimants, the ASEAN non-claimants, the current Chair, the US, China – all “have effectively held ASEAN hostage one way or another”, and used it “as a play toy for their own benefits all the way”.

This is nearer the mark, I feel (although it is perhaps a little harsh on the non-claimants).

China seems to be making diplomatic missteps into an art form. But did the US really not foresee this kind of escalation after its highly public 2010 intervention and subsequent “pivot”? Did Viet Nam and the Philippines really think all ASEAN's members would want to sign up to some China-antagonizing mission over the South China Sea? Did the Cambodian Chair really think it was OK to massively inflate the whole issue, yet again, by not moving heaven and earth to reach an agreement?

The cohesive role to which ASEAN-the-organization should be aspiring is that of providing an open and level platform – one that shores up political will for a long-term search for a solution, but also facilitates the kind of short-term understandings necessary to minimize the risk of accidents and the escalation of small flare-ups.

This role is much less likely to be realized if ASEAN, as an organization, shows itself to be partial. Individual members, therefore, who appear to be blatantly pushing the association to line up behind one “side” – whichever side that might be – are doing ASEAN, and SEA as a whole, a grave disservice.

UPDATE (18 July): Former Ambassador Saban Siagian warns: “If this diplomatic guerrilla war between Washington and Beijing continues unchecked it could be the beginning of the end for ASEAN,” and calls for urgent Indonesian diplomatic action. The Bangkok Post, too, in an article referred to by Milton Osborne in The Interpreter, points the finger at the US and China: “There was no clear winner in last week's skirmish between two superpowers in Phnom Penh and it is probably in the interests of all Asean nations and the world that there not be a winner in this power struggle. Instead both countries should drop the Cold War mentality and begin working together on resolving the maritime disputes and other issues in a way that reflects their strategic and economic interdependence.” This report details some of the behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts.

UPDATE (19 July): Karim Raslan evokes “a constant tussle for pre-eminence and advantage between Washington and Beijing”, in which “the two sides wrestled almost without care for their nominal hosts”, displaying “intensity, fury and doggedness”. ASEAN's members face a choice: “they can live up to Asean’s promise as a means to keep the countries in the region from being pawns of great powers, or again fall victim to the age-old tactic of divide and conquer.”

Updating the Myanmar story

I attended an interesting event on Myanmar this week.

As always, it is hard to keep the balance between enthusiasm about what has changed, and caution about what is still depressingly the same.

The two write-ups here and here capture that ambivalence.

Questioning an ASEAN 'united front' on the South China Sea

I am terribly embarrassed by my lack of postings lately… It’s not that SEA has grown one jot less interesting. Au contraire. But I’ve been finishing a book, and it turns out this is a terribly time-intensive activity. And other KPIs don't leave the building while you're busy on something major.

To break the drought, however, I want to draw attention to this piece on the South China Sea by Xunpeng Shi:

‘ASEAN should be a neutral, transparent and fair platform for both sides to resolve disputes peacefully, and should not take a biased stand toward its member states. By promoting this first platform, ASEAN has the potential to gain credit from member states and the international community, while increasing its profile in the international arena for tackling regional affairs.’

I think this is right. I’ve always had my doubts about the view that ASEAN’s states ought to march in lockstep on everything.

Sheldon Simon argued a little while ago that ‘ASEAN’s integration continues to be problematic, and ability to speak with a single authoritative voice on politico-security matters remains uncertain and at best premature’, with the result that ‘US reliance on a strong ASEAN lead for multilateral Asian security issues might well be reconsidered’.

But how ‘integrated’ does ASEAN need to be in order to play a useful regional role? A broad range of observers would certainly welcome greater economic integration within the region, as well as a deeper consensus on human rights and governance issues. These aims are all expressed in ASEAN's community-building plans. But is ‘ability to speak with a single authoritative voice on politico-security matters’ actually always an asset? Surely it depends on what that single authoritative voice would say?

ASEAN’s most telling defence of its driving-seat position is that the organization is non-threatening. This inoffensiveness is made up of several facets. Part of it is ASEAN’s intrinsic make-up – it is not a great power, and not an alliance.

But a key factor is also that ASEAN as an organization has traditionally practised the kind of balancing that engages all the major powers, and exclusively favours none of them. This policy has made an important contribution to regional peace and confidence-building. If the evolution of a ‘single authoritative voice’ also equated with an unequivocal leaning in the direction of any one particular power, this would not bode well.

Individually, Southeast Asia’s states have also broadly practised this balancing policy. Some have recently engaged in a recalibration of that balance over the issue of the South China Sea, but even now, no state wants all its eggs in one basket.

