Why religion and politics were banned at the dinner-table

Those in predominantly secular societies sometimes struggle to understand nations where religion has a much stronger imprimatur. They may find it hard to understand, for example, “why the Antichrist matters in politics”, or that “around 20 percent of Americans see God’s hand at work in the economy – even if they also strongly support a market free of all non-divine influence”.

Leaps to comprehend are also often needed in analysing events in Indonesia – “neither a theocratic nor secular state”, where “religion is not fully separated from political and public life”, as Azyumardi Azra puts it.

Not only understanding, but using that understanding to form responsible ethical judgements, is even harder.

But it seems it doesn’t get that much easier even if you are within Indonesia. Andreas Harsono recently tackled the question of “Indonesia’s religious violence: the reluctance of reporters to tell the story”. He argues, “The question confronting journalists in Indonesia is how to explain what can only be seen as their selective self-censorship on stories involving religious freedom.”

I was particularly interested in his comment on one of the findings from a nationwide survey of journalists (see his piece for references), which indicated that 64 per cent of those questioned said they supported banning the Ahmadiyah sect: “When I saw that figure of 64 percent,” he says, “it reminded me of a conversation I'd had with a newspaper editor in Jakarta who was a Christian. She told me that she was shocked when her chief editor, a Muslim, told an editorial meeting, ‘Our policy is to eliminate the Ahmadiyah. We have to get rid of the Ahmadiyah.’”

I have previously noted my own surprise at conversations with moderate Indonesian Muslims who totally condemned the violence against Ahmadiyah, but also thought there should be some limitations on the group (in fact they thought the failure to uphold the 2008 restrictions was partly responsible for some groups taking the law into their own hands). It was something I couldn’t really fathom, and I came to the conclusion that their response was similar to the kind of response a group of professionals might have to a lone-ranger subgroup, whose unilateral reinterpretation of professional rules might bring the entire profession into disrepute. (There are other groups that differ from mainstream Islam, but because the differences do not concern the role of the Prophet – and therefore the essential identity of Islam – they have not proved nearly so controversial.) But I was aware, somehow, of a big gap in my comprehension.

In the current climate, there are always those who are ready to jump on an anti-Islamic bandwagon (there’s a particularly egregious example here, h/t The Interpreter – but in general I am regularly shocked by how acceptable it has become in many circles to malign and stereotype Islam). This makes it even more difficult to find a balance – to pay the right amount of attention to the minority that does totally inexcusable things, to the majority that is moderate but whose views on a number of issues may be very different from those prevalent in a liberal and/or secular environment, and to the various kinds of minorities that suffer from both the above, and also need protection simply because it is always hard to be a minority.

Given the lack of simple answers, material that shows the subtlety and paradox of the vastly complex world of Islam in Indonesia is always useful, and there have been several fascinating examples recently. Karen Bryner, for example, unpacks “one of the fastest growing trends in Islamic education in post-Suharto Indonesia” – integrated Islamic schools. Chiara Formichi has some hopeful thoughts about the trajectory of Indonesia’s Shi’i population. Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman looks at the contradictions of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia – the group is growing, despite the fact that it opposes concepts (eg capitalism) that surveys show Indonesians generally accept, and it attracts “large numbers of Muslim professionals who work in multinational companies and are part of Indonesian capitalism”. AP also reports on the rise in the use of Islamic medicine.

The complexity that emerges from pieces like these is difficult to turn into dinner-table platitudes, but all the more useful for that.

