Darwin and TPP continue to make waves

It was saddening to read of a rumoured rift between the Indonesian president and his foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa. While some have rejected this speculation, others have wondered whether SBY might be looking to replace Marty. Political observer Ikrar Nusa Bhakti points out that it would not be a good time for such a move: “If he insists on [the replacement] now, it would trigger a big question for the public, especially after Obama’s reported statement of dislike … It would make it sound as if [Yudhoyono] is a US crony; as if he receives political orders from the US.” (The “reported statement” is mentioned here.)

Given that 2011 has already turned out to be something of an “annus horribilis” for Yudhoyono, getting rid of the highly articulate and intelligent Marty, in circumstances that might suggest “leaning toward the US”, would hardly seem advisable.

Bantarto Bandoro of the Indonesia Defense University (link above) argues that, “given recent events, Indonesia needed to reaffirm its free and active foreign policy”. SBY’s “gestures” regarding the Darwin plan, however, no longer reflected this stance: “It is in fact a pretty significant deviation.” University of Indonesia international law expert Hikmahanto Juwana “also reiterated Indonesia’s need to stay true to its free and active stance, given that most of the public still rejected the idea of a pro-US foreign policy”.

An “official close to the issue” has suggested that this is a “good cop bad cop” game,  aimed at both the US and China, “with Marty expressing a tough stance on the US while Yudhoyono presented a calming influence”. Maybe…

Meanwhile, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), another US-endorsed bone of contention, continues to generate reaction.

Philippine trade official Ramon T. Kabigting is quoted by BusinessWorld as saying that ASEAN “will begin discussions next year on harmonizing existing free trade agreements in a bid to open an alternative” to the TPP. The move reflects “concern over the complexities of implementing separate free tree agreements” and “worry given strict standards in terms of intellectual property rights, labor, and the environment”.

Kabigting explains: “How do we consolidate those ASEAN plus one FTAs for simplification and consistency? … To some degree, it will be like the TPP, but it is not meant to outdo the other trading bloc. It’s just that members of the two groups (ASEAN with its partners and the TPP group) are asking themselves what measures do they deem appropriate to become part of such a deal … Maybe for the TPP, the attraction will be that the [United States] is part of it, but we are formulating our own offerings which are sets of trade facilitation and liberalization measures with anybody who wants to trade with the ASEAN.”

On the TPP in Indonesia generally, “one thing is becoming apparent: the absence of the two major emerging economies in Asia — China and Indonesia”. On the details, though, opinion is mixed. Some see promising opportunities for textiles and electronics. Others question Indonesia’s preparedness for such an arrangement, expressing doubts about infrastructure, logistics, legal frameworks, and service sector capacity.

These are stories that will no doubt continue to run in 2012. Let's hope the denouements reflect the inclusivity and balance that have always stood SEA in good stead in the past.

“Great Irresponsibles”?

I increasingly wonder whether the US and China – just like the US and USSR characterized by Hedley Bull in his 1980 article ‘The Great Irresponsibles?’ – are just not “well suited to fulfil the normative requirements of great powerhood”.

Like Bull’s superpowers of the Cold War, neither has a “continuous tradition of involvement as a great power manager in co-operation with other great powers”. Neither seems capable of realizing that “the overweening power of a state … provides other states and peoples with grounds for legitimate concern”. Rather, in each there is “an instinctive belief that the menace to others of superior power is cancelled out by virtuous purposes” – whether those purposes are a peaceful rise or the advancement of freedom. Both are “societies … that are self-absorbed and inattentive to values and perspectives other than their own, in a way that only very large societies can be”.

There is never any lack of reportage on China’s diplomatic missteps, and a thicket of commentary has noted how a carefully calibrated “charm offensive” seemed to give way over the last few years to a worrying tendency to come across as a bully. China definitely needs to do better.

But what about the US? Is it all good news for SEA that it’s “back”? Hardly.

It is not that SEA is opposed to US engagement. Far from it. Its economic and strategic security has long depended on ensuring that all its surrounding powers have a stake in its wellbeing. In broad terms, therefore, the region is happy that the US has signed ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, showed up at regional meetings, and generally signalled a massive upgrade in attention.

But responsible engagement involves more than this.

One element of responsibility involves not coming across as too obviously self-interested.

As Fenna Egberink has pointed out (8 Sep): “Increased engagement is much welcomed, but not if it feels like an anti-China rather than a pro-ASEAN policy.”