Part of the reason ASEAN looks unthreatening, therefore, is precisely this variety. Its various components have politico-security feet in many different camps, and may at any given time be leaning in different directions and at different angles. ASEAN is not like a solid mass of colour, as it were – it is more like one of those shimmering patterns that looks slightly different in different lights. And that’s a good thing, not a bad thing. What we lose in unity and predictability, we arguably gain in strategic and diplomatic flexibility. Such an entity is far more likely to forestall a dangerous regional binary.

UPDATE 15 June: From the title alone (‘Following the ASEAN tune’), it sounds as though Farish Noor is at odds with the above article. Their conclusions, however, are actually rather similar. For Xunpeng Shi, ‘the question is whether Asean would gain by pinning China as its opponent. The answer is unlikely to be positive. Asean should be a fair, neutral and transparent facilitator of peace, rather than an aggressive opponent against China, when it comes to resolving the South China Sea dispute.’

For Noor, too, ‘For ASEAN to be able to present a united face to the world, some cohesion and cooperation is necessary from all member states... Breaking ranks and brokering bilateral deals with other countries while neglecting common ASEAN concerns is not the way to move forward. And at the moment, it is highly doubtful if the rest of ASEAN wishes to be dragged into a conflict with China, which happens to be the biggest trading partner of several ASEAN economies. Post-2015, Asean will face a new era where its collective identity will be tested. Already, the region is witness to the resurgence of China, India and the United States. Will ASEAN be able to hold its own and maintain some sense of common purpose and identity? Yes, but only if we dance by the ASEAN tune and think of ASEAN’s future as our own.’

The bottom line: ASEAN nations should work together. Of course. But not with the purpose of ganging up against China.

The Lady

The Lady came out in Malaysia just last week. Seats were selling fast when I went this weekend.

It’s beautifully filmed, and very poignant. The terrible requirement to choose between family and country is very movingly portrayed. And the courage of this extraordinary woman – and those around her – is always worth celebrating.

But I left feeling disappointed. The way this movie told the Burma/Myanmar story – in terms of light and darkness, angels and devils – is very common. It rouses our sympathies. We are invited to hate the generals and love Aung San Suu Kyi, in a way that might feel morally very satisfying. But it doesn’t help us understand anything.

There was nothing that explored Myanmar’s early difficulties with democracy, or the circumstances that brought the generals into power in the first place. There was nothing that attempted to probe their motivations, or the differences among them.

Understanding, after all, doesn’t mean condoning… I have linked to this Inside Story post before, but it’s worth another airing. An activist from the “88 Generation” explains: “I have suffered a great deal myself. But from these bitter experiences I realised that we cannot achieve what we want with hatred. We need a situation where everybody wins, including the military. They are our brothers as well.” Another “activist-turned-educator” agrees “that in every negotiation process we have to try and understand the other side’s interests, and we must make their interests our interests... Whatever worries them, we have to find out what it is and eliminate it.”

In light of these comments, the message of The Lady seemed strangely anachronistic.

Equally, there was no attempt to flag up any of the recent changes. The movie was first shown in September 2011. The winds of change were already blowing. For many observers, the breeze had been getting up ever since the dodgy election in 2010.

Yet the little text at the end of the movie gives no indication that Aung San Suu Kyi’s perseverance might finally be reaping concrete rewards.

Of course, the changes to date are not sufficient. And they’re not irreversible. But they are significant. Surely they deserved a few little words of cautious hope?

So, go and see this movie, and wonder at the strength of the human spirit, and admire Michelle Yeoh’s fabulous performance. But don’t go expecting new insight on Myanmar/Burma.

Simon Tay on ASEAN and the South China Sea

Writing about the recent US-Philippines military exercises, and ongoing difficulties over the South China Sea, Simon Tay (1 May) cautions:

“ASEAN should not automatically back the Philippines. Nor should the Aquino government expect unquestioning support from the group if the Filipinos seem to be the ones who are provoking the issue, rather than the Chinese.

“What needs to be done by ASEAN is to reinforce the multilateral setting for dialogue about the South China Sea and other issues…

“Bilateral security alliances – like that between the US and the Philippines – were once accepted benignly as a foundation for Pax Americana.

“They will undoubtedly continue…

“Today's need, however, is not for more aggressive alliances with the US, targeted against anyone. The region needs to, instead, pursue and strengthen wider processes that can engage both the US and China.

“Almost all agree that keeping the Americans in Asia can be positive. But equally, the region must understand that treating Beijing as an outsider and presuming it to always be the aggressor is a dangerous and potentially self-fulfilling prophecy.”