ASEAN round-up

• Based on the recent Singapore Global Dialogue, Edmund Sim comments on the areas where ASEAN as an entity needs to be strengthened (economic), and the areas where weakness can be quite useful (political-security). (He also blogs on the ASEAN Economic Community.) 
• A meeting of legal experts in Manila “has concluded that there is a legal basis for a proposal by the Philippines for joint economic development in disputed parts of the South China Sea". Bunn Nagara, however, comments on Manila’s “confusing if not also conflicting signals over the issue”.
• Meanwhile, the “haze” from forest fires in Indonesia continues to illustrate the problems of cooperation in SEA, and the limits of Indonesian leadership. After a recent meeting in Bangkok, ministers from Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei called on Indonesia to ratify the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze. Singaporean Environment Minister Vivian Balakrishnan noted progress on the haze, but also continuing “serious concern”. As he put it, “Transboundary haze is one example in which, unfortunately, the economic interests of the culprits responsible for starting these fires are not aligned with the interests of larger society.” This is a misalignment that still impedes ASEAN cooperation on a number of fronts.
• Malaysian minister Rais Yatim has suggested the official use of the “Malay language” within ASEAN. “As regards which Malay is being proposed… Rais was not willing to answer.” There has also been a proposal to make Indonesian the official language of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA).
• The AIPA meeting took place last week, involving parliamentarians from Myanmar/Burma. The ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, however, is still taking a sceptical line on progress there.

An update post: ARF and the South China Sea

Echoes from July’s ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting are still reverberating, and the din from the South China Sea continues to get louder.

Opinion divides, as I noted in my post of 3 August, over the potential for success of ASEAN-type fora and their outcomes. For some, for example, the Bali agreement to draw up guidelines on the South China Sea has been “overrated” (29 Aug) and “changes almost nothing” (22 Aug); for others, it is a “big step towards the resolution of the dispute… [and] will serve the interest of all parties in a pragmatic manner” (26 Aug).  

On the ARF itself, while some are still unimpressed, Ernie Bower points out that “ministers and senior officials noted a significant change in the tone and substance of the ARF meetings from more pro forma to substantive” (3 Aug). As See Seng Tan argued back in July, if regional flashpoints can as much as be aired at the Forum, then a key objective will have been reached, “even if no solutions are immediately apparent” (22 Jul).

But lurking behind this debate about form and substance, and undoubtedly colouring it and shaping it, is another divider of opinion: the role and intentions of the two giants in the ARF arena.

Their behaviour makes or breaks a forum, and Bower notes that the “cooperative narrative” of this year’s ARF was ascribed by participants to diplomatic efforts by the US and China to address certain issues ahead of the meeting.

Their supporters line up behind whichever best represents the way they want the international game to be played. While for some, the US was the shining light at the ARF (23 Jul), for Jakarta Post editor Meidyatama Surodiningrat, “it was China who became the ‘breakout star’” at the meeting. “Admittedly,” he goes on, “the United States still grabbed its share of headlines; however it was in large part, if not all, due to the fanfare and celebrity status that Secretary Clinton attracts.” At the end of the day, it is the one “who can influence – not dominate” – the creation of all the overlapping Asia-Pacific architectures who will ultimately be best positioned in the region (4 Aug).

The problem for SEA is that both these powers are just a little too difficult to keep in their box, especially on the issue of the South China Sea. Hao, for example, works his way from the contentious points (“China’s sovereign rights supported by historical evidence” and “China’s claim based on international law”) through the explanatory point (“China’s national interests in the South China Sea”) to the normative point (“The great efforts of China to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea”).  I seem to recall that the important points come at the end in a Chinese presentation, so peace and stability is what is being emphasized, but the rest of it will not reassure the SEA camp. But even Ott’s conclusion – “there will be a premium on efforts designed to strengthen U.S. strategic cooperation with ASEAN governments while buttressing ASEAN itself as a strategic partner” – meshes well with one reality in SEA (that it wants and needs US engagement), but not so comfortably with the other equally valid reality (that it wants and needs China too).  

Meanwhile, everyone’s declaring some kind of interest in the South China Sea. Japan has been talking to the Philippines. India has been talking to Viet Nam.

