Dealing with "extremism"

The Pew Research Centre poll I referred to in yesterday’s post, while highlighting considerable differences between Muslim and Western publics, also pointed out that they shared worries about “Islamic extremism”. In Indonesia, for example, 42% expressed this concern (only Muslims were interviewed, for the sake of comparison among publics). This is a significant number, although still the lowest among the publics surveyed. The problem, as always, is that one person’s “extremist” is another person’s strong-minded defender of the good.

Indonesia has made significant strides in dealing with terrorist elements, although they are constantly morphing. Luke Hunt focuses on the hardball side of Indonesia’s counter-terrorism (as well as offering Malaysia’s “widely loathed” International Security Act a rare plaudit). A recent comic book initiative in Indonesia, starring a reformed militant in a “Captain Jihad” role, exemplifies another side of the attempt to change the script. 

But as Tim Lindsey argued last week, “extremism” has many guises, not all of them terrorist.

The treatment of minorities is always a good test of the health of a democracy. This applies to any democracy – and some Western democracies need to take a good, hard look at themselves in this respect. But relatively young democracies are particularly vulnerable to challenges in this area. Rising tension between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia is therefore a real cause for concern, and is likely to provide fuel for more intolerance and stereotyping, on all sides, both domestically and further afield. 

As a report on Indonesia late last year from International Crisis Group makes clear, when officials and legislators insist on the need for “religious harmony”, they often give the impression that “this can be legislated or even imposed, rather than requiring sustained time and effort to understand how tensions have grown and developing programs designed to reduce them”.

Religious tension is not primeval, unstoppable, or inevitable. It is caused. Rooting out those causes – while sensitively dealing with their effects – will not be easy, but it is possible.

Mr Mahathir not alone...

In a turn of phrase guaranteed to upset pretty much everyone, Malaysia’s former PM Mahathir has leapt to news prominence again, expressing views that 9/11 might have been “staged”.

But of course, he is far from alone in that opinion: 58% of Indonesians surveyed recently by the Pew Research Centre did not believe “Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks”, and 23% did not know. Only 20% believed they did. 

The report goes on: “There is no Muslim public in which even 30% accept that Arabs conducted the attacks. Indeed, Muslims in Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey are less likely to accept this today than in 2006.”

Until we get to the bottom of why that is, there is a lot of unfinished business about 9/11.

"Singapore, capital of the world"

The other day, The Interpreter pointed us to Edward Carr’s proposal of Singapore as “capital of the world”.

“As the age of empire fades,” he argues, “the world needs a federal capital”, and there’s a little vote going on, with Singapore set up to rival contenders such as New York, Beijing, etc.

It’s an amusing piece, written tongue in cheek, so I don’t want to get too much on my high horse. But it’s hard not to get annoyed with this kind of thing:

"Singapore’s sterility and fussy outlook might not be what you’d choose for a weekend break, any more than you’d bother with Canberra on a trip to Australia. But order and efficiency are pluses when it comes to helping the world go round. The lesson from federal states is that you don’t choose a capital for fun – that’s what you want from your home town. You want a capital where you can get things done."

It’s a neat literary trick to be able to sneer at something while praising it. At least it’s a different way of dishing up that old, old chestnut – Singapore: efficient, dull, bland.

But the repackaging is still a distortion, on many counts, and seems to just perpetuate a stereotype.

People clearly do choose Singapore for the equivalent of a weekend break. Even pre-casino, and even in the thick of the financial crisis, a multi-billion-dollar tourist sector was indicating that plenty of people were finding something to lure them out of the famous airport. Tourist arrivals last year soared.

I’m not sure how you measure the “fun” that is not supposed to be a criterion in choosing a capital, but watching Singaporeans at play, I certainly don’t get the impression they’re not enjoying themselves. And their capacity (by and large) to enjoy themselves without turning their city into a scary and intimidating place for others as soon as night falls seems to have its merits.

Mr Carr's bow to order and efficiency is good – they are, after all, not to be taken for granted given all the fates that could have overtaken Singapore after independence. But recent signals of discontent with the ruling party show that people are faulting the government’s efficiency in many aspects, especially in terms of managing demographic change and redistributing income. Singaporeans seem to be signalling they want a more responsive, perhaps more humble type of efficiency – although it’s unlikely the “new normal” wants to trade in that efficiency for disorder.