Singaporean Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam sums this up in an interview with Amitav Acharya (21 Oct), noting that he “believes that the ‘US has to demonstrate the importance it attaches to Southeast Asia’. The US needs to engage the region in a ‘responsible’ way and pursue ‘a coherent and clear policy towards Southeast Asia, otherwise countries here will make their own calculations’.”

Of course, no state has purely altruistic motives for any of its diplomatic moves. Understandably, the US wants to get some benefit from its investment of time, energy, and political capital. But being a responsible power means knowing how to make your great-power status palatable – knowing how to demonstrate that political initiatives are not “all about me”.

A second element of responsibility involves not creating or exacerbating harmful divisions – in other words, not making things worse. US administrations come and go, but the idea that “whoever is not with us is against us” never quite disappears.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, also interviewed by Acharya, insists that “the answer to regional tensions lies not in inviting the US to balance China militarily, but in expanding and deepening ASEAN's engagement with both the US and China”. Asians, famously, “do not want to have to favor one country over another”.

Yet participants at a recent workshop “wondered if the US is increasingly successful in ‘using’ ASEAN-led regionalism against China”.

Indonesian newspapers likewise pick up on undercurrents that resent what is perceived as an unwarranted tilt towards the US, or that question an increased US presence on the edges of the region.

And in a recent opinion piece (6 Dec), Ruhanas Harun, from the National Defence University of Malaysia, detects “some concern about the US intention to deepen their military presence in the region.  If it is done too fast, too deep and somewhat arrogantly, many countries are worried that it might antagonise China… Are ASEAN countries actively looking to refurbish their relationships with the US as a way of balancing against Chinese power, as suggested by some? Not really. ASEAN countries maintain that they have no quarrel with China and are not willing to fight someone else’s battle against China… For ASEAN, the dilemma is managing the delicate balance between the necessity to reassure its security and the desire to have its sovereignty and integrity respected. While there are differences among ASEAN members with regards to outside powers’ intentions in the region, they all agree that arrogance is unacceptable, wherever it might originate.”

Two current issues are particulaly ripe with divisive possibilities, and offer a clear test of responsibility for both powers. One is the South China Sea. Both powers seem incapable of realizing that their actions look threatening to the other, and are threatening to the unity of the region. China’s famous dotted line is an obvious provocation, but the US, too, seems often oblivious to the effect of its actions, which can easily come across as contributing to “encirclement” or pursuing a “zero-sum approach”.

And then there's the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

It appears this “potentially threatening arrangement” has jolted China into redoubling efforts to reach a regional trade agreement in East Asia “even if it means moving towards Japan’s position on issues of coverage and membership” (maybe).

But as Shiro Armstrong very forcefully argues (11 Dec), this possibly useful galvanizing effect may come with a heavy price tag: “China needs to help set the rules and agree to them so that it has buy-in – not have those rules created around it. The latter scenario may have been possible a decade ago, but not now. It is crucial, then, that a major trade policy initiative in the Asia Pacific, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, include China, else it will become one of the set of rules created around China, constraining not promoting one of the main trans-Pacific economic relationships…The biggest risk of the TPP is political: that it might divide the region strategically between its members and the rest, with China being on the outside.”

Peter Drysdale (12 Dec) agrees: “The TPP is supposed to weld the Asia Pacific region together. It is supposed to deal with ‘behind-the-border’ regulatory (21st century) issues on which other preferential trade agreements fall short. Without careful consideration, design and a manageable framework, it will likely do the reverse — exclude key partners who are at the heart of East Asian economic dynamism by making it near-impossible for the excluded to join… It is disingenuous to declare, as [Congressman and Chairman of the Subcommittee of Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means Kevin] Brady did in announcing the congressional hearings last week, that ‘we should also welcome new countries to the TPP if they are willing to meet TPP’s high ambitions and resolve outstanding bilateral issues’. There is absolutely no indication that the intention is to draw China into the TPP process any time soon.”

The report from an ASEAN Studies Centre seminar (12 Dec) concludes: “The TPP is another part of the ongoing Sino-US rivalry. The absence of China’s participation is evident. While the US states that it aims to prevent a division in the Asia-Pacific, it may actually be carefully engineering this division… The TPP is a very ambitious initiative towards deeper economic integration in Asia-Pacific. But it should be managed with ‘great sophistication’ so that it does not become another confrontational ground for the US and China.”

Having a large power in your vicinity is like having a hippo in your bathtub. It leaves you little space for manoeuvre. SEA is in the invidious position of having two major hippos and several minor ones in its bathing place. Individually and collectively, its states have the responsibility to do their utmost not to rock the tub. But at the end of the day, it’s the hippos who have to play responsibly, and learn to share. Otherwise, we’ll be in for a very messy, bruising outcome. 

