That missing communiqué

ASEAN’s unprecedented failure to agree on a communiqué after the foreign ministers’ meeting last week, because of problems finding acceptable wording on the South China Sea (SCS) issue, is still provoking plenty of commentary.

For Ernest Bower, it’s all China's fault:

“Fundamentally, the chaos at the ASEAN meeting was an outcome cynically manipulated and abetted by a China that has decided that a weak and divided ASEAN is in its national interests.

“Understanding the fact that China has decided to undermine ASEAN unity and the fact that ASEAN has the capacity and commitment to overcome this shortsighted campaign to break its ranks is a necessary condition for advising policy-makers in Manila to avoid the trap of underinvesting in ASEAN. They should continue joining countries that push to advance regional structures that will promote peace, security and prosperity in the Asia Pacific to strengthen ASEAN…

“Filipinos should know what happened in Phnom Penh and understand that the message from Cambodia is not ‘ASEAN is messy and we should proceed carefully and reduce our engagement and investment,’ but rather ‘ASEAN unity is not supported by China and this is an indication we need to redouble our efforts to engage and support ASEAN’s goals for unity.’”

Tan Seng Chye, on the other hand, names no individual countries. But by emphasizing ASEAN as a “neutral platform”, and presenting the SCS as a distraction from the main purpose of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), he clearly points towards the Philippines and Viet Nam.

“What happened at the recent AMM should be taken seriously by ASEAN as a wake-up call. For the first time certain individual ASEAN countries were prepared to pursue their own interest to the extent of disregarding ASEAN’s cohesion and the practice of finding a compromise for ASEAN’s common interests. This issue has become more challenging for ASEAN because of the emerging big power rivalry in the region including in the SCS…

“Over the years, ASEAN has been able to establish its importance and relevance as a neutral platform and a convenor [italics added] for the major powers to meet with ASEAN countries and among themselves…

“The new era of emerging big power rivalry in the region involves the US’ enhanced engagement in the Asia region and its pivot or re-balancing of its military forces to Asia Pacific as well as China’s response to the US strategy to conscribe it. This rivalry has an impact on ASEAN... 

“The AMM has been distracted from its main purpose and objectives by the SCS disputes which would not be resolved for a long time to come… Looking forward, ASEAN should review what has happened at the AMM and in recent times and consider how it can regain its cohesion and solidarity for ASEAN to maintain its relevance and role in the region to further ASEAN’s interests.”

For Kavi Chongkittavorn, there is guilt everywhere. The ASEAN claimants, the ASEAN non-claimants, the current Chair, the US, China – all “have effectively held ASEAN hostage one way or another”, and used it “as a play toy for their own benefits all the way”.

This is nearer the mark, I feel (although it is perhaps a little harsh on the non-claimants).

China seems to be making diplomatic missteps into an art form. But did the US really not foresee this kind of escalation after its highly public 2010 intervention and subsequent “pivot”? Did Viet Nam and the Philippines really think all ASEAN's members would want to sign up to some China-antagonizing mission over the South China Sea? Did the Cambodian Chair really think it was OK to massively inflate the whole issue, yet again, by not moving heaven and earth to reach an agreement?

The cohesive role to which ASEAN-the-organization should be aspiring is that of providing an open and level platform – one that shores up political will for a long-term search for a solution, but also facilitates the kind of short-term understandings necessary to minimize the risk of accidents and the escalation of small flare-ups.

This role is much less likely to be realized if ASEAN, as an organization, shows itself to be partial. Individual members, therefore, who appear to be blatantly pushing the association to line up behind one “side” – whichever side that might be – are doing ASEAN, and SEA as a whole, a grave disservice.

UPDATE (18 July): Former Ambassador Saban Siagian warns: “If this diplomatic guerrilla war between Washington and Beijing continues unchecked it could be the beginning of the end for ASEAN,” and calls for urgent Indonesian diplomatic action. The Bangkok Post, too, in an article referred to by Milton Osborne in The Interpreter, points the finger at the US and China: “There was no clear winner in last week's skirmish between two superpowers in Phnom Penh and it is probably in the interests of all Asean nations and the world that there not be a winner in this power struggle. Instead both countries should drop the Cold War mentality and begin working together on resolving the maritime disputes and other issues in a way that reflects their strategic and economic interdependence.” This report details some of the behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts.

UPDATE (19 July): Karim Raslan evokes “a constant tussle for pre-eminence and advantage between Washington and Beijing”, in which “the two sides wrestled almost without care for their nominal hosts”, displaying “intensity, fury and doggedness”. ASEAN's members face a choice: “they can live up to Asean’s promise as a means to keep the countries in the region from being pawns of great powers, or again fall victim to the age-old tactic of divide and conquer.”

Updating the Myanmar story

I attended an interesting event on Myanmar this week.

As always, it is hard to keep the balance between enthusiasm about what has changed, and caution about what is still depressingly the same.

The two write-ups here and here capture that ambivalence.

Questioning an ASEAN 'united front' on the South China Sea

I am terribly embarrassed by my lack of postings lately… It’s not that SEA has grown one jot less interesting. Au contraire. But I’ve been finishing a book, and it turns out this is a terribly time-intensive activity. And other KPIs don't leave the building while you're busy on something major.

