An update post: ARF and the South China Sea

Echoes from July’s ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting are still reverberating, and the din from the South China Sea continues to get louder.

Opinion divides, as I noted in my post of 3 August, over the potential for success of ASEAN-type fora and their outcomes. For some, for example, the Bali agreement to draw up guidelines on the South China Sea has been “overrated” (29 Aug) and “changes almost nothing” (22 Aug); for others, it is a “big step towards the resolution of the dispute… [and] will serve the interest of all parties in a pragmatic manner” (26 Aug).  

On the ARF itself, while some are still unimpressed, Ernie Bower points out that “ministers and senior officials noted a significant change in the tone and substance of the ARF meetings from more pro forma to substantive” (3 Aug). As See Seng Tan argued back in July, if regional flashpoints can as much as be aired at the Forum, then a key objective will have been reached, “even if no solutions are immediately apparent” (22 Jul).

But lurking behind this debate about form and substance, and undoubtedly colouring it and shaping it, is another divider of opinion: the role and intentions of the two giants in the ARF arena.

Their behaviour makes or breaks a forum, and Bower notes that the “cooperative narrative” of this year’s ARF was ascribed by participants to diplomatic efforts by the US and China to address certain issues ahead of the meeting.

Their supporters line up behind whichever best represents the way they want the international game to be played. While for some, the US was the shining light at the ARF (23 Jul), for Jakarta Post editor Meidyatama Surodiningrat, “it was China who became the ‘breakout star’” at the meeting. “Admittedly,” he goes on, “the United States still grabbed its share of headlines; however it was in large part, if not all, due to the fanfare and celebrity status that Secretary Clinton attracts.” At the end of the day, it is the one “who can influence – not dominate” – the creation of all the overlapping Asia-Pacific architectures who will ultimately be best positioned in the region (4 Aug).

The problem for SEA is that both these powers are just a little too difficult to keep in their box, especially on the issue of the South China Sea. Hao, for example, works his way from the contentious points (“China’s sovereign rights supported by historical evidence” and “China’s claim based on international law”) through the explanatory point (“China’s national interests in the South China Sea”) to the normative point (“The great efforts of China to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea”).  I seem to recall that the important points come at the end in a Chinese presentation, so peace and stability is what is being emphasized, but the rest of it will not reassure the SEA camp. But even Ott’s conclusion – “there will be a premium on efforts designed to strengthen U.S. strategic cooperation with ASEAN governments while buttressing ASEAN itself as a strategic partner” – meshes well with one reality in SEA (that it wants and needs US engagement), but not so comfortably with the other equally valid reality (that it wants and needs China too).  

Meanwhile, everyone’s declaring some kind of interest in the South China Sea. Japan has been talking to the Philippines. India has been talking to Viet Nam.

The headline for the September Comparative Connections overview of US-China relations reads a bit like something from the I Ching: “Friction and cooperation co-exist uneasily”. The South China Sea, not surprisingly, is “high on the agenda”. Likewise, “diplomacy in the South China Sea disputes has dominated US actions in Southeast Asia over the past two years”, while relations between China and SEA, also focused on “managing rising tensions in the South China Sea”, display a pattern characterized by “incidents, disputes, and engagement”.

Says it all really.