The headline for the September Comparative Connections overview of US-China relations reads a bit like something from the I Ching: “Friction and cooperation co-exist uneasily”. The South China Sea, not surprisingly, is “high on the agenda”. Likewise, “diplomacy in the South China Sea disputes has dominated US actions in Southeast Asia over the past two years”, while relations between China and SEA, also focused on “managing rising tensions in the South China Sea”, display a pattern characterized by “incidents, disputes, and engagement”.

Says it all really.

Moving forward in Myanmar/Burma

In a report released yesterday, International Crisis Group argues:

“With the political process moving ahead quickly, now is not the time for the West to remain disengaged and sceptical. It is critical to grasp this unique opportunity to support a process that not even the most optimistic observers saw coming. This requires a new, pro-active and engaged approach, in line with the positive signals coming from Naypyitaw.”

On proposals for a “commission of inquiry” into war crimes and crimes against humanity, it points out:

“Progress in tackling those abuses and creating domestic accountability is only possible with the cooperation of the government and the military, whose personnel are a major part of the problem, and therefore must be a major part of any solution. At a time when the new government is moving ahead with its reform agenda, including on human rights, pursuing the establishment of a UN commission of inquiry is unlikely to achieve anything. At this time, the international community should focus its efforts on ways to support the process of reform and encourage engagement.”

The report also notes, however, that the government in Naypyitaw “has so far failed to bring the same degree of subtlety and imagination to the ethnic issue as it has to the economic issue”.

Indeed, as Marie Lall commented earlier this month, "the ethnic conflict remains Burma's Achilles heel and needs to be taken as seriously as economic reforms and national recociliation with Aung San Suu Kyi”.

Commentary on Burma/Myanmar is coming thick and fast now, responding to the gathering momentum of announced change. A strong strand continues to emphasize the human rights abuses that clearly continue on many fronts in Burma. Many remain unconvinced by “largely superficial changes” in recent months, and continue to argue that sanctions have not effected change simply because they have been inadequately implemented.

But, continuing a long-standing argument, others continue to question the usefulness of sanctions and the policy of isolationism, not only because of Myanmar's economic and geopolitical situation, but also because of signs of the possibility of change.

Thant Myint-U writes:

“If this opportunity for positive change is lost, Burma may remain a miserably run place – but it will no longer be an isolated backwater. The great infrastructure projects under way will continue, as will the much longer-term processes of change. Asia's frontier will close and a new but dangerous crossroads will be the result. But if Burma indeed takes a turn for the better and we see an end to decades of armed conflict, a lifting of Western sanctions, democratic government, and broad-based economic growth, the impact could be dramatic. China's hinterland will suddenly border a vibrant and young democracy, and India's northeast will be transformed from a dead end into its bridge to the Far East. What happens next in Burma could be a game-changer for all Asia.”

Meanwhile, a report last week noted that “Burma may face sanctions for having ‘failed demonstrably’ in its anti-drug efforts”. Such policies need careful consideration, especially at the moment. We’ve been down this road before, and it arguably represented a “lost opportunity”. Now is surely a sensitive time, when the sticks and the carrots on all fronts need to be particularly carefully balanced. 

It will be the unenviable task of Indonesia’s foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, to pronounce on Burma’s suitability to be ASEAN’s chair in 2014. FM Marty has considerable diplomatic gifts, and he’s going to need them all.

The wood and the metal: the year so far in SEA

We’re about three quarters of the way through the Year of the Rabbit. Personally, I’ve not been a fan. Anything you would normally associate with rabbits does not seem to have been borne out by what must be one of the most tumultuous years in recent history.

But if I’d been paying attention properly, I shouldn’t have been surprised. While rabbits are apparently associated with wood, this year is associated with metal, and wood and metal are not natural partners (think choppers and trees).  

I’m absolutely not an expert on Chinese astrology, but this metaphor seems apt for what’s going on in SEA at the moment.