Wise words...

ASEAN and regional civil society

My article has now come out in The Pacific Review, Volume 25, Issue 2, 2012, pp 199-222.

It’s called Bridging the gap: an ‘English School’ perspective on ASEAN and regional civil society.

Below is the abstract:

The objective of a ‘people-oriented’ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has not readily translated into easy relations between the Association and regional civil society. Discourse inspired by global civil society has found plenty to focus on in the gap between aspiration and practice. This article argues, however, that not enough attention has been directed to the bridges that are gradually forming across that gap, and suggests that an ‘English School’-derived account can give a fuller picture of what is under way in this area. From this perspective, a process of institutionalization is observable among the different actors. By tackling – consciously or unconsciously – core problems such as recognition, location of common ground, confidence-building, and burden-sharing, this process is potentially transforming the relations of a state-imposed hierarchy into something more societal. The usefulness of such an approach lies in its ability to describe a process of slow change on its own terms, to normatively validate the fragile bridges under construction, and to stake out possibilities for progress on the basis of negotiation and accommodation.

And the whole thing is available online here.

Comments welcome!

Anthony Trollope, democracy, and Southeast Asia

I’ve done lots of long bus, train, and plane journeys this year. Bad for blogging, but good for reading.

One of my mainstays has been Anthony Trollope’s “political novels”, and I’m now half-way through the fourth of six.

Written in Britain in the 1860s and 1870s, these books strikingly depict how the path to parliamentary and democratic reform is not always strewn with roses.

Here we find a cast of very real MPs, whose array of virtues and vices clearly reminds us that the quality of democracy ultimately always depends on the quality of the human beings who translate its ideals into practice.

Here, too, is a relentless portrayal of the inseparability of money from democratic politics. Over the course of the series, the law is changed so that MPs are no longer able to enter Parliament by way of seats gifted by the nobility, and the rules for elections are gradually tightened. Nevertheless, able but poverty-stricken politicians clearly still need backing from rich people to get anywhere. Public campaigns are managed by agents whose last thought is the health of democracy. And the attempt to stamp out vote-buying runs up against an old-boys’-club mentality that may claim to hate the sin, but certainly cannot bring itself to condemn the sinner.

Here, as well, are depictions of the difficulties of running a party system. What does an MP do when his party and his ideals start to diverge? (And, yes, it was all “his” in those days – political women had to pull strings from the sidelines.) What does a party do, when one of its progressive ideas is unexpectedly championed by its conservative opponents?

At a time when SEA’s democracies face a host of challenges, and when the world’s older democracies hardly offer an inspiring model to emulate, it’s good to sometimes pause and remember that participatory politics involves much more than stirring slogans. Just desiring “freedom and democracy” is not going to be enough.

Creating and safeguarding participatory politics is a hard, uphill battle. There will certainly be reversals and compromises. There will always be much to condemn.

As Myanmar takes its next lurching steps into what we all sincerely hope will be a more democratic future, it will be good to keep remembering that democracy does not emerge anywhere like some beautiful foal from the womb of a thoroughbred – perfectly formed, admirable, and ready to run from day one.

Rather, this elusive but indispensable phenomenon is a much-stained, much-deformed piece of work, that has to be slowly knit together in the course of a sometimes sordid, often uninspiring, and certainly never-ending struggle. None of us – whether in old democracies, new democracies, or not-yet-democracies – can ever afford to rest on our laurels, and assume we’ve arrived.

Nor can we bleakly conclude that democracy’s stains and deformities mean it can never work, so we might as well give up and shout from the sidelines.

We can still travel hopefully, even while acknowledging that, on this particular journey, we are never likely to arrive exactly where we would like to be.

ASEAN: Communicate! Now!

The last week of February saw SEA’s information ministers gathering in Kuala Lumpur. The resulting media statement includes the following:

“The Chairman in his opening statement highlighted that ASEAN should leverage on the popularity of social media that would keep it current and relevant as a disseminator of information. He expressed his view that the Information Ministers should re-look their engagement through new media and the social network, especially with the younger generation, otherwise they may not be able to play an effective role in promoting ASEAN awareness or building the ASEAN Community… Appreciating the need to implement a comprehensive communications plan to meet the vision of One ASEAN Community by 2015, the Ministers directed a technical working group to study the immediate communications need and recommend an effective communications plan, using media channels that are available in Member States. It is envisioned that this plan will promote a clearer understanding on what One ASEAN Community means for the entire region and its peoples… [emphasis mine]”

It would be hard to overemphasize the importance of this task. Last week in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, I had the opportunity to meet a number of academics, and discuss these issues with three classes of students, undergraduate and postgraduate.