Clinton in Myanmar

There’s lots of commentary, of course, about this visit, ranging from the metaphysical through the anecdotal to the frankly sartorial.

In the background is the China theme. While The New York Times (29 Nov) notes: “The Chinese are warily watching as the United States makes overtures toward Myanmar’s leaders,” Elizabeth Economy (1 Dec) insists: “Recent developments in U.S.-Myanmar relations are largely independent of the U.S.-China relationship and reflect instead a desire on the part of Myanmar’s leaders to begin reforming the country’s political and economic system and, within that process, to re-engage with the United States.”

But what the US should do next is an even bigger preoccupation. Joshua Kurlantzick (2 Dec) proposes “conditional normalization, in which Washington would significantly boost its relationship with Myanmar provided the reforms in that country continue apace”.

Two RSIS scholars (2 Dec) contend that “changes in Myanmar require the US to be more responsive”. Movements toward reform up to now are “not insignificant, and should be rewarded by the US, not simply with cautious approval and diplomatic visits, but with tangible actions that send the message that reforms bring attractive benefits.” There are two obstacles to speedy changes in US policy, they argue: the US government’s “heavy policy reliance” upon Aung San Suu Kyi, and “the oversimplification of Myanmar's internal political landscape by US commentators and policymakers”. They continue: “These obstacles have contributed to ineffective US policies toward Myanmar that reflect ostensible political morality over pragmatism. This has only worsened the impasse in bilateral relations. Ongoing developments in Myanmar necessitate that the US reengage the country as a matter of priority.”

A Jakarta Post commentator (2 Dec) urges the US not to “play out its own agenda in Myanmar simply to satisfy members of Congress”, and to employ “fairness”: “Fair treatment, as against ‘double standards’, is social capital for the US to utilize in its role in the region. A superior approach, as expressed through ‘acting like a colonial master’ to dictate its will on others will be no longer be helpful and sounds obsolete.”

But in a pre-visit post, Ernie Bower (22 Nov) warns that the US response to change in Burma “is likely to be measured, incremental and similar to normalizing relations with Vietnam. Don’t look for U.S. sanctions to be unwound anytime soon. In fact, even if the Obama administration wanted to, it couldn’t move too quickly to unwind and revoke the multiple layers of legal sanctions preventing U.S. companies and the U.S. government from engaging Myanmar.”

 

As with most things related to Myanmar, the next moves are going to be difficult to finesse.

Norms, power, and SEA

The Asia Society’s November report on US-East Asia relations offers many sound conclusions, not surprisingly, given its eminent panel of contributors.

One of its most useful pieces of advice is to avoid rushing to “tidy” the region’s overlapping institutions (because this might lead to exclusion and imbalance), and to tolerate instead a looser “Asia-Pacific network” arrangement (pp. 19, 35).

The following recommendation, however, does not quite seem to capture the complexity of the SEA dynamic:

“ASEAN’s role in building a more integrated regional society based on shared norms and values should be fully recognized and supported. Asia currently faces tensions between two competing trends: Asia as a community of norms and values, and Asia as a region shaped by power relations, given the presence of the United States and China... Deeper ASEAN engagement with the United States can reinforce ASEAN’s role in promoting values and building norms. This may be a more productive focus for U.S.–ASEAN relations, rather than simply seeking to use U.S.–ASEAN ties as a means of balancing rising regional actors such as China” (p.36).

This somewhat dichotomous understanding of norms and power is even more starkly expressed in the executive summary: “ASEAN’s efforts to build a regional society based on norms and values rather than power relations should be supported by the United States” (p. 7).

There is a good point here, of course, which aims to encourage the US to see ASEAN as a producer of useful long-term norms, rather than just another element that can potentially be arrayed against China. It serves as a reminder that ASEAN has contributed to the normative environment of Southeast Asia in ways that have often been under-valued.

But it suggests that norms and power are on divergent tracks, which is misleading. One of ASEAN’s greatest strengths has been its capacity to maintain a balance with all the region’s major powers. This multi-dimensional, ever-oscillating balance has in itself a normative dimension. Behind it is the idea that a balanced region will create greater room for manoeuvre for individual states and the region as a whole – a situation that is regarded as better than other imaginable alternatives (such as out-and-out dominance by any particular power). And just as power-balancing has a normative dimension, so too does norm-creation have a power dimension. Power always plays a role in the development of norms.

This is particularly obvious in the case of SEA. The normative strand of the regional narrative has always, and will always, come with a distinct power component – and vice versa. These facets are two sides of a coin rather than “competing trends”.