There are undoubtedly some game little trees putting out leaves and sprouts. What’s unfolding in Myanmar is still fraught and fragile, and the status of the ethnic minorities still represents a very big river to cross. Nevertheless, something useful seems to be stirring. Thailand has been given another chance to let a democratically elected government live out its normal lifespan. It’s too early to rule out some awful nationalist backlash, but domestic change also seems to be on the way to solving the temples dispute with Cambodia. Malaysia has announced some promising reforms. Singapore has the potential to lay new ground in showing that you can be a stand-out economic performer while still keeping up with the evolving political aspirations of your citizens. Indonesia is struggling on the home front in some respects, but its chairmanship of ASEAN this year has been admirable.

Many of these beginnings could turn into even-better-news stories, if we don’t kill them off in their infancy with unrealistic expectations and all-too-heavy, self-interested pressure.

But the regional environment – which seems increasingly dominated by the South China Sea – is the chopper that threatens to lay about this newly burgeoning forest. And though China, with that undoubtedly provocative line on the map, is often presented as the big bogey-man in the scenario, actually few individual participants come out of this unfolding story in an entirely good light.

Claimants within SEA are not exactly shrinking violets. And attention from the larger region is becoming ever more intense. From a Japanese perspective, “[w]hat is happening in the South China Sea can be a harbinger of the potential shift of the strategic thinking among the regional states and eventually the regional strategic order itself“. India, too, has its own point to make. And the South China Sea pops up very specifically in the communiqué of the AUSMIN consultations.

Evelyn Goh clearly warns ASEAN that this dispute could potentially become an arena for China and the US “to send messages of resolve to each other”. Other contentious SEA-focused issues could similarly morph into arenas for their grandstanding.

The problem for SEA – and the East Asia Summit will only sharpen it – is that both these powers are difficult to keep in their box. The US often manages to do the better PR job. But like Gary Hawke, I sometimes wonder whether it always differentiates among “engagement”, “leadership”, and “dominance”.

Given this climate, an independent ASEAN at the helm of the EAS is a must – for the wider region and the wider world. The East Asia Summit (EAS) will be a dangerous disaster if it even begins to start resembling an anti-China forum. ASEAN understands this all too well. It is part of the reason it resisted the idea of an “Asia-Pacific community” parented by a key US ally. (And note how the AUSMIN communiqué takes care to “welcome Australia’s leadership role in building a more robust community in the Asia-Pacific region through the EAS”.)

ASEAN is much, much more useful, for the region and the world, as the honest-broking middleman it has always sought to be. It must not be turned into another element of what China already suspects is a range of actors arrayed against it. ASEAN – with its hard-to-herd assortment of differently leaning but ultimately balancing individual states – does not look threatening in itself. This has always been its great asset. It would be tragic to seek to undermine that asset.

The presence of irrepressible South China Sea claimants within ASEAN itself inevitably makes its task on this particular dispute more difficult. As Simon Tay observed before the recent ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN needs to “make efforts to calm the seas before anyone can usefully debate how to divide them”.

But the ante is upped enormously, on this and on future disputes, if its big regional neighbours try to coopt or crowd it.  

SEA’s statespersons have often been extraordinarily successful in balancing the influence of the great powers that surround them. This facility has played out for the good of the wider region as well as SEA itself. But their task is becoming harder and harder, and they often seem to be undermined by the very parties who stand to gain most from their continued success in this area.

Many of the good fruits we see growing in SEA at the moment could be choked off if the wider geopolitical arena turns sour. ASEAN has an important role to play. Let us allow it to play that role – as ASEAN, not as some extra limb of any of the extra-regional powers.  

For the wood to keep growing, the metal needs to be kept in check.

Malaysia "at a crossroads"

The Star (along with lots of other outlets) reports PM Najib’s announcement of  “major civil liberty reforms” – “historic changes… which represent the biggest shake-up of the Malaysian system since independence from Britain in 1957”. The reforms involve significant changes to the Internal Security Act, the Emergency Ordinance (EO), and regulations on press and assembly.

It is hard to imagine these moves have not been precipitated by the huge “Bersih” protest on 9 July, when a broad cross-section of Malaysians turned out to support electoral reform, and were met with a heavy-handed response that has been much criticized.