As for comparisons with Canberra – well, I just don’t know where to start…

It's a light-hearted contest, and I'm already regretting taking umbrage, but I just can't help feeling that stereotypes are dangerous, however lightly meant.

Networked Cambodia?

Cambodian bloggers started to attract wider attention a few years ago. A recent commentary by Faine Greenwood, featured on the blog of one of the contributors it quotes, confirms that blogging is still (for the moment) providing a platform for expressing ideas and views that may be harder to articulate through conventional media. The drawback is still Cambodia’s very low Internet penetration (only 78,000 users according to the World Bank) – and its 78% literacy rate.

But many trends are pointing upwards. Bun Tharum quotes a figure approaching 60% for mobile phone usage among Cambodia’s population (and the ubiquity of mobile phone outlets in Cambodia would certainly seem to corroborate the growing popularity of this technology). Advertisers, he says, have also spotted the opportunity to increase the number of Internet consumers, and ads on Cambodian TV currently portray "youth hanging out at cafes with friends and using touch-screen phones to catch up on the news of the day over cups of coffee." Twitter use is increasing, and in May this year, BuddeComm noted "promising signs that the widespread introduction of wireless broadband services will see a long-term surge in growth" in the Internet sector. The use of social media networks is on the rise, although Phatry Derek Pan, a Cambodian-American blogger, cautions against automatically expecting that to translate into a politically focused “social media movement”.

Blogger Sopheap Chak argues that relatively humble mobile phone technology already provides a channel for "people who otherwise would have no voice" to pass on information and join social causes. She also acknowledges, however, that SMS message campaigns can be used for starkly nationalistic causes, as well as more progressive ones.   

Whatever its political possibilities, the mobile phone has already proved itself to be a technology that offers economic opportunity across the board. If it can chip away at some of Cambodia's inequalities, that will already be a substantial achievement.

Remembering Vann Nath

Vann Nath passed away yesterday. He was one of the very few to survive the infamous Khmer Rouge prison that was set up at Tuol Sleng, a former high school in Phnom Penh. He was imprisoned there for exactly a year, starting in January 1978.

As he recounts in his book, A Cambodian Prison Portrait: One Year in the Khmer Rouge's S-21, he escaped death because his jailers needed him to paint pictures of Pol Pot. Later, after the Khmer Rouge were driven from power, he depicted the barbarity that was the daily routine at S-21. He wrote his memoir, and he helped to set up the museum at Tuol Sleng.

The history of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia must be one of the sorriest episodes of the Cold War, and whatever eventually comes of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, there will be many – not only inside but also outside Cambodia – who will never face any kind of formal justice.

Vann Nath testified at the tribunal, but his book was written long before, in 1998. It closes:

"Pot Pot died unpunished, without ever having to answer for his deeds. And perhaps the surviving Khmer Rouge leaders will never be punished either. But one way or another, I believe there will be justice. A person harvests what he has sown. According to the Buddhist religion, good actions produce good results, bad actions produce bad results. The peasant harvests the rice, the fisherman catches the fish. Pol Pot and his henchmen will harvest the actions they committed. They will reap what they have sown."

Those who suffered from the long and complex ramifications of the Khmer Rouge interlude may still have to rely on this kind of comfort for quite some time.

Burma/Myanmar round-up

The last few weeks have provided an interesting snapshot of the Myanmar/Burma debate. The following makes no pretence of being an exhaustive listing, but it certainly flags the themes:

At the end of July, Bunn Nagara highlighted ASEAN’s continuing struggle with the problem that just won’t go away: “Naypyidaw is claiming 'mission accomplished' and is about to collect on its Asean chairmanship. Suddenly, a very subjective judgment on its political reforms has to decide on the objective prospect of its Asean chair”. Given the widely differing sets of expectations and demands, Tin Maung Maung Than agrees that ASEAN’s “review mission carries a heavy burden in ‘assessing’ Myanmar’s ‘commitment to the principles of ASEAN’”, and hopes for a solution that will be beneficial for both Myanmar and ASEAN: “Otherwise, there is a possibility that Myanmar would come to believe that its quest for the ASEAN Chair is turning into a game of musical chairs in which the music is not indigenous to the grouping.”