To break the drought, however, I want to draw attention to this piece on the South China Sea by Xunpeng Shi:

‘ASEAN should be a neutral, transparent and fair platform for both sides to resolve disputes peacefully, and should not take a biased stand toward its member states. By promoting this first platform, ASEAN has the potential to gain credit from member states and the international community, while increasing its profile in the international arena for tackling regional affairs.’

I think this is right. I’ve always had my doubts about the view that ASEAN’s states ought to march in lockstep on everything.

Sheldon Simon argued a little while ago that ‘ASEAN’s integration continues to be problematic, and ability to speak with a single authoritative voice on politico-security matters remains uncertain and at best premature’, with the result that ‘US reliance on a strong ASEAN lead for multilateral Asian security issues might well be reconsidered’.

But how ‘integrated’ does ASEAN need to be in order to play a useful regional role? A broad range of observers would certainly welcome greater economic integration within the region, as well as a deeper consensus on human rights and governance issues. These aims are all expressed in ASEAN's community-building plans. But is ‘ability to speak with a single authoritative voice on politico-security matters’ actually always an asset? Surely it depends on what that single authoritative voice would say?

ASEAN’s most telling defence of its driving-seat position is that the organization is non-threatening. This inoffensiveness is made up of several facets. Part of it is ASEAN’s intrinsic make-up – it is not a great power, and not an alliance.

But a key factor is also that ASEAN as an organization has traditionally practised the kind of balancing that engages all the major powers, and exclusively favours none of them. This policy has made an important contribution to regional peace and confidence-building. If the evolution of a ‘single authoritative voice’ also equated with an unequivocal leaning in the direction of any one particular power, this would not bode well.

Individually, Southeast Asia’s states have also broadly practised this balancing policy. Some have recently engaged in a recalibration of that balance over the issue of the South China Sea, but even now, no state wants all its eggs in one basket.

Part of the reason ASEAN looks unthreatening, therefore, is precisely this variety. Its various components have politico-security feet in many different camps, and may at any given time be leaning in different directions and at different angles. ASEAN is not like a solid mass of colour, as it were – it is more like one of those shimmering patterns that looks slightly different in different lights. And that’s a good thing, not a bad thing. What we lose in unity and predictability, we arguably gain in strategic and diplomatic flexibility. Such an entity is far more likely to forestall a dangerous regional binary.

UPDATE 15 June: From the title alone (‘Following the ASEAN tune’), it sounds as though Farish Noor is at odds with the above article. Their conclusions, however, are actually rather similar. For Xunpeng Shi, ‘the question is whether Asean would gain by pinning China as its opponent. The answer is unlikely to be positive. Asean should be a fair, neutral and transparent facilitator of peace, rather than an aggressive opponent against China, when it comes to resolving the South China Sea dispute.’

For Noor, too, ‘For ASEAN to be able to present a united face to the world, some cohesion and cooperation is necessary from all member states... Breaking ranks and brokering bilateral deals with other countries while neglecting common ASEAN concerns is not the way to move forward. And at the moment, it is highly doubtful if the rest of ASEAN wishes to be dragged into a conflict with China, which happens to be the biggest trading partner of several ASEAN economies. Post-2015, Asean will face a new era where its collective identity will be tested. Already, the region is witness to the resurgence of China, India and the United States. Will ASEAN be able to hold its own and maintain some sense of common purpose and identity? Yes, but only if we dance by the ASEAN tune and think of ASEAN’s future as our own.’

The bottom line: ASEAN nations should work together. Of course. But not with the purpose of ganging up against China.

The Lady

The Lady came out in Malaysia just last week. Seats were selling fast when I went this weekend.

It’s beautifully filmed, and very poignant. The terrible requirement to choose between family and country is very movingly portrayed. And the courage of this extraordinary woman – and those around her – is always worth celebrating.

But I left feeling disappointed. The way this movie told the Burma/Myanmar story – in terms of light and darkness, angels and devils – is very common. It rouses our sympathies. We are invited to hate the generals and love Aung San Suu Kyi, in a way that might feel morally very satisfying. But it doesn’t help us understand anything.

There was nothing that explored Myanmar’s early difficulties with democracy, or the circumstances that brought the generals into power in the first place. There was nothing that attempted to probe their motivations, or the differences among them.

Understanding, after all, doesn’t mean condoning… I have linked to this Inside Story post before, but it’s worth another airing. An activist from the “88 Generation” explains: “I have suffered a great deal myself. But from these bitter experiences I realised that we cannot achieve what we want with hatred. We need a situation where everybody wins, including the military. They are our brothers as well.” Another “activist-turned-educator” agrees “that in every negotiation process we have to try and understand the other side’s interests, and we must make their interests our interests... Whatever worries them, we have to find out what it is and eliminate it.”

In light of these comments, the message of The Lady seemed strangely anachronistic.

Equally, there was no attempt to flag up any of the recent changes. The movie was first shown in September 2011. The winds of change were already blowing. For many observers, the breeze had been getting up ever since the dodgy election in 2010.