(By way of background, The Star recently spotlighted some of the difficulties of the EO, described by a human rights lawyer as “a hammer to kill a mosquito”.) 

Many reactions are still understandably cautious, and the proof of the pudding will be in the eating, but these moves are surely a small step in the right direction. It’s too early to hose them down completely.

Thailand and the "war on drugs"

Thailand’s “new war on drugs” has been much in the news in the last few days.

“There will be no licence to kill involved,” Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm insists, seeking to head off concerns from human rights groups that the new campaign will turn out to be a repeat of the one carried out under Mr Thaksin’s administration.

Bangkok Post quotes Wasant Panich, a former human rights commissioner involved in the investigation of the 2003 version: "We do not want to see a recurrence of the Thaksin war on drugs, which took the lives of 2,600 people suspected of being involved in narcotics… There must be no torture or extrajudicial killings of suspects."

The Nation recalls that Thai society, “being largely indifferent to the notion of due legal process”, welcomed the 2003 campaign “in spite of the many questions surrounding human rights issues”.

That was indeed one of the curious things about the Mark-1 version of the war on drugs. The high levels of public support that were expressed at the time were discussed, for example, in a contemporary article reproduced here.

It’s not unknown, of course, for a policy that seems inhumane from the outside to be regarded as necessary, even commendable, from the inside – any number of contemporary examples spring to mind – but that was then, The Nation implies, and things in Thailand have changed: “Today, a body count of alleged drug dealers can no longer be regarded as a benchmark for success. Instead we must focus on how many lives the government can turn around, as it says it will do.”

It will be difficult to convince The Nation, which has already announced that there is “no sign of any leadership quality from Yingluck”.  

But the conduct of the campaign this time round, its motivation, the way it is received in Thailand, and the way it plays into the current Burma/Myanmar debate, will be interesting signs of the way several winds are blowing.

All over Burma/Myanmar...

This from Greg Sheridan this morning:

"All unnoticed, we might have reached an historic turning point in Burma."

All unnoticed?? People have been commenting ad infinitum on what may or may not be happening in Myanmar/Burma ever since the election...

He goes on:

"If a new and better Burma is struggling to be born, Australia is determined to be a midwife of history... As the only Western nation in the Southeast Asian region, and as a close ally of the US, Australia has an important role... It would be absurd to suggest Rudd's intervention [a combination of visit and letter] was decisive. But it has helped move the Burmese government."

It all sounds just a little overwrought – we're here, we're helping, if we end up on the right side of history, don't forget us...

And the problem is that Australia's alliance with the US could be as much a handicap as an advantage in reaching the elements in Burma's power structure that still profoundly mistrust the US and all its works.

Meanwhile, the US, of course, is in there too, on its own behalf: US special envoy Derek Mitchell "says he has held discussions with the new government in Naypyitaw about conditions under which American sanctions could be lifted... [but] did not elaborate on what he told the Burmese leaders they will have to do".

And like everyone else, he's leaving lots of room for dashing away again if engagement starts to become too politically costly. 

I'm glad we're all talking – but Myanmar's government is very new, very fragile, and very conflicted. Let's support the good moves by all means, but let's not smother what might be happening in an all-too-heavy embrace.

Dealing with "extremism"

The Pew Research Centre poll I referred to in yesterday’s post, while highlighting considerable differences between Muslim and Western publics, also pointed out that they shared worries about “Islamic extremism”. In Indonesia, for example, 42% expressed this concern (only Muslims were interviewed, for the sake of comparison among publics). This is a significant number, although still the lowest among the publics surveyed. The problem, as always, is that one person’s “extremist” is another person’s strong-minded defender of the good.