Debate on Burma/Myanmar is notoriously subject to polarization. The pragmatic strand that is willing to countenance the usefulness even of small steps has been very detectable all year. Examples from the middle of August include Joshua Kurlantzick’s wondering (with every due caveat) whether there are “signs of change in Burma?”, given the presence of some “optimistic signals”, and the BBC’s reference to “several recent signs that the nominally civilian government is trying to change its hardline image” (18 Aug). Bunn Nagara agrees, again very cautiously: “Political reconciliation in Myanmar is still a long way off, but there are visible efforts all-round of getting there.” He is fully aware of the lack of confidence on all sides that impedes progress, and remarks: “So far, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa is in no rush to visit Myanmar, perhaps mindful of how such a visit could be interpreted as premature endorsement of Naypyidaw. Holding off a visit could work as another spur for continued reform” (21 Aug).

Kyaw Kyaw, in a piece at New Mandala, again steers well clear of unbridled optimism, but argues that “the early signs are actually more promising than is widely realised”, even though “the majority of people remain disengaged” (23 Aug). The change theme is to the fore in a Reuters piece, too, if a little more grudgingly: “Diplomats, political analysts and many Burmese interviewed inside Myanmar say the retired generals brought back to power after a controversial election last year now appear to realize some moves toward reform could be the key to their survival” (26 Aug). Kavi Chongkittavorn predicts “extensive engagements and commitment” over the next few weeks as Myanmar tries to convince both ASEAN and the UN that it is moving in the right direction. Kavi suggests that the inclusion of Aung San Suu Kyi, “in whatever capacity”, in the official Burmese delegation to the Bali Summit would provide “a win-win situation” for all (29 Aug). (I can’t help wondering whether this is akin to those high-stakes, pre-stacked challenges that are often laid out for ASEAN: If [fill in target] doesn’t [fill in really difficult task] then this will show that it is [fill in undesirable adjective]. But maybe not…)

But there is still a strong strand of activism and commentary that sets the bar very high for any progress to be declared in Myanmar, and wholly distrusts anything that implies accommodation. Commentators who try to take a nuanced line on Burma/Myanmar (and nuanced is the word – it’s hard to find serious commentators who defend it) again came in for some hard and angry criticism this month (22 and 23 Aug).

Meanwhile, Baroness Kinnock, Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Democracy in Burma, in the British Parliament, warns that “Thein Sein is back with Plan B, a new charm offensive designed to create the impression of change, while so far not making any actual changes at all” (31 Aug). And Asian Tribune reports a statement by the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, and notes: “Following a series of meetings with Myanmar’s government officials and political opposition leaders, the [UN] Special Rapporteur also described the possible expansion of political space and welcomed the creation of Parliamentary committees to tackle human rights issues in Myanmar. Regardless of whether or not such developments take shape, a mechanism should be set up to investigate possible war crimes and crimes against humanity. Justice and accountability should not be sidestepped by the ‘potential’ for improvements in the political sphere” (1 Sep).

Joshua Kurlantzick brings us back full circle, citing a court sentence for “subversion” as “not exactly a sign of a Burmese spring” (31 Aug).

One thing certainly doesn’t change about Myanmar/Burma – its capacity to divide.

What's history for?

In this Asia Foundation piece on teaching history in Viet Nam, I was struck by this quote from historian Pham Quoc Su: “It is time to throw away the old way of thinking about history as simply about galvanizing national pride … because history also contains the history of the world, because it must speak of the bitter truths that should not be studied but from which lessons must be drawn for future generations, or truths that have been buried which now must be recovered”.

At primary school in the British Isles, I was taught that Francis Drake was a hero. I later learnt from Spanish students many very different epithets... In Southeast Asia, too, in recent years, the “historically dubious”, the “poison” lurking in some of the history textbooks, has proved politically costly. The region more than ever needs the contextualizing influence of history – but the focus needs to be on what unites, rather than on what divides.