The attempt to separate norms and power has often been at the root of skewed interpretations of Southeast Asian politics: realists have too exclusively privileged power; constructivists and liberals have too exclusively privileged norms. Many interpretations of Southeast Asis consequently come across as one-sided, since Southeast Asia epitomizes the interplay of both.

English School interpretations hit the spot more closely here, I would argue, since ideas of international society clearly recognize and value processes of normative change, but equally clearly foreground the dimension of power in the evolution of underlying institutions.

Attempts to somehow overcome power relations, as though they are embarrassing remnants of an old-fashioned past that we should have outgrown, are likely to leave Southeast Asia vulnerable. ASEAN needs to work with the grain of both dimensions – the normative and the power-conscious elements – if it is to ride out the waves of a US “pivot” that faces the Association with what Mark Valencia (30 Nov) sees as “perhaps its greatest challenge since its creation”.

The dangers of “wishing away” power are perhaps what Rizal Sukma (2 Dec) has in mind when he considers how Indonesia should react to the looming strategic rivalry between the US and China. In language reminiscent of Michael Leifer’s, he argues:

“For ASEAN’s normative multilateral framework to function well there is the need for a stable balance of power among the major powers. Hence, a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ within an ASEAN’s multilateral framework — such as the EAS — requires a stable conventional balance of power outside that framework.”

But this does not leave ASEAN or Southeast Asia as a powerless puppet of external forces. As another recent report on Southeast Asia suggests: “Southeast Asian states often ‘punch above their weight’ as ASEAN shapes the rules of the game in Southeast Asia, and individual Southeast Asian states are not compelled to side completely with either the U.S. or China.”

ASEAN and its individual states need to redouble their efforts to ensure they do their bit towards contributing to a stable Asia-wide balance of power, resisting all blandishments to favour one power over another.

Not having too many eggs in any one basket is still the best way to safeguard their normative Asia-wide room for manoeuvre. The two belong, inextricably, together.

"Southeast Asia's Place in Asia"

The East-West Center and the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies organized a workshop last month on “Southeast Asia’s Place in Asia: Perceptions, Realities, and Aspirations”. The report has just come out.

Some interesting points on the surrounding powers:

“The ‘return’ of the United States to Southeast Asia in the past two years was generally applauded, but discussion focused not on Washington’s current intentions but on American consistency... Other participants asked if the American concept of a broader ‘Indo-Pacific’ region really boils down to ‘America on top, with India drawn in?’...

“As for India, Southeast Asian participants commented that New Delhi has undertaken few recent initiatives in the ASEAN region. Except for episodic gestures that annoy China, its interest in Southeast Asia appears to have waned...

“Japan’s influence in Southeast Asia continues to fade...

“While competition between China and the U.S. was the dominant theme, caution was also expressed about overstating the role of outside powers. Southeast Asian states often ‘punch above their weight’ as ASEAN shapes the rules of the game in Southeast Asia, and individual Southeast Asian states are not compelled to side completely with either the U.S. or China...

“Southeast Asians do not believe their expanding trade with China undermines or threatens their independence or security. While fundamental economic (China-centered production networks) and diplomatic-security (hedging against China) trends are not aligned, Southeast Asia can both prosper and balance, with American assistance, China’s growing military capabilities and diplomatic influence. For example, there is no evidence that Sino-Vietnamese or Sino-Filipino commercial ties have been affected by rising tensions in the South China Sea. This finding contradicts the currently fashionable assumption in Australia and the U.S. that Asian states will be compelled to choose between their trade with China and their security relationships with the United States...

“Examples are few and far between where the Chinese government has sought to use economic leverage to alter Southeast Asian states’ policies...”

And on the role of ASEAN:

“ASEAN’s utility is underappreciated...

“One discussion revolved around who is using regionalism for what purpose. ASEAN uses it to advance Southeast Asian states’ ‘strategic autonomy.’ At the same time, ASEAN’s flexibility is useful for individual countries. Is, in fact, strengthening the institution in the interests of individual states? There was consensus among the Southeast Asian participants that it was not, as weak institutionalism gives member states greater room for maneuver.

“Another focus was on ASEAN’s relations with the U.S. and China. Official US policy has declared that ASEAN is a ‘fulcrum’ for regional institution building. While China appears more comfortable with ‘open regionalism’ and less determined to try to exclude the United States, some participants wondered if the U.S. is increasingly successful in ‘using’ ASEAN-led regionalism against China?”

Pick of the month -- 3 -- the Myanmar story

This is more akin to “pick of two months” now, but the story continues to be a fascinating one.