Indonesia has made significant strides in dealing with terrorist elements, although they are constantly morphing. Luke Hunt focuses on the hardball side of Indonesia’s counter-terrorism (as well as offering Malaysia’s “widely loathed” International Security Act a rare plaudit). A recent comic book initiative in Indonesia, starring a reformed militant in a “Captain Jihad” role, exemplifies another side of the attempt to change the script. 

But as Tim Lindsey argued last week, “extremism” has many guises, not all of them terrorist.

The treatment of minorities is always a good test of the health of a democracy. This applies to any democracy – and some Western democracies need to take a good, hard look at themselves in this respect. But relatively young democracies are particularly vulnerable to challenges in this area. Rising tension between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia is therefore a real cause for concern, and is likely to provide fuel for more intolerance and stereotyping, on all sides, both domestically and further afield. 

As a report on Indonesia late last year from International Crisis Group makes clear, when officials and legislators insist on the need for “religious harmony”, they often give the impression that “this can be legislated or even imposed, rather than requiring sustained time and effort to understand how tensions have grown and developing programs designed to reduce them”.

Religious tension is not primeval, unstoppable, or inevitable. It is caused. Rooting out those causes – while sensitively dealing with their effects – will not be easy, but it is possible.

Mr Mahathir not alone...

In a turn of phrase guaranteed to upset pretty much everyone, Malaysia’s former PM Mahathir has leapt to news prominence again, expressing views that 9/11 might have been “staged”.

But of course, he is far from alone in that opinion: 58% of Indonesians surveyed recently by the Pew Research Centre did not believe “Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks”, and 23% did not know. Only 20% believed they did. 

The report goes on: “There is no Muslim public in which even 30% accept that Arabs conducted the attacks. Indeed, Muslims in Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey are less likely to accept this today than in 2006.”

Until we get to the bottom of why that is, there is a lot of unfinished business about 9/11.

"Singapore, capital of the world"

The other day, The Interpreter pointed us to Edward Carr’s proposal of Singapore as “capital of the world”.

“As the age of empire fades,” he argues, “the world needs a federal capital”, and there’s a little vote going on, with Singapore set up to rival contenders such as New York, Beijing, etc.

It’s an amusing piece, written tongue in cheek, so I don’t want to get too much on my high horse. But it’s hard not to get annoyed with this kind of thing:

"Singapore’s sterility and fussy outlook might not be what you’d choose for a weekend break, any more than you’d bother with Canberra on a trip to Australia. But order and efficiency are pluses when it comes to helping the world go round. The lesson from federal states is that you don’t choose a capital for fun – that’s what you want from your home town. You want a capital where you can get things done."

It’s a neat literary trick to be able to sneer at something while praising it. At least it’s a different way of dishing up that old, old chestnut – Singapore: efficient, dull, bland.

But the repackaging is still a distortion, on many counts, and seems to just perpetuate a stereotype.

People clearly do choose Singapore for the equivalent of a weekend break. Even pre-casino, and even in the thick of the financial crisis, a multi-billion-dollar tourist sector was indicating that plenty of people were finding something to lure them out of the famous airport. Tourist arrivals last year soared.

I’m not sure how you measure the “fun” that is not supposed to be a criterion in choosing a capital, but watching Singaporeans at play, I certainly don’t get the impression they’re not enjoying themselves. And their capacity (by and large) to enjoy themselves without turning their city into a scary and intimidating place for others as soon as night falls seems to have its merits.

Mr Carr's bow to order and efficiency is good – they are, after all, not to be taken for granted given all the fates that could have overtaken Singapore after independence. But recent signals of discontent with the ruling party show that people are faulting the government’s efficiency in many aspects, especially in terms of managing demographic change and redistributing income. Singaporeans seem to be signalling they want a more responsive, perhaps more humble type of efficiency – although it’s unlikely the “new normal” wants to trade in that efficiency for disorder.

As for comparisons with Canberra – well, I just don’t know where to start…

It's a light-hearted contest, and I'm already regretting taking umbrage, but I just can't help feeling that stereotypes are dangerous, however lightly meant.

Networked Cambodia?