Time after time from the academics came the complaint that ASEAN is still – despite all its efforts – far too remote from the ordinary people of SEA.

Many of the region’s citizens have too much of a struggle with daily needs to have time to acquaint themselves with an esoteric topic such as ASEAN.

But even the middle classes know too little about it, and about what it means for them. As one academic put it, it is Tony Fernandes who has done most for the idea of an ASEAN community. AirAsia’s facilitation of cheap flights makes the rest of SEA more accessible – at least for some. It therefore represents a very palpable bridging of gaps.

But while the regional vision is clear and bright for the high flyers in the ASEAN Business Club, it still needs to percolate down to the small businesses who struggle to understand what an ASEAN Economic Community might have to offer them.

As an economics researcher in Singapore told me, generalities are not enough – people in the shoe industry (for example) need to know precisely how Community plans will affect shoes and the components that go into shoes. A monumental information campaign is necessary if people are to start to see what community-building offers them and their businesses.

The ASEAN Secretariat also reported last week on a youth seminar in Indonesia. Addressing the event, ASEAN Deputy Secretary-General Bagas Hapsoro noted the importance of such events, as they provided platforms for young people “to play a leading role in realising the ASEAN Community by 2015”. He went on to say that young people “need to unite to create a strong network with other young people from all aspects of life so they can consequently reach mutual understanding and boost regional cooperation... [and] suggested that enhancing policy advocacy activities would lay the foundation for the youth’s voices to be heard by their governments, parliaments, and business people.” 

Truly, the moment is now. Interestingly, the Indonesian undergraduates I talked to were still largely open to ASEAN, and still prepared to give it a chance. The postgraduates, on the other hand, had already learnt to be much more sceptical. Youth enthusiasm can very quickly turn to disappointment if elements of real progress (or at least good reasons why that progress is elusive) are not very clearly communicated to them.

Young people need not only to know more about what they can realistically expect from ASEAN and what ASEAN is actually doing – because I find there are still a lot of misconceptions and knowledge gaps out there – but also to know how they can learn and contribute.

One undergraduate asked me, “What do we have to do to communicate with ASEAN?” I reeled off a few web addresses – regional civil society organizations (which, incidentally, have produced some excellent training programmes on how to deal with ASEAN), the ASEAN Secretariat, the ASEAN Foundation – but I’m hard pressed to cite a one-stop shop that can link up young people interested in learning about ASEAN’s regional vision.

I would love to know that such a thing is out there, and I’ve just missed it – so if you know of good “ways in” to ASEAN for young people, please get in contact.

I truly think this is a pivotal moment for ASEAN publicity, outreach, and youth engagement. If we can’t draw in educated young people and small businesses now, the ASEAN Community that is projected for 2015 will really struggle to get airborne.

Green shoots? -- pick of the fortnight

• Asia Sentinel has a slightly more positive round-up of recent events in Thailand than many I’ve seen lately (9 Mar). The report concludes: “There is plenty to be concerned about. Eventually, the harshness of the lese majeste laws, the military’s dominance of the political process and concerns that somehow the government will engineer Thaksin’s return could trigger more of the kind of trouble that has characterized far too much of the country’s political sphere. The mai pen rai (Don’t worry, it’s okay) attitude that characterizes the country, to take the easy option and ignore problems, could once again result in lack of will to put flood control infrastructure in place. But the feeling is that for now, mai pen rai will prevail despite the gradual disintegration of the arrangements that have kept Thai politics relatively stable since the 2011 election. Thailand needs it.”
• A New York Times report notes that Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi is increasingly “being asked to propose solutions to her country’s woes rather than merely lament them” (7 Mar). Fears are being expressed that she will tarnish her reputation in the rough-and-tumble of day-to-day politics. But as I’ve observed before, this is a trade-off that all SEA’s activists have had to come to terms with. It’s never an easy choice or combination. But we need good people who can build as well as good people who can scourge.
• Still on Myanmar, Nicolas Farrelly (8 Mar) notes that this is not the time to be watching “for unambiguous signs that change is irreversible and that the military has surrendered political power for good”. Rather, he warns: “Instead of a final resolution of Burma’s problems it is conceivable that changes will remain incremental, erratic and somewhat opaque… Meanwhile there is much to be gained by increasing our awareness of the changes that are occurring and by accepting Burma’s new government as a normal part of the Southeast Asian political landscape. This is the time when Burmese authorities, businesses and individuals are actively seeking partners from around the world to assist with the challenges ahead. There are still reasons to doubt and fret, but the time is ripe for action and involvement.” Hear, hear...
• Malaysia has been rated “the safest country in Southeast Asia and 19th in the world” (8 Mar). This is interesting, because it certainly doesn’t square with the many, many warnings I’ve been given by concerned locals since moving to Malaysia in November last year… Is the discrepancy just due to a perception lag, or to something more complex?
• The website for the upcoming ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN People’s Forum is here. This will be one to watch in terms of gauging the nature of Cambodia’s ASEAN chairmanship.
• “Singapore will be contributing $50 million over the next four years to an Asean initiative to narrow the divide within the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean)…The amount will be given from this year till 2015, and will bring Singapore's total contribution to IAI [Initiative for ASEAN Integration] to $170 million [6 Mar]”. And – Singapore’s domestic workers are to be given a day off.
• The election season is underway in Timor Leste. There are useful backgrounders here and here.