Approval of Myanmar’s bid to chair ASEAN in 2014, coupled with the announcement of Hillary Clinton’s visit, brought to the surface towards the end of November a number of pleas to slow down the rapidly accelerating process of engagement. 

Even before that, the note of caution was always present (13 Oct), and some commentators were keen to inject some element of measurability into the debate, suggesting “benchmarks” (25 Sep) or “conditions” (25 Oct) that Myanmar should be expected to meet.

But others argued for not asking too many questions too soon. A. Lin Neumann contends (23 Sep): “In short, Burma has to allow its people enough freedom that it will no longer be an embarrassment to its neighbors, while remaining repressive enough to keep the generals secure. It is not a perfect arrangement, but it is a start and probably the best anyone can hope for.” Sounds cynical – but it is good to be reminded that Myanmar is not going to turn into a model democracy overnight.

“As imperfect as they may be, the signs [of change] are unmistakable,” Kamrul Idris writes (23 Nov), quoting Amnesty International researcher Benjamin Zawacki as saying, “Those who deny this are simply not paying attention or are allowing their personal, political or institutional agendas to get in the way.” But at the end of the day, Idris continues, “the aim of bringing in Myanmar from the cold for the sake of its long-suffering population can benefit from not asking too many questions at the present time.” Elsewhere, too, current developments were seen as validating “a persuasive approach”, that focused on “incentives rather than punishments” (1 Nov).

A couple of particularly noteworthy observations came during November. Nicholas Farelly (15 Nov) comments: “If you watch the Burmese media closely then you already know that there have been some simply remarkable changes in the past year.  I can’t think of any time (since 1962, at least) when so much has happened to shift perceptions of the country. It is remarkable, and important, that the media is now free(er) to play a vital role in helping keep the public informed about the country’s political, economic and social changes.”

And in a powerful article, an Inside Story correspondent (1 Nov) observes that “the scepticism of many international pundits is strikingly absent in Rangoon. Here, a new air of openness is drawing many people into the political process ... which the military unveiled to such opprobrium in 2003.”

This correspondent sums up the surprise of many: “I felt betrayed, and naive for having hoped that an election process so obviously flawed could usher in any sort of significant, positive change. But that is precisely what has happened. And, most dramatically, many foes of the former regime – including Aung San Suu Kyi – are rolling the dice and throwing their support behind President Thein Sein and his government, seeing them as the best last chance to break Burma’s decades-old political deadlock.”

True, there are many potential motivations behind the decision to suspend construction of the Myitsone Dam, but, as the Inside Story writer notes, on the one hand, this move “sent a strong signal to both China and the West: Thein Sein wants Burma’s international relationships to be better balanced”. On the other, “what was most striking was the broad-based anti-dam movement that found its voice in the weeks leading up to the 30 September announcement. For the first time since the 1988 uprising, the many groups that make up Burma’s notoriously fractious opposition movement had come together on a single issue.”

Pragmatism involves trying to steer a course between euphoria and scepticism, seeking out not the highest moral ground, but rather what might best work for continued positive change in what is still a very fragile and constrained situation. 

It involves compromise – and the ability to live with history. As one activist from the “88 Generation” explains to the Inside Story correspondent quoted above: “I have suffered a great deal myself. But from these bitter experiences I realised that we cannot achieve what we want with hatred. We need a situation where everybody wins, including the military. They are our brothers as well.”

Another “activist-turned-educator” agrees “that in every negotiation process we have to try and understand the other side’s interests, and we must make their interests our interests... Whatever worries them, we have to find out what it is and eliminate it.”

These are good strategies for pragmatists everywhere…

Some of the recent commentary has focused on Aung San Suu Kyi, and the need for a “deft touch” in playing what is a rather new political game (27 Oct). Andrew Selth writes (23 Nov): “Burma's pro-democracy forces have endured terrible privations over the past 23 years to get to this position. Now that it is here, however, they may find that the real work has only just begun. The existence of an undisguised military dictatorship guilty of appalling human rights abuses offered them a simple choice. The decision whether or not to trust a hybrid civilian-military government that seems to promise incremental reform and national reconciliation is much more difficult.”

This, of course – albeit less starkly, and certainly less prominently – is the kind of choice SEA’s civil society activists face every day. 

The biggest fly in the ointment is still the ethnic issue. As a new International Crisis Group report (30 Nov) makes clear, recent conciliatory moves “mark one of the most significant moments in the six decades of conflict”, but still “lasting peace is still not assured”. If ever there was a situation where pragmatism needs to prevail, this is it.