Cambodian bloggers started to attract wider attention a few years ago. A recent commentary by Faine Greenwood, featured on the blog of one of the contributors it quotes, confirms that blogging is still (for the moment) providing a platform for expressing ideas and views that may be harder to articulate through conventional media. The drawback is still Cambodia’s very low Internet penetration (only 78,000 users according to the World Bank) – and its 78% literacy rate.

But many trends are pointing upwards. Bun Tharum quotes a figure approaching 60% for mobile phone usage among Cambodia’s population (and the ubiquity of mobile phone outlets in Cambodia would certainly seem to corroborate the growing popularity of this technology). Advertisers, he says, have also spotted the opportunity to increase the number of Internet consumers, and ads on Cambodian TV currently portray "youth hanging out at cafes with friends and using touch-screen phones to catch up on the news of the day over cups of coffee." Twitter use is increasing, and in May this year, BuddeComm noted "promising signs that the widespread introduction of wireless broadband services will see a long-term surge in growth" in the Internet sector. The use of social media networks is on the rise, although Phatry Derek Pan, a Cambodian-American blogger, cautions against automatically expecting that to translate into a politically focused “social media movement”.

Blogger Sopheap Chak argues that relatively humble mobile phone technology already provides a channel for "people who otherwise would have no voice" to pass on information and join social causes. She also acknowledges, however, that SMS message campaigns can be used for starkly nationalistic causes, as well as more progressive ones.   

Whatever its political possibilities, the mobile phone has already proved itself to be a technology that offers economic opportunity across the board. If it can chip away at some of Cambodia's inequalities, that will already be a substantial achievement.

Remembering Vann Nath

Vann Nath passed away yesterday. He was one of the very few to survive the infamous Khmer Rouge prison that was set up at Tuol Sleng, a former high school in Phnom Penh. He was imprisoned there for exactly a year, starting in January 1978.

As he recounts in his book, A Cambodian Prison Portrait: One Year in the Khmer Rouge's S-21, he escaped death because his jailers needed him to paint pictures of Pol Pot. Later, after the Khmer Rouge were driven from power, he depicted the barbarity that was the daily routine at S-21. He wrote his memoir, and he helped to set up the museum at Tuol Sleng.

The history of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia must be one of the sorriest episodes of the Cold War, and whatever eventually comes of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, there will be many – not only inside but also outside Cambodia – who will never face any kind of formal justice.

Vann Nath testified at the tribunal, but his book was written long before, in 1998. It closes:

"Pot Pot died unpunished, without ever having to answer for his deeds. And perhaps the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders will never be punished either. But one way or another, I believe there will be justice. A person harvests what he has sown. According to the Buddhist religion, good actions produce good results, bad actions produce bad results. The peasant harvests the rice, the fisherman catches the fish. Pol Pot and his henchmen will harvest the actions they committed. They will reap what they have sown."

Those who suffered from the long and complex ramifications of the Khmer Rouge interlude may still have to rely on this kind of comfort for quite some time.

Burma/Myanmar round-up

The last few weeks have provided an interesting snapshot of the Myanmar/Burma debate. The following makes no pretence of being an exhaustive listing, but it certainly flags the themes:

At the end of July, Bunn Nagara highlighted ASEAN’s continuing struggle with the problem that just won’t go away: “Naypyidaw is claiming 'mission accomplished' and is about to collect on its Asean chairmanship. Suddenly, a very subjective judgment on its political reforms has to decide on the objective prospect of its Asean chair”. Given the widely differing sets of expectations and demands, Tin Maung Maung Than agrees that ASEAN’s “review mission carries a heavy burden in ‘assessing’ Myanmar’s ‘commitment to the principles of ASEAN’”, and hopes for a solution that will be beneficial for both Myanmar and ASEAN: “Otherwise, there is a possibility that Myanmar would come to believe that its quest for the ASEAN Chair is turning into a game of musical chairs in which the music is not indigenous to the grouping.”

