Norms, power, and SEA

The Asia Society’s November report on US-East Asia relations offers many sound conclusions, not surprisingly, given its eminent panel of contributors.

One of its most useful pieces of advice is to avoid rushing to “tidy” the region’s overlapping institutions (because this might lead to exclusion and imbalance), and to tolerate instead a looser “Asia-Pacific network” arrangement (pp. 19, 35).

The following recommendation, however, does not quite seem to capture the complexity of the SEA dynamic:

“ASEAN’s role in building a more integrated regional society based on shared norms and values should be fully recognized and supported. Asia currently faces tensions between two competing trends: Asia as a community of norms and values, and Asia as a region shaped by power relations, given the presence of the United States and China... Deeper ASEAN engagement with the United States can reinforce ASEAN’s role in promoting values and building norms. This may be a more productive focus for U.S.–ASEAN relations, rather than simply seeking to use U.S.–ASEAN ties as a means of balancing rising regional actors such as China” (p.36).

This somewhat dichotomous understanding of norms and power is even more starkly expressed in the executive summary: “ASEAN’s efforts to build a regional society based on norms and values rather than power relations should be supported by the United States” (p. 7).

There is a good point here, of course, which aims to encourage the US to see ASEAN as a producer of useful long-term norms, rather than just another element that can potentially be arrayed against China. It serves as a reminder that ASEAN has contributed to the normative environment of Southeast Asia in ways that have often been under-valued.

But it suggests that norms and power are on divergent tracks, which is misleading. One of ASEAN’s greatest strengths has been its capacity to maintain a balance with all the region’s major powers. This multi-dimensional, ever-oscillating balance has in itself a normative dimension. Behind it is the idea that a balanced region will create greater room for manoeuvre for individual states and the region as a whole – a situation that is regarded as better than other imaginable alternatives (such as out-and-out dominance by any particular power). And just as power-balancing has a normative dimension, so too does norm-creation have a power dimension. Power always plays a role in the development of norms.

This is particularly obvious in the case of SEA. The normative strand of the regional narrative has always, and will always, come with a distinct power component – and vice versa. These facets are two sides of a coin rather than “competing trends”.

The attempt to separate norms and power has often been at the root of skewed interpretations of Southeast Asian politics: realists have too exclusively privileged power; constructivists and liberals have too exclusively privileged norms. Many interpretations of Southeast Asis consequently come across as one-sided, since Southeast Asia epitomizes the interplay of both.

English School interpretations hit the spot more closely here, I would argue, since ideas of international society clearly recognize and value processes of normative change, but equally clearly foreground the dimension of power in the evolution of underlying institutions.

Attempts to somehow overcome power relations, as though they are embarrassing remnants of an old-fashioned past that we should have outgrown, are likely to leave Southeast Asia vulnerable. ASEAN needs to work with the grain of both dimensions – the normative and the power-conscious elements – if it is to ride out the waves of a US “pivot” that faces the Association with what Mark Valencia (30 Nov) sees as “perhaps its greatest challenge since its creation”.

The dangers of “wishing away” power are perhaps what Rizal Sukma (2 Dec) has in mind when he considers how Indonesia should react to the looming strategic rivalry between the US and China. In language reminiscent of Michael Leifer’s, he argues:

“For ASEAN’s normative multilateral framework to function well there is the need for a stable balance of power among the major powers. Hence, a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ within an ASEAN’s multilateral framework — such as the EAS — requires a stable conventional balance of power outside that framework.”

But this does not leave ASEAN or Southeast Asia as a powerless puppet of external forces. As another recent report on Southeast Asia suggests: “Southeast Asian states often ‘punch above their weight’ as ASEAN shapes the rules of the game in Southeast Asia, and individual Southeast Asian states are not compelled to side completely with either the U.S. or China.”

ASEAN and its individual states need to redouble their efforts to ensure they do their bit towards contributing to a stable Asia-wide balance of power, resisting all blandishments to favour one power over another.

Not having too many eggs in any one basket is still the best way to safeguard their normative Asia-wide room for manoeuvre. The two belong, inextricably, together.

"Southeast Asia's Place in Asia"

The East-West Center and the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies organized a workshop last month on “Southeast Asia’s Place in Asia: Perceptions, Realities, and Aspirations”. The report has just come out.

Some interesting points on the surrounding powers:

“The ‘return’ of the United States to Southeast Asia in the past two years was generally applauded, but discussion focused not on Washington’s current intentions but on American consistency... Other participants asked if the American concept of a broader ‘Indo-Pacific’ region really boils down to ‘America on top, with India drawn in?’...

“As for India, Southeast Asian participants commented that New Delhi has undertaken few recent initiatives in the ASEAN region. Except for episodic gestures that annoy China, its interest in Southeast Asia appears to have waned...

“Japan’s influence in Southeast Asia continues to fade...

“While competition between China and the U.S. was the dominant theme, caution was also expressed about overstating the role of outside powers. Southeast Asian states often ‘punch above their weight’ as ASEAN shapes the rules of the game in Southeast Asia, and individual Southeast Asian states are not compelled to side completely with either the U.S. or China...

“Southeast Asians do not believe their expanding trade with China undermines or threatens their independence or security. While fundamental economic (China-centered production networks) and diplomatic-security (hedging against China) trends are not aligned, Southeast Asia can both prosper and balance, with American assistance, China’s growing military capabilities and diplomatic influence. For example, there is no evidence that Sino-Vietnamese or Sino-Filipino commercial ties have been affected by rising tensions in the South China Sea. This finding contradicts the currently fashionable assumption in Australia and the U.S. that Asian states will be compelled to choose between their trade with China and their security relationships with the United States...

“Examples are few and far between where the Chinese government has sought to use economic leverage to alter Southeast Asian states’ policies...”

And on the role of ASEAN:

“ASEAN’s utility is underappreciated...

“One discussion revolved around who is using regionalism for what purpose. ASEAN uses it to advance Southeast Asian states’ ‘strategic autonomy.’ At the same time, ASEAN’s flexibility is useful for individual countries. Is, in fact, strengthening the institution in the interests of individual states? There was consensus among the Southeast Asian participants that it was not, as weak institutionalism gives member states greater room for maneuver.

“Another focus was on ASEAN’s relations with the U.S. and China. Official US policy has declared that ASEAN is a ‘fulcrum’ for regional institution building. While China appears more comfortable with ‘open regionalism’ and less determined to try to exclude the United States, some participants wondered if the U.S. is increasingly successful in ‘using’ ASEAN-led regionalism against China?”

Pick of the month -- 3 -- the Myanmar story

This is more akin to “pick of two months” now, but the story continues to be a fascinating one.

Approval of Myanmar’s bid to chair ASEAN in 2014, coupled with the announcement of Hillary Clinton’s visit, brought to the surface towards the end of November a number of pleas to slow down the rapidly accelerating process of engagement. 

Even before that, the note of caution was always present (13 Oct), and some commentators were keen to inject some element of measurability into the debate, suggesting “benchmarks” (25 Sep) or “conditions” (25 Oct) that Myanmar should be expected to meet.

But others argued for not asking too many questions too soon. A. Lin Neumann contends (23 Sep): “In short, Burma has to allow its people enough freedom that it will no longer be an embarrassment to its neighbors, while remaining repressive enough to keep the generals secure. It is not a perfect arrangement, but it is a start and probably the best anyone can hope for.” Sounds cynical – but it is good to be reminded that Myanmar is not going to turn into a model democracy overnight.

“As imperfect as they may be, the signs [of change] are unmistakable,” Kamrul Idris writes (23 Nov), quoting Amnesty International researcher Benjamin Zawacki as saying, “Those who deny this are simply not paying attention or are allowing their personal, political or institutional agendas to get in the way.” But at the end of the day, Idris continues, “the aim of bringing in Myanmar from the cold for the sake of its long-suffering population can benefit from not asking too many questions at the present time.” Elsewhere, too, current developments were seen as validating “a persuasive approach”, that focused on “incentives rather than punishments” (1 Nov).

A couple of particularly noteworthy observations came during November. Nicholas Farelly (15 Nov) comments: “If you watch the Burmese media closely then you already know that there have been some simply remarkable changes in the past year.  I can’t think of any time (since 1962, at least) when so much has happened to shift perceptions of the country. It is remarkable, and important, that the media is now free(er) to play a vital role in helping keep the public informed about the country’s political, economic and social changes.”

And in a powerful article, an Inside Story correspondent (1 Nov) observes that “the scepticism of many international pundits is strikingly absent in Rangoon. Here, a new air of openness is drawing many people into the political process ... which the military unveiled to such opprobrium in 2003.”

This correspondent sums up the surprise of many: “I felt betrayed, and naive for having hoped that an election process so obviously flawed could usher in any sort of significant, positive change. But that is precisely what has happened. And, most dramatically, many foes of the former regime – including Aung San Suu Kyi – are rolling the dice and throwing their support behind President Thein Sein and his government, seeing them as the best last chance to break Burma’s decades-old political deadlock.”

True, there are many potential motivations behind the decision to suspend construction of the Myitsone Dam, but, as the Inside Story writer notes, on the one hand, this move “sent a strong signal to both China and the West: Thein Sein wants Burma’s international relationships to be better balanced”. On the other, “what was most striking was the broad-based anti-dam movement that found its voice in the weeks leading up to the 30 September announcement. For the first time since the 1988 uprising, the many groups that make up Burma’s notoriously fractious opposition movement had come together on a single issue.”

Pragmatism involves trying to steer a course between euphoria and scepticism, seeking out not the highest moral ground, but rather what might best work for continued positive change in what is still a very fragile and constrained situation. 

It involves compromise – and the ability to live with history. As one activist from the “88 Generation” explains to the Inside Story correspondent quoted above: “I have suffered a great deal myself. But from these bitter experiences I realised that we cannot achieve what we want with hatred. We need a situation where everybody wins, including the military. They are our brothers as well.”

Another “activist-turned-educator” agrees “that in every negotiation process we have to try and understand the other side’s interests, and we must make their interests our interests... Whatever worries them, we have to find out what it is and eliminate it.”

These are good strategies for pragmatists everywhere…

Some of the recent commentary has focused on Aung San Suu Kyi, and the need for a “deft touch” in playing what is a rather new political game (27 Oct). Andrew Selth writes (23 Nov): “Burma's pro-democracy forces have endured terrible privations over the past 23 years to get to this position. Now that it is here, however, they may find that the real work has only just begun. The existence of an undisguised military dictatorship guilty of appalling human rights abuses offered them a simple choice. The decision whether or not to trust a hybrid civilian-military government that seems to promise incremental reform and national reconciliation is much more difficult.”

This, of course – albeit less starkly, and certainly less prominently – is the kind of choice SEA’s civil society activists face every day. 

The biggest fly in the ointment is still the ethnic issue. As a new International Crisis Group report (30 Nov) makes clear, recent conciliatory moves “mark one of the most significant moments in the six decades of conflict”, but still “lasting peace is still not assured”. If ever there was a situation where pragmatism needs to prevail, this is it.

Pick of the month -- 2 -- changing views on ASEAN

Slowly but surely, a new song is being sung about ASEAN these days. Maybe it’s Indonesia’s able leadership; maybe it’s the pressure of global economic headaches, which suddenly make different forms of regionalism look more attractive; maybe it’s the signs of hope in Myanmar; maybe it’s the perceived cold winds blowing down from China – whatever the reason, the tone seems to be changing. There is less emphasis on ASEAN’s (manifest) defects, and more emphasis on what it can offer.

I commented on The Economist’s two days ago. But Shekhar Shah (16 Oct) also argues, “ASEAN has had considerable experience in coordinating policy responses and domestic policy choices, both those that have been successful and those that have failed. Asian members should bring this experience to the G20. ASEAN’s durability and openness to change presents an opportunity for the Asian G20 members to bring this ASEAN spirit to the G20. This will equip the G20 to be effective over the generation that will be required to rebuild the global economic order.”

Maria Monica Wihardja (12 Nov) captures the prevailing tone, writing that ASEAN’s “stability as an institution for over 44 years and its visible maturing over this time is testimony that ASEAN serves as a regional power-broker and conciliator. Its maintenance of a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ in the region by avoiding the hegemony of any power also supports a successful and fluid regionalism, including the emergence of fora like the EAS… A sense of community, solidarity and unity — ASEAN’s greatest offering — must not be lost; it must be promoted beyond the organisation. Asia is one of a handful of regions that remain economically prosperous, peaceful and socially stable, and every effort must be made to maintain it this way.”

While forecasting no easy road ahead, Awidya Santikajaya (14 Nov) comments: “Before the American and European crises, ASEAN was discredited because of its ineffectiveness, lack of commitment to becoming a supranational body and lax rules. But, now ASEAN is praised as a comfort vehicle for regionalism.”

And Teuku Rezasyah (23 Nov), a researcher at the Indonesian Center of Democracy, Diplomacy and Defense, tells the Jakarta Post that ASEAN has shown itself to be “bonafide, credible and acceptable to the West” during Indonesia’s chairmanship. “ASEAN,” he is quoted as saying, “has successfully made the US think over whether they want to continue criticizing Myanmar and push it even closer to China [...] or invite Myanmar to learn together with ASEAN how to be a modern democratic country”.

Such a change in the dominant tone is long overdue. ASEAN, as I have posted before, has in the past received far more than its fair share of pillorying and pummelling.

But narratives are fickle. ASEAN is flavour of the month at the moment. But it could find itself back in the firing line for a number of reasons.  

One is strategic. As ASEAN defence ministers stressed in their recent meeting (25 Oct), they want to forge ahead with cooperation, and undertake “more concrete actions” in key areas like disaster relief, peace-keeping, and military industry cooperation. But mention of the South China Sea brings the following proviso from Indonesian Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, chairman of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting: “We know what we don’t want in our Political-Security Community. We don’t want to be a military pact; we don’t want to do anything against any outsider; we don’t want to use force.” It is not difficult to imagine, however, the kinds of voices that might want to challenge this pragmatic and centrist stance.

Economically, too, there are two distinct “truths” that need careful balancing. On the one hand, ASEAN’s economic integration efforts have often been too readily dismissed. Yet while all the dismissing has been going on, progress has been happening on the ground. Luke Hunt (16 Nov) notes “a dawning in the Western conscious that ASEAN will economically integrate as a community by 2015, opening their economies to free trade in goods, services and investments, encompassing a population of about 500 million people”. It is interesting how often the business press already refers to “ASEAN” as a unit. Indeed, growing de facto regionalism in and beyond ASEAN is one of the reasons a recent report by the Asia Society concludes that the US “should renew and deepen engagement” with East Asia as a whole, and pushes for “a new US diplomacy with ASEAN”.

On the other hand, ASEAN's “growing integration”, while real, is still very much a work in progress – even “wishful thinking” for some. Non-tariff barriers and labour mobility remain substantial stumbling-blocks. For some domestic constituencies, economic integration within ASEAN, let alone across a wider area, where bigger and/or more developed players hold substantial influence, is hard to swallow. As a BBC report (24 Oct) notes, “ASEAN leaders are quick to point out that the benefits they get from a strong economic relationship with China are far more advantageous than isolating one of the world's strongest economies, and an increasingly important world power”, and ASEAN Secretary General Surin highlights the decreasing trend of the China-favourable trade balance. But there are plenty of vested interests who will want to defend their turf, and there are plenty of ideological opponents, too, who resent that ASEAN is “continuously used as a tool to implement the global capitalism agenda”.

And free trade is itself becoming another potential divider of the Asia-Pacific region, in a way that will also test ASEAN and its loyalties. Two trade initiatives are currently offering alternatives to APEC: the US-favoured Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the China-favoured ASEAN+* initiative. These may prove ultimately cooperative. But until that cooperation is realized, the differently envisioned trade concepts also have the capacity to carry strategic messages. This – along with multiple domestic considerations – may account for Indonesian President SBY’s “cold” response to the TPP.

So, ASEAN is enjoying something of a discursive high at the moment. But in attempting to chart the path that is best for SEA and its wider environment (as opposed to best for some other individual players), it could very easily find itself – unfortunately – back in the position of political punch-ball.

[*ADDED 29/11: China was initially associated with an ASEAN+3-based East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA), arguing that a (Japanese-associated) East Asia Summit-based Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) might be a potential eventual follow-up. Shekhar suggests that China's “exclusion from the TPP offers a common point for them to actively pursue quicker implementation of CEPEA”.]

The Europe turn-around

Fascinating to read The Economist's take on the recent round of ASEAN summitry (18 Nov). This is not a paper that has always been sympathetic to ASEAN. So it's interesting to see this Banyan writer expounding on the reasons ASEAN was never able to plunge down the European path (even while it acknowledged Europe's achievements), and concluding that we should “expect ASEAN to stay loose, broad, and talkative. Endless summits don’t necessarily have to result in an ever-closer union, thank goodness.”

There are two things here. What a good job, firstly, that ASEAN has always politely resisted the heavy pressure from many academics and other observers to “become like Europe faster”. ASEAN is a lumbering old thing, and exceedingly frustrating at times, but Europe's traumas certainly illustrate that conservatism in region-building is not always a bad thing.

And this piece also illustrates the speed with which things are changing in SEA this year. In light of the European fire-storm, my piece a couple of months ago, inspired in part by work earlier in the year with Indonesian students, seems almost quaint.

But the wheel will no doubt turn. Europe (we all sincerely hope) will find a way out of its problems. Maybe this way will involve the deeper integration of a limited number of core states. Maybe the calls for ASEAN to learn from its European cousin will one day fire up again. Then it will be time to learn all over again that regionalisms are not all the same.

Pick of the month -- 1

One of the perils of an only spasmodically connected road trip is the pile of info that has to be sorted when you return. But there are bonuses. A month’s hindsight makes some stories stand out very clearly. Here are some key contenders:

• Rizal Sukma (18 Oct) gives an excellent run-down on the impact of three domestic factors on Indonesia’s quest for a greater role on the world stage.
• Amitav Acharya (18 Oct) cogently outlines another of ASEAN’s many dilemmas – how can it succeed in “courting Washington without hurting Beijing”? Although ASEAN has to date proved adept at pulling off a sophisticated balancing act among the major powers, the US’s renewed vocal focus on the Asia-Pacific will make the Association’s task harder, not easier. As Acharya argues: “America should listen carefully. There may be a possible disconnect between how some in the United States see its role, and the views of key ASEAN members about how the United States should behave in the region… In resisting Beijing’s assertiveness, ASEAN has to think very carefully about how far it might want to go to seek America’s involvement, especially when it comes to security in the South China Sea. Courting Washington without hurting Beijing will be a daunting challenge.”
• The Interpreter has recently published a number of pieces urging Australians to embrace their immediate neighbourhood more enthusiastically. Attending a writing course in Melbourne recently, I was totally underwhelmed (and baffled) by the lack of interest in SEA as a region, so I think these pieces are tackling a very genuine problem:
• Mark Carroll, director of the Australian-Thai Chamber of Commerce, kicks off by noting (25 Oct): “Damning for Australian business is that it has largely failed to recognise the importance of the Thai economy. Most Australians still see Thailand through the prism of beaches, bars and pretty girls. The US, China, Japan and Korea — among others — have moved past this perception of Thailand. It is a serious business destination for them. Australian businesses should follow their lead.”
• But Michael Wesley (2 Nov) also wonders whether “our schools teach our kids anything about Southeast Asia”, and Tim Lindsey (4 Nov) comments: “It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Australians want returns from Asia without putting effort into it… We, alone of all Western countries [well, there is New Zealand…], are located in one of the most exciting and stimulating parts of the world, with fabulously rich artistic traditions and cutting-edge modern cultures. Asia is funky! It is a place to love and be stimulated by, not to loathe and fear. It is deeply sad that we are missing out on this, and strangling ourselves with parochialism.” Amen to that.
• Meanwhile, Bangkok Pundit (31 Oct) examines the politics behind Thailand’s floods, and Steven Rood (2 Nov) charts events in the southern Philippines over recent months, and warns of the dangers of failing to make demonstrable progress in peace talks.
• And because I’m always working myself up about stereotypes of Singapore, it was nice to see this by Sharon Chen (24 Oct).

Ind(ones)ia

I’m just back from my second India trip, more enthused about the country and its potential than ever, and determined to follow its relations with SEA more closely.

I didn’t have time to be glued to the press, which – as in all large countries – exhibits a strong domestic focus, but notable international stories voiced:

• More of the predictable speculation on India-China-US power equations;
• Frustration at the imposition by a range of countries of travel warnings during the Divali period;
• Suspicion of Commonwealth attempts to call the shots on human rights;
• Pride at the successful running of the first Formula 1 (preceded in the papers and on the streets by a substantial amount of advertising, together with lengthy explanations of the finer points of motor racing);
• Disappointment over India’s poor showing on tourist arrivals, compared with, say, Thailand’s.

One of the things that struck me most about India this time round, however, was the parallel that exists with Indonesia. Both are proudly democratic, with strong underlying support for pluralism and human rights. Both see their size as an indication of their entitlement to carry more clout in the region and the world.

But both are still working through issues of infrastructure, poverty, corruption, and law enforcement that sometimes undermine their credentials not only in the eyes of foreign observers but also in the eyes of their own citizens. Both have large majorities following a particular religion, and the virtues of pluralism and tolerance are regularly challenged. In neither are insurgencies a thing of the past. Both have ethnically similar smaller neighbours, with whom relations (albeit for very different reasons) are strained and emotional.

And both are strongly nationalistic. This trait makes them awkward partners at times, as justifiable pride easily translates into tetchiness. But it also constitutes a kind of vaccine against unequivocally aligning with, and/or being pushed around by, any one particular ideological camp.

Democratic but different, both demonstrate a complexity that militates against dangerous dualities. This is a sign of hope in a time of worrying polarization.