Pick of the month -- 2 -- changing views on ASEAN

Slowly but surely, a new song is being sung about ASEAN these days. Maybe it’s Indonesia’s able leadership; maybe it’s the pressure of global economic headaches, which suddenly make different forms of regionalism look more attractive; maybe it’s the signs of hope in Myanmar; maybe it’s the perceived cold winds blowing down from China – whatever the reason, the tone seems to be changing. There is less emphasis on ASEAN’s (manifest) defects, and more emphasis on what it can offer.

I commented on The Economist’s two days ago. But Shekhar Shah (16 Oct) also argues, “ASEAN has had considerable experience in coordinating policy responses and domestic policy choices, both those that have been successful and those that have failed. Asian members should bring this experience to the G20. ASEAN’s durability and openness to change presents an opportunity for the Asian G20 members to bring this ASEAN spirit to the G20. This will equip the G20 to be effective over the generation that will be required to rebuild the global economic order.”

Maria Monica Wihardja (12 Nov) captures the prevailing tone, writing that ASEAN’s “stability as an institution for over 44 years and its visible maturing over this time is testimony that ASEAN serves as a regional power-broker and conciliator. Its maintenance of a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ in the region by avoiding the hegemony of any power also supports a successful and fluid regionalism, including the emergence of fora like the EAS… A sense of community, solidarity and unity — ASEAN’s greatest offering — must not be lost; it must be promoted beyond the organisation. Asia is one of a handful of regions that remain economically prosperous, peaceful and socially stable, and every effort must be made to maintain it this way.”

While forecasting no easy road ahead, Awidya Santikajaya (14 Nov) comments: “Before the American and European crises, ASEAN was discredited because of its ineffectiveness, lack of commitment to becoming a supranational body and lax rules. But, now ASEAN is praised as a comfort vehicle for regionalism.”

And Teuku Rezasyah (23 Nov), a researcher at the Indonesian Center of Democracy, Diplomacy and Defense, tells the Jakarta Post that ASEAN has shown itself to be “bonafide, credible and acceptable to the West” during Indonesia’s chairmanship. “ASEAN,” he is quoted as saying, “has successfully made the US think over whether they want to continue criticizing Myanmar and push it even closer to China [...] or invite Myanmar to learn together with ASEAN how to be a modern democratic country”.

Such a change in the dominant tone is long overdue. ASEAN, as I have posted before, has in the past received far more than its fair share of pillorying and pummelling.

But narratives are fickle. ASEAN is flavour of the month at the moment. But it could find itself back in the firing line for a number of reasons.  

One is strategic. As ASEAN defence ministers stressed in their recent meeting (25 Oct), they want to forge ahead with cooperation, and undertake “more concrete actions” in key areas like disaster relief, peace-keeping, and military industry cooperation. But mention of the South China Sea brings the following proviso from Indonesian Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, chairman of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting: “We know what we don’t want in our Political-Security Community. We don’t want to be a military pact; we don’t want to do anything against any outsider; we don’t want to use force.” It is not difficult to imagine, however, the kinds of voices that might want to challenge this pragmatic and centrist stance.

Economically, too, there are two distinct “truths” that need careful balancing. On the one hand, ASEAN’s economic integration efforts have often been too readily dismissed. Yet while all the dismissing has been going on, progress has been happening on the ground. Luke Hunt (16 Nov) notes “a dawning in the Western conscious that ASEAN will economically integrate as a community by 2015, opening their economies to free trade in goods, services and investments, encompassing a population of about 500 million people”. It is interesting how often the business press already refers to “ASEAN” as a unit. Indeed, growing de facto regionalism in and beyond ASEAN is one of the reasons a recent report by the Asia Society concludes that the US “should renew and deepen engagement” with East Asia as a whole, and pushes for “a new US diplomacy with ASEAN”.

On the other hand, ASEAN's “growing integration”, while real, is still very much a work in progress – even “wishful thinking” for some. Non-tariff barriers and labour mobility remain substantial stumbling-blocks. For some domestic constituencies, economic integration within ASEAN, let alone across a wider area, where bigger and/or more developed players hold substantial influence, is hard to swallow. As a BBC report (24 Oct) notes, “ASEAN leaders are quick to point out that the benefits they get from a strong economic relationship with China are far more advantageous than isolating one of the world's strongest economies, and an increasingly important world power”, and ASEAN Secretary General Surin highlights the decreasing trend of the China-favourable trade balance. But there are plenty of vested interests who will want to defend their turf, and there are plenty of ideological opponents, too, who resent that ASEAN is “continuously used as a tool to implement the global capitalism agenda”.

And free trade is itself becoming another potential divider of the Asia-Pacific region, in a way that will also test ASEAN and its loyalties. Two trade initiatives are currently offering alternatives to APEC: the US-favoured Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the China-favoured ASEAN+* initiative. These may prove ultimately cooperative. But until that cooperation is realized, the differently envisioned trade concepts also have the capacity to carry strategic messages. This – along with multiple domestic considerations – may account for Indonesian President SBY’s “cold” response to the TPP.

So, ASEAN is enjoying something of a discursive high at the moment. But in attempting to chart the path that is best for SEA and its wider environment (as opposed to best for some other individual players), it could very easily find itself – unfortunately – back in the position of political punch-ball.

[*ADDED 29/11: China was initially associated with an ASEAN+3-based East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA), arguing that a (Japanese-associated) East Asia Summit-based Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) might be a potential eventual follow-up. Shekhar suggests that China's “exclusion from the TPP offers a common point for them to actively pursue quicker implementation of CEPEA”.]