Debate on Burma/Myanmar is notoriously subject to polarization. The pragmatic strand that is willing to countenance the usefulness even of small steps has been very detectable all year. Examples from the middle of August include Joshua Kurlantzick’s wondering (with every due caveat) whether there are “signs of change in Burma?”, given the presence of some “optimistic signals”, and the BBC’s reference to “several recent signs that the nominally civilian government is trying to change its hardline image” (18 Aug). Bunn Nagara agrees, again very cautiously: “Political reconciliation in Myanmar is still a long way off, but there are visible efforts all-round of getting there.” He is fully aware of the lack of confidence on all sides that impedes progress, and remarks: “So far, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa is in no rush to visit Myanmar, perhaps mindful of how such a visit could be interpreted as premature endorsement of Naypyidaw. Holding off a visit could work as another spur for continued reform” (21 Aug).

Kyaw Kyaw, in a piece at New Mandala, again steers well clear of unbridled optimism, but argues that “the early signs are actually more promising than is widely realised”, even though “the majority of people remain disengaged” (23 Aug). The change theme is to the fore in a Reuters piece, too, if a little more grudgingly: “Diplomats, political analysts and many Burmese interviewed inside Myanmar say the retired generals brought back to power after a controversial election last year now appear to realize some moves toward reform could be the key to their survival” (26 Aug). Kavi Chongkittavorn predicts “extensive engagements and commitment” over the next few weeks as Myanmar tries to convince both ASEAN and the UN that it is moving in the right direction. Kavi suggests that the inclusion of Aung San Suu Kyi, “in whatever capacity”, in the official Burmese delegation to the Bali Summit would provide “a win-win situation” for all (29 Aug). (I can’t help wondering whether this is akin to those high-stakes, pre-stacked challenges that are often laid out for ASEAN: If [fill in target] doesn’t [fill in really difficult task] then this will show that it is [fill in undesirable adjective]. But maybe not…)

But there is still a strong strand of activism and commentary that sets the bar very high for any progress to be declared in Myanmar, and wholly distrusts anything that implies accommodation. Commentators who try to take a nuanced line on Burma/Myanmar (and nuanced is the word – it’s hard to find serious commentators who defend it) again came in for some hard and angry criticism this month (22 and 23 Aug).

Meanwhile, Baroness Kinnock, Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Democracy in Burma, in the British Parliament, warns that “Thein Sein is back with Plan B, a new charm offensive designed to create the impression of change, while so far not making any actual changes at all” (31 Aug). And Asian Tribune reports a statement by the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, and notes: “Following a series of meetings with Myanmar’s government officials and political opposition leaders, the [UN] Special Rapporteur also described the possible expansion of political space and welcomed the creation of Parliamentary committees to tackle human rights issues in Myanmar. Regardless of whether or not such developments take shape, a mechanism should be set up to investigate possible war crimes and crimes against humanity. Justice and accountability should not be sidestepped by the ‘potential’ for improvements in the political sphere” (1 Sep).

Joshua Kurlantzick brings us back full circle, citing a court sentence for “subversion” as “not exactly a sign of a Burmese spring” (31 Aug).

One thing certainly doesn’t change about Myanmar/Burma – its capacity to divide.

What's history for?

In this Asia Foundation piece on teaching history in Viet Nam, I was struck by this quote from historian Pham Quoc Su: “It is time to throw away the old way of thinking about history as simply about galvanizing national pride … because history also contains the history of the world, because it must speak of the bitter truths that should not be studied but from which lessons must be drawn for future generations, or truths that have been buried which now must be recovered”.

At primary school in the British Isles, I was taught that Francis Drake was a hero. I later learnt from Spanish students many very different epithets... In Southeast Asia, too, in recent years, the “historically dubious”, the “poison” lurking in some of the history textbooks, has proved politically costly. The region more than ever needs the contextualizing influence of history – but the focus needs to be on what unites, rather than on what divides.