Pick of the fortnight: Powers, ASEAN, and Myanmar

• ISEAS has launched the quarterly Monitor, a socio-political survey of Southeast Asia – a welcome addition to the regional updates.
• In an interesting interview, ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan welcomes the new US engagement in SEA and in Asia more broadly. Asked whether this is “not a move by the US to contain China”, he offers a good summing up: “I think less so than the fact that the world would like to be reassured that this region is going to remain stable, peaceful and prosperous. I think the American attitude is that with less commitment and less involvement in the Middle East, they must look to where there are potential areas of instability that could affect the global economic recovery. When they look around for where best to go for global trade and investment to help them out of their own economic crisis, it’s got to be East Asia. It’s ASEAN. So their new pivot towards us is understandable. But what we don’t want is anyone coming in and bringing tension or confrontation. Everybody, including the US, is welcome on the basis of openness and fairness. To ensure that happens, ASEAN must learn to be a balancing mechanism, a fulcrum, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, of regional cooperation.”
• Joshua Ho, however, warns of the danger of “overstretching” the notion of ASEAN centrality, “especially if ASEAN states start to adopt an ‘inward-looking, it-is-all-about-ASEAN mentality’…  In light of the increasingly complex and multifaceted nature of global challenges, the tendency and temptation for ASEAN to look inwards and close in on itself will grow… The Bali Concord III which was signed last November by ASEAN leaders must not be used to justify an overly ASEAN-centric view of the world. Indeed such an outcome would paralyse the region whose very growth was founded upon its diverse and dynamic relationships its member states have with the wider world… [T]o what extent ASEAN is able to maintain its global engagement while at the same time keeping its own house in order will be a critical test of its readiness – and relevance – as a regional stakeholder.”
• And, a propos of powers and order more generally, Robert Ayson has a great piece at The Interpreter (21 Feb) on the kinds of common values we need “if the coming international order is going to be genuinely orderly”. These are values like accommodation, respectfulness, peacefulness, responsibility, and restraint – and they need to be stressed and promoted by all the powers in the region, large and small. The longer version is well worth reading.
• The ASEAN Secretariat reports that in a meeting on 17-19 February, the members of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) “discussed and agreed on the structure and the elements” of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), and “also agreed on the framework for discussion of the draft AHRD”. It notes: “The AICHR has received inputs from civil society groups on the AHRD. AICHR plans to hold regional consultations on the AHRD in the coming months to encourage more inputs.” This will be welcome, in light of criticism that too little consultation has taken place to date. Not surprisingly, achieving consensus on this issue is going to be difficult. But ASEAN has been here before. Incrementally, painfully – but still productively, I would argue – they manage to find a way forward. It may not be fast. It may not be ideal. But it is moving in the right direction. In the next round of debate and struggle, it’s important not to lose sight of how far the region has come in the last 10-20 years.
• Reuters reported last week (15 Feb) that “Myanmar's government expects to reach ceasefire deals with all of the country's ethnic minority rebel armies within three months,” citing Aung Min, the minister responsible for negotiating an end to the conflict. It’s an interesting report – let’s hope he’s right.
• Considering the huge changes that have taken place in Myanmar recently, Trevor Wilson, a former Australian ambassador to that country, notes: “Now the challenge for all concerned—Burmese and non-Burmese alike—is to manage the thaw better than they managed the freeze. The West can respond by gradually easing sanctions, as Australia has already begun to do, but very few countries have so far committed to this. Easing of sanctions should be done in a positive and generous manner, rather than with a grudging distrustful mindset, and without ‘moving the goalposts’. Aid donors should focus on how new international assistance can help the people of Burma make up for the years of deprivation and ensure that reforms, by virtue of their success, are irreversible.”