The Europe turn-around

Fascinating to read The Economist's take on the recent round of ASEAN summitry (18 Nov). This is not a paper that has always been sympathetic to ASEAN. So it's interesting to see this Banyan writer expounding on the reasons ASEAN was never able to plunge down the European path (even while it acknowledged Europe's achievements), and concluding that we should “expect ASEAN to stay loose, broad, and talkative. Endless summits don’t necessarily have to result in an ever-closer union, thank goodness.”

There are two things here. What a good job, firstly, that ASEAN has always politely resisted the heavy pressure from many academics and other observers to “become like Europe faster”. ASEAN is a lumbering old thing, and exceedingly frustrating at times, but Europe's traumas certainly illustrate that conservatism in region-building is not always a bad thing.

And this piece also illustrates the speed with which things are changing in SEA this year. In light of the European fire-storm, my piece a couple of months ago, inspired in part by work earlier in the year with Indonesian students, seems almost quaint.

But the wheel will no doubt turn. Europe (we all sincerely hope) will find a way out of its problems. Maybe this way will involve the deeper integration of a limited number of core states. Maybe the calls for ASEAN to learn from its European cousin will one day fire up again. Then it will be time to learn all over again that regionalisms are not all the same.

Pick of the month -- 1

One of the perils of an only spasmodically connected road trip is the pile of info that has to be sorted when you return. But there are bonuses. A month’s hindsight makes some stories stand out very clearly. Here are some key contenders:

• Rizal Sukma (18 Oct) gives an excellent run-down on the impact of three domestic factors on Indonesia’s quest for a greater role on the world stage.
• Amitav Acharya (18 Oct) cogently outlines another of ASEAN’s many dilemmas – how can it succeed in “courting Washington without hurting Beijing”? Although ASEAN has to date proved adept at pulling off a sophisticated balancing act among the major powers, the US’s renewed vocal focus on the Asia-Pacific will make the Association’s task harder, not easier. As Acharya argues: “America should listen carefully. There may be a possible disconnect between how some in the United States see its role, and the views of key ASEAN members about how the United States should behave in the region… In resisting Beijing’s assertiveness, ASEAN has to think very carefully about how far it might want to go to seek America’s involvement, especially when it comes to security in the South China Sea. Courting Washington without hurting Beijing will be a daunting challenge.”
• The Interpreter has recently published a number of pieces urging Australians to embrace their immediate neighbourhood more enthusiastically. Attending a writing course in Melbourne recently, I was totally underwhelmed (and baffled) by the lack of interest in SEA as a region, so I think these pieces are tackling a very genuine problem:
• Mark Carroll, director of the Australian-Thai Chamber of Commerce, kicks off by noting (25 Oct): “Damning for Australian business is that it has largely failed to recognise the importance of the Thai economy. Most Australians still see Thailand through the prism of beaches, bars and pretty girls. The US, China, Japan and Korea — among others — have moved past this perception of Thailand. It is a serious business destination for them. Australian businesses should follow their lead.”
• But Michael Wesley (2 Nov) also wonders whether “our schools teach our kids anything about Southeast Asia”, and Tim Lindsey (4 Nov) comments: “It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Australians want returns from Asia without putting effort into it… We, alone of all Western countries [well, there is New Zealand…], are located in one of the most exciting and stimulating parts of the world, with fabulously rich artistic traditions and cutting-edge modern cultures. Asia is funky! It is a place to love and be stimulated by, not to loathe and fear. It is deeply sad that we are missing out on this, and strangling ourselves with parochialism.” Amen to that.
• Meanwhile, Bangkok Pundit (31 Oct) examines the politics behind Thailand’s floods, and Steven Rood (2 Nov) charts events in the southern Philippines over recent months, and warns of the dangers of failing to make demonstrable progress in peace talks.
• And because I’m always working myself up about stereotypes of Singapore, it was nice to see this by Sharon Chen (24 Oct).

Ind(ones)ia

I’m just back from my second India trip, more enthused about the country and its potential than ever, and determined to follow its relations with SEA more closely.

I didn’t have time to be glued to the press, which – as in all large countries – exhibits a strong domestic focus, but notable international stories voiced:

• More of the predictable speculation on India-China-US power equations;
• Frustration at the imposition by a range of countries of travel warnings during the Divali period;
• Suspicion of Commonwealth attempts to call the shots on human rights;
• Pride at the successful running of the first Formula 1 (preceded in the papers and on the streets by a substantial amount of advertising, together with lengthy explanations of the finer points of motor racing);
• Disappointment over India’s poor showing on tourist arrivals, compared with, say, Thailand’s.

One of the things that struck me most about India this time round, however, was the parallel that exists with Indonesia. Both are proudly democratic, with strong underlying support for pluralism and human rights. Both see their size as an indication of their entitlement to carry more clout in the region and the world.

But both are still working through issues of infrastructure, poverty, corruption, and law enforcement that sometimes undermine their credentials not only in the eyes of foreign observers but also in the eyes of their own citizens. Both have large majorities following a particular religion, and the virtues of pluralism and tolerance are regularly challenged. In neither are insurgencies a thing of the past. Both have ethnically similar smaller neighbours, with whom relations (albeit for very different reasons) are strained and emotional.

And both are strongly nationalistic. This trait makes them awkward partners at times, as justifiable pride easily translates into tetchiness. But it also constitutes a kind of vaccine against unequivocally aligning with, and/or being pushed around by, any one particular ideological camp.

Democratic but different, both demonstrate a complexity that militates against dangerous dualities. This is a sign of hope in a time of worrying polarization.