Yet the little text at the end of the movie gives no indication that Aung San Suu Kyi’s perseverance might finally be reaping concrete rewards.

Of course, the changes to date are not sufficient. And they’re not irreversible. But they are significant. Surely they deserved a few little words of cautious hope?

So, go and see this movie, and wonder at the strength of the human spirit, and admire Michelle Yeoh’s fabulous performance. But don’t go expecting new insight on Myanmar/Burma.

Simon Tay on ASEAN and the South China Sea

Writing about the recent US-Philippines military exercises, and ongoing difficulties over the South China Sea, Simon Tay (1 May) cautions:

“ASEAN should not automatically back the Philippines. Nor should the Aquino government expect unquestioning support from the group if the Filipinos seem to be the ones who are provoking the issue, rather than the Chinese.

“What needs to be done by ASEAN is to reinforce the multilateral setting for dialogue about the South China Sea and other issues…

“Bilateral security alliances – like that between the US and the Philippines – were once accepted benignly as a foundation for Pax Americana.

“They will undoubtedly continue…

“Today's need, however, is not for more aggressive alliances with the US, targeted against anyone. The region needs to, instead, pursue and strengthen wider processes that can engage both the US and China.

“Almost all agree that keeping the Americans in Asia can be positive. But equally, the region must understand that treating Beijing as an outsider and presuming it to always be the aggressor is a dangerous and potentially self-fulfilling prophecy.”

Wise words...

ASEAN and regional civil society

My article has now come out in The Pacific Review, Volume 25, Issue 2, 2012, pp 199-222.

It’s called Bridging the gap: an ‘English School’ perspective on ASEAN and regional civil society.

Below is the abstract:

The objective of a ‘people-oriented’ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has not readily translated into easy relations between the Association and regional civil society. Discourse inspired by global civil society has found plenty to focus on in the gap between aspiration and practice. This article argues, however, that not enough attention has been directed to the bridges that are gradually forming across that gap, and suggests that an ‘English School’-derived account can give a fuller picture of what is under way in this area. From this perspective, a process of institutionalization is observable among the different actors. By tackling – consciously or unconsciously – core problems such as recognition, location of common ground, confidence-building, and burden-sharing, this process is potentially transforming the relations of a state-imposed hierarchy into something more societal. The usefulness of such an approach lies in its ability to describe a process of slow change on its own terms, to normatively validate the fragile bridges under construction, and to stake out possibilities for progress on the basis of negotiation and accommodation.

And the whole thing is available online here.

Comments welcome!

Anthony Trollope, democracy, and Southeast Asia

I’ve done lots of long bus, train, and plane journeys this year. Bad for blogging, but good for reading.

One of my mainstays has been Anthony Trollope’s “political novels”, and I’m now half-way through the fourth of six.

Written in Britain in the 1860s and 1870s, these books strikingly depict how the path to parliamentary and democratic reform is not always strewn with roses.

Here we find a cast of very real MPs, whose array of virtues and vices clearly reminds us that the quality of democracy ultimately always depends on the quality of the human beings who translate its ideals into practice.

Here, too, is a relentless portrayal of the inseparability of money from democratic politics. Over the course of the series, the law is changed so that MPs are no longer able to enter Parliament by way of seats gifted by the nobility, and the rules for elections are gradually tightened. Nevertheless, able but poverty-stricken politicians clearly still need backing from rich people to get anywhere. Public campaigns are managed by agents whose last thought is the health of democracy. And the attempt to stamp out vote-buying runs up against an old-boys’-club mentality that may claim to hate the sin, but certainly cannot bring itself to condemn the sinner.

Here, as well, are depictions of the difficulties of running a party system. What does an MP do when his party and his ideals start to diverge? (And, yes, it was all “his” in those days – political women had to pull strings from the sidelines.) What does a party do, when one of its progressive ideas is unexpectedly championed by its conservative opponents?

At a time when SEA’s democracies face a host of challenges, and when the world’s older democracies hardly offer an inspiring model to emulate, it’s good to sometimes pause and remember that participatory politics involves much more than stirring slogans. Just desiring “freedom and democracy” is not going to be enough.

Creating and safeguarding participatory politics is a hard, uphill battle. There will certainly be reversals and compromises. There will always be much to condemn.

As Myanmar takes its next lurching steps into what we all sincerely hope will be a more democratic future, it will be good to keep remembering that democracy does not emerge anywhere like some beautiful foal from the womb of a thoroughbred – perfectly formed, admirable, and ready to run from day one.

Rather, this elusive but indispensable phenomenon is a much-stained, much-deformed piece of work, that has to be slowly knit together in the course of a sometimes sordid, often uninspiring, and certainly never-ending struggle. None of us – whether in old democracies, new democracies, or not-yet-democracies – can ever afford to rest on our laurels, and assume we’ve arrived.

Nor can we bleakly conclude that democracy’s stains and deformities mean it can never work, so we might as well give up and shout from the sidelines.

We can still travel hopefully, even while acknowledging that, on this particular journey, we are never likely to arrive exactly where